





 Migration Control and Access 
to Welfare 
Over the past decades, European states have increasingly limited irregular
migrants’ access to welfare services as a tool for migration control. Still, irregular 
migrants tend to have access to certain basic services, although frequently of 
a subordinate, arbitrary, and unstable kind. Drawing on in-depth ethnographic 
fieldwork conducted in Norway, this book sheds light on ambiguities in the state’s 
response to irregular migration that simultaneously cut through law, policy, and 
practice. Carefully examining the complex interplay between the geopolitical 
management of territory and the biopolitical management of populations, the 
book argues that irregularised migrants should be understood as  precariously 
included in the welfare state rather than simply excluded. The notion of precarious 
inclusion highlights the insecure and unpredictable nature of the inclusive 
practises, underscoring how limited access to welfare does not necessarily 
contradict restrictive migration policies. Taking the situated encounters between 
irregularised migrants and service providers as its starting point for exploring 
broader questions of state sovereignty, biopolitics, and borders,  Migration Control 
and Access to Welfare offers insightful analyses of the role of life, territory, 
and temporality in contemporary politics. As such, it will appeal to scholars of 
migration and border studies, gender research, social anthropology, geography, 
and sociology. 
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Setting the stage 
In December 2014 the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) told the story 
of Louila Tuban, a 31-one-year-old woman originally from the Philippines who 
came to Norway in 2010 as an au pair. Shortly after arrival, she suffered from 
acute renal failure. She received lifesaving treatment at a local hospital. However, 
no longer able to work as an au pair, she lost the grounds for her legal stay, but 
remained in the country. In Norway, patients with the same condition as Louila 
would normally be scheduled for a kidney transplant with a median waiting time 
of 40 days. Louila, however, was only offered dialysis, up to five times a week. 
This kept her alive, but after nearly five years on dialysis treatment, her doctors 
began to worry that her heart could not take the tough treatment anymore. Based 
on these medical considerations, she was granted a temporary residence permit of 
one year to receive a transplant. When it expired, she would again be required to 
leave the country. Yet, according to the transplant-performing hospital’s internal 
guidelines, only patients with a permanent residence permit would be eligible on 
the grounds that a transplant would require lifelong medication and follow-up. 
Shortly after Louila’s story was broadcasted, the hospital nevertheless decided to 
depart from these guidelines to allow her a kidney transplant, choosing to believe 
that the ‘immigration authorities would listen to a reasonable medical argument’
and grant her permanent residence ( Nilsen et al., 2014 ). In February 2015, Louila 
had the kidney transplant. By then her temporary permit had expired and her 
future status remained uncertain. 
I first became aware of Louila Tuban’s case when I was asked by NRK to com-
ment on it in one of their follow-up pieces. Her case aptly highlighted many of 
the themes emerging in my research on the provision of welfare to the so-called 
irregular migrants in Norway. For instance, her case clearly showed the ethical 
and practical dilemmas service providers face when the criterion of inclusion 
becomes legal status rather than need of treatment. Her case also draws attention 
to ambiguities in the state’s response to irregular migration, arising from the inter-
action and tension between welfare policy and entry control. More fundamen-
tally, though, Louila Tuban’s case raises a series of urgent and troubling questions 








extent can those excluded from membership in the nation-state, but who are still 
present within its territorial borders, be lives to be cared for? How is the decision 
to care for certain lives made? What role do frontline service providers play in (re) 
producing, defining, and negotiating state borders? 
In this book, I will address these questions through an ethnographic explora-
tion of the Norwegian welfare state’s attempts to deal with irregularised migrants’
basic needs for food, shelter, and healthcare. Norway, with its specific combina-
tion of a comprehensive and ambitious welfare state, humanitarian image, and 
rather strict immigration policies, provides a particularly interesting, although not 
unique, context for examining the interplay between the geopolitical management 
of territory and the biopolitical management of populations. 
 Bordering care 
The term ‘irregular migrant’ generally refers to migrants who enter or dwell on 
state territory without formal authorisation. Within the global system of territori-
ally sovereign states, the irregular migrant has become an increasingly problem-
atic figure as s/he ruptures the neat connections between territory and sovereignty, 
presence and membership, outside and inside, upon which this system rests. This 
rupture is very much evident in recent state efforts in Norway to distinguish 
between those lives, within state borders, that qualify for care and those that do 
not. This rupture also makes irregular migration an interesting lens through which 
to explore questions of state sovereignty and practices of care. 
According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, everyone 
has the right to ‘a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of him-
self and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and nec-
essary social services’. Yet, in today’s globalised world, the system of sovereign 
nation-states and the sovereign prerogative of denying membership still plays a 
key role in determining how basic social protection is distributed. As the present 
system of nation-states, and international law, builds on the idea that everyone 
should belong to a particular state, it follows that a person’s basic rights should 
be guaranteed by that state. In this sense, the system exempts states from the 
responsibility of caring for those not deemed to belong because their right to be 
protected and cared for lies ‘somewhere else’ irrespective of the major inequali-
ties that exist between states in terms of wealth and stability. Although certain 
concessions are made through international conventions for asylum seekers and 
those deemed to fulfil the requirements for refugee status, states’ right to control 
admission to state territory, including which and how many of the refugees are to 
be accepted, is generally recognised. 
The question of what obligations states owe to those whose presence is not 
legally accepted is more controversial ( Bosniak, 2006 ). While irregular migrants 
are theoretically entitled to internationally guaranteed standards of treatment with 
respect to human rights, their formal entitlements and effective access to basic 








in many cases entitlements have been severely restricted ( Karl-Trummer et al., 
2009 ). Over the past decades, several European countries, including Norway, 
have implemented measures that limit irregular migrants’ access to services as a 
way of compelling them to leave on their own. In the process, ‘illegal migrants’ as 
a category have increasingly been legally and discursively demarcated from asy-
lum seekers and ‘legal’ migrants, as well as formal citizens. Nevertheless, irregu-
lar migrants still tend to have access to certain basic welfare provisions. These 
include, to various degrees, access to healthcare, shelter, education, and workplace 
protection. These services may be provided by state institutions, municipalities, 
or NGOs sanctioned or even funded by the state. State approaches to its irregular 
population are as such often more ambivalent than commonly assumed. The aim 
of this book is to explore what is at stake in these limited practices of inclusion. 
The trouble with inclusion 
So far, most research on irregular migration has focused on the problem of exclu-
sion, highlighting repressive control practices. Indeed, much scholarship on 
irregular migration builds on the assumption that irregular migrants by definition 
are excluded members of society ( De Graauw, 2014 ). For example, many studies 
have been influenced by Hannah Arendt’s (1968 ) famous notion of ‘the right to 
have rights’, understood as the right to membership in a political community. As 
irregular migrants are deprived of this fundamental right, they are understood as 
‘absolutely rightless’ even though they may have access to some civic and social 
rights ( Parekh, 2004 ). Another and more recent source of inspiration is the work 
of Giorgio Agamben (1998 ) on sovereignty and bare life. Agamben locates sover-
eignty, not in the rule of law in a territory, as it has been understood traditionally, 
but in a decision on the (non-)value of life. Drawing on his work, several studies 
have approached irregular migrants as a modern example of a bare life unpro-
tected by law and exposed to arbitrary state violence ( Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 
2004 ;  Darling, 2009 ;  Kjærre, 2010 ). 
In this theoretical context, it may seem counterintuitive to explore practices 
of inclusion oriented towards irregular migrants. However, scholars have begun 
increasingly to challenge the focus on irregular migrants as simply a figure of the 
excluded, instead emphasising the conditionality of legal status and social and 
institutional processes of boundary making ( Goldring and Landolt, 2012 ;  Gonza-
les and Sigona, 2017 ). Stressing the multiple dimensions of the institutions of citi-
zenship, scholars have for example suggested that irregular migrants can develop 
other, more informal, forms of membership in the communities in which they live 
( Coutin, 2000 ) and challenge their political exclusion by acting as citizens ( Isin 
and Nielsen, 2008 ). Studies on the so-called bureaucratic incorporation have also 
pointed to professional and moral concerns of street-level bureaucrats to explain 
irregular migrants’ inclusion in a wide range of institutional arenas, including 
healthcare ( Marrow, 2012 ; Van der Leun, 2006 ). While this literature has tended 








started to examine more formal circuits of incorporation that stem from a tension 
between immigration law and other areas of law such as labour and welfare laws 
( Gleeson, 2016 ;  Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012 ; Abrego, 2011 ;  Gonzales, 
2011 ). 
In this book, I seek to further nuance discussions and understandings of irregu-
lar migrants’ inclusion/exclusion by interrogating the complex interplay between 
welfare policy and migration control in Norway. While the various explorations 
of irregular migrants’ exclusion and limited inclusion mentioned so far have been 
highly perceptive, there is often an underlying assumption that inclusion is a 
straightforward solution to the injustice caused by exclusion. As such, they openly 
or implicitly evoke the progressivist assumptions embedded in the notion of citi-
zenship and rights, thus risking to underplay the power relations associated with 
it. For example, while social participation and informal inclusion may importantly 
challenge migrants’ political exclusion, political exclusion still shapes their inclu-
sion. As cautioned by  De Genova (2013 ), incorporation in the labour market tends 
to take the form of ‘inclusion through illegalisation’. It is the migrants’ illegality 
that makes them desirable as cheap and flexible labour. Formal inclusion through 
granting social rights to the politically excluded also has it limits as irregular 
migrants still risk deportation when exercising these rights ( Noll, 2010 ). 
My contention is that irregular migrants’ exclusion/inclusion from welfare
should not necessarily be understood as contradictory processes, nor just in terms 
of a continuum, or a hierarchy. It is the simultaneity of practices of inclusion/exclu-
sion that produces irregular migrants’ precarious position in society. The stakes 
are both analytical and theoretical, which I aim to unpack throughout this book. 
Yet, the stakes are also ethical and political, and it is necessary to reflect on this 
before continuing. Critically analysing current inclusive practices towards irregu-
lar migrants is, as importantly noted by Ticktin (2011 ), not without its own dangers 
as it may risk undermining the limited support structures available to them. This 
is particularly so in a time characterised by a gradual hardening of the political 
discourse about migration. For many of the irregular migrants in my study, the lim-
ited and substandard access to services that they received was of vital importance, 
and the significance of this should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, I agree 
with researchers such as Fassin (2012 ) and Ticktin (2011 ), who have insisted on 
the importance of scrutinising what is at stake in inclusive practices, particularly 
if current practices are complicit in furthering structural inequalities. Moreover, 
I believe that it is critical that neither the social scientific gaze nor our political 
imagination is constrained by the apparent naturalness and givenness of a world 
divided into nation-states. Irregular migration is a product of the nation-state sys-
tem, global inequality, and increasingly strict immigration law. While regularisa-
tion, deportation, and rights without status are pragmatic approaches within the 
existing political and economic order to the presence of irregular migrants, they do 
not constitute a solution as they do not challenge or end the socio-legal production 
of migrant illegality. My concern in this book, though, is not the normative  ought 
to-question, of how irregular migration should be dealt with, but the how of the 









Precarious inclusion as strategy of government 
In the book, I propose that irregularised migrants in Norway should be understood 
as precariously included in the welfare state, rather than simply excluded. The 
notion of precarious inclusion is an attempt to capture what I see as a complex 
interplay between irregular migrants’ formal exclusion from the nation-state and 
their (limited) access to certain services aimed at ensuring their bodily survival. 
The term refers, on the one hand, to how the limited inclusive practices address 
the precariousness of migrants’ life through a minimalist management of survival 
and, on the other hand, to how the inclusion itself is precarious, that is, insecure 
and unpredictable. The inclusive practices thus protect exposed life and expose it 
at the same time. 
I understand precarious inclusion furthermore as a strategy of government in 
a Foucauldian sense, that is, as both intentional and non-subjective. According 
to Foucault (1979, 94–95), a strategy of government is intentional because no 
power is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. These are often highly 
explicit at the local level. Yet, it is also non-subjective because the overall out-
come cannot be understood as resulting from the choice or decision of an indi-
vidual or a group. Subsequently, the strategy can only be known through the realm 
of its effects ( Dean, 2010 , 269). As a strategy of government, precarious inclusion 
cannot therefore simply be read out of law, government policy documents, or 
statements but involves an exploration of practices and effects. 
The notion of precarious inclusion stems in part from field observations. In 
Norway, irregular migrants were not completely excluded from access to welfare, 
yet they were neither included on equal grounds nor did they receive the same 
standard of welfare. The care offered tended to be of an arbitrary and unstable 
kind, as I will detail in depth in the following ethnographic chapters. The notion 
is also informed by a particular theoretical discussion about sovereignty and bio-
politics inspired by the work of Agamben in his Homo Sacer-project. 1 This work 
by Agamben, as previously mentioned, has become a touchstone of many of the 
current discussions on irregular migration and their relation to the state in which 
they live. Yet the complexities and subtleness of his arguments are often not fully 
recognised. Particularly his concept of bare life has been rather simplistically 
reduced to a mere figure of abject exclusion ( De Genova, 2012 ). A major strength 
of Agamben’s work, as I see it, is that it encourages a questioning of the concepts 
that are so often taken for granted in contemporary politics, such as national sov-
ereignty, rule of law, and human rights. Furthermore, of importance for this book, 
his perspective intersects juridical power with biopolitics in a way that offers 
ways of rethinking what and where state borders are, and as such the ways in 
which the regulation of the population and that of state territory are intimately 
connected. 
Although Agamben’s work serves as a point of departure, my interest is nota-
bly different. Agamben offers a compelling metaphysical critique of the Western 
political tradition and its core concepts, whereas I hope to show how state sov-









processes of inclusion and exclusion. In exploring the interplay between practices 
of care and the production and maintenance of state borders, I critically engage 
Agamben’s retheorisation of sovereignty to see how it can inform an ethnographic 
enquiry of state sovereignty, as well as how the knowledge produced by ethnogra-
phy might advance and nuance the discussions. The notion of precarious inclusion 
is, in this sense, an attempt to move on, conceptually, from Agamben’s inclusive 
exclusion through which irregular migrants can be analysed as the state’s consti-
tutive outside, to address how states try to govern irregular migration through the 
intersection of exceptional measures and the normal workings of state institutions. 
As such, I am concerned with less spectacular expression of sovereign exception-
alism than those generally explored in the literature inspired by Agamben. 
Before introducing the study and the Norwegian context, I will give a brief 
outline of the theoretical discussions that guide the analysis in the subsequent 
chapters and how they inform my understanding and usage of the notion of pre-
carious inclusion. My aim is not to give a full overview or try to overcome all 
the theoretical contradictions that exist in these theoretical discussions, but to 
highlight some analytical perspectives and tensions that contribute to the follow-
ing analyses. There are particularly three interrelated themes in the discussions 
that I focus on, and which lie in the background for the argument developed, and 
which structure the book. These are the role of life, territory, and temporality in 
contemporary politics. 
The place of life in contemporary configurations of power
One of the main questions explored in this book, as previously stated, is the 
extent to which, and the ways in which, people excluded from membership in 
the nation-state, but who are still present within its territorial borders, are lives to 
be cared for. This question raises other related issues such as: What is life? What 
does it mean to care for lives? The answers to these questions are not necessarily 
straightforward. In the case of Louila Tuban, for example, it is possible to see how 
her physical body was kept alive through dialysis, although she was not initially 
healed, nor was she allowed to work, study, or marry. The irregularised migrants 
that I met during fieldwork frequently used the disparity between being ‘alive’
and ‘living’ to explain their experiences. By this, they were referring to the state 
of biological survival while at the same time they were not allowed to fulfil their 
potential in ways they found meaningful. 
The question ‘what is life’ and the place life holds in contemporary politics 
have been the subject of considerable academic discussions. One of the main 
influences has been the work of Foucault on biopolitics ( Foucault et al., 2003 ; 
Foucault et al., 2007 ). To Foucault, biopolitics emerged in Western societies in 
the 18th century, representing a shift whereby the modern state started to gain its 
legitimacy from the protection of life (biopower) rather than the threat of death 
(sovereign power). Although this shift involved increasing state intervention in 
human life, it also resulted, according to Foucault, in life itself becoming the 









of biopolitics, Foucault thus identifies the emergence of a contemporary rights 
discourse centred on claims about the right to health, happiness, and satisfac-
tion of needs rather than protection from the sovereign ( Wells, 2011 ). Such rights 
claims are articulated both in the UN declaration of Human Rights and the welfare 
states’ expansions of social rights. Hence, the life that came to be cared for in the 
biopolitical welfare states that developed during the 20th century, including the 
Norwegian welfare state, was the rights-bearing subject. 
The question of whether irregular migrants can be understood, and cared for, 
as rights-bearing subjects has been a central, and contested, topic in the literature 
on irregular migrants ( Bosniak, 2007 ;  Carens, 2008 ). Yet, in a Foucauldian per-
spective, rights are not a simple benefit, but also function as an administrative 
and regulatory tool. The lives that are cared for are therefore also lives that are 
governed. This perspective opens for the possibility of analysing the relation of 
irregular migrants to the state in which they live, not only in terms of inclusion or 
exclusion from rights but also according to how access to welfare is selectively 
applied as a regulating mechanism. 
Agamben in his work on bare life draws on and reformulates Foucault’s con-
cept of biopolitics, focusing primarily on its relation to sovereignty. To Agam-
ben (1998 ), biopolitics is not a distinctively modern form of power, or a separate 
entity from sovereign power, because sovereign power constitutes and is consti-
tuted by a decision on life from the very beginning. Agamben thus argues that 
Western politics, including its emancipatory resources such as rule of law, and 
human and citizens’ rights, have been flawed since Aristotle because they are 
predicated on dividing the human into bios (the manner in which life is lived) and 
zoē (the simple fact of life common to all living beings) ( Whyte, 2013 ). In the 
Greek polis, for example, one needed to be qualified beyond simply being alive 
to participate in political life. Conversely, what Agamben sees as characteristic of 
modern rule is how supposedly natural life begins to coincide with the political 
realm, producing a zone of indistinction between bios and zoē, law and life, inclu-
sion and exclusion. What emerges in this zone of indistinction is what Agamben 
calls bare life, a life that is included in bios through an act of exclusion. Bare life 
is thus importantly not a category of ontic politics but a product of this abstract 
division between bios and zoē in Western political thought ( Abbott, 2012 ). Yet, 
the key political problem of modernity is, according to Agamben (1998 , 11), how 
bare life has become both the subject and object of political power, both the place 
for the organisation of state power and emancipation from it. 
As I try to show here, Agamben provides a very distinct lens by which to exam-
ine the bodily protection of irregular migrants in Western welfare states from those 
who would frame it in terms of a (limited) success or failure of human rights, 
humanitarian values, or ideas of equality and human dignity inherent to the wel-
fare state project. By entwining sovereignty with the state’s new role of fostering 
life, Agamben draws attention to how state violence and care of life are intimately 
related. Moreover, to structure politics around the demand that the state protect 
bare life means to Agamben, as Whyte phrases it, ‘to sacrifice the possibility that 








of the fracture between ‘natural’ and ‘political’ life in Western political thought, 
thus, offers an entry point for analysing how provision of basic care to irregular 
migrants becomes entwined with a form of violence that reduces the value of life 
to mere subsistence, rather than the killing of life as such. 
This perspective also draws attention to the role of practices directed at caring 
for the survivability of the body in governing irregular migrants. Insightful writ-
ing in anthropology on the topic of biopolitics that engages Agamben’s work has 
for example highlighted how humanitarian reason has become an important force 
in contemporary European politics with particular significance for governing 
migration. The works of Ticktin (2011 ,  2016 ) and  Fassin (2012 ) on humanitarian 
government in France are particularly perceptive. They understand humanitarian-
ism not only as a social field of action defined and administered by NGOs but 
rather as a moral principle that grants human life absolute priority. Hence, while 
social welfare fosters citizens of nation-states, humanitarian government targets 
a universal humanity perceived and united in its suffering or ‘bareness’ ( Ticktin, 
2011 ). Still, as Ticktin (2011 ) found, even the suffering body, while purportedly 
universal, requires certain political, historical, and cultural attributes to render 
it visible and worthy of care. The ‘bare’ lives that are cared for in humanitarian 
government are thus those recognised as ‘victims’ rather than bearers of rights. 
Although Agamben’s work offers a compelling lens, it also has its limits, as 
Ticktin’s point shows. If biopolitics increasingly means reducing human life to a 
question of survival and necessities, how is it possible to explain the gradation of 
care offered to various lives on state territory, and how does this enable or inhibit 
different life projects? My central interest in this book is not simply to explore 
how irregular migrants are left legally unprotected but how and in what ways their 
bodily needs are still addressed by the welfare state despite their exclusion from 
the nation-state. How is it that an irregular migrant like Louila Tuban is kept alive 
(but not allowed to study, work, marry, etc.)? 
One of the main criticisms of Agamben’s work, particularly from black and 
feminist studies, is that it does not account for how power functions differentially 
( Butler, 2004 ; Weheliye, 2014 ). These scholars highlight the social and historical 
differentials of gender, race, and class, and their prominence in distinguishing 
between different values of life. Their critique is an important warning to those 
who interpret and apply Agamben’s work within critical border and migration 
research. While Agamben’s theory may enable evocative descriptions of the vio-
lence made possible by a particular legal experience, it does not allow for analysis 
of how and why certain lives are more exposed to this violence ( Whitley, 2017 ). 
Also, as Ong (2006) has argued, Agamben’s distinction between the protected life 
of the citizen and the expandable bare life can easily provide a too rigid and sim-
ple binary framework for research within the social sciences. Agamben’s migra-
tion research followers thus risk portraying irregular migrants as a monolithic 
category that is excluded and outside the law, even when analysed and understood 










Governing territory and population 
The precarity of irregular migrants, such as Louila Tuban, not simply is a con-
sequence of the limited support and recognition that they receive but also stems 
from the fact that their continuing presence on state territory is constantly under 
threat. Exploring irregular migrants’ access to welfare thus also involves address-
ing the role of territory in contemporary government, and particularly the role the 
notion of territory plays in valorising and distinguishing between lives. 
Control over people’s movement across state borders has generally been con-
sidered an integral part of state’s sovereignty. However, in migration and border 
studies, scholars have increasingly argued that migration control practices have 
shifted from more traditional forms of territorial control at the outer edges of the 
state to a more spatially mobile ‘management of populations’, focusing on the 
bodies of people on the move as a site of border policing. According to  Coleman 
(2012 , 403), the law, or more precisely, the production of legal disenfranchise-
ment, is crucial to this shift from territory to population. 
Coleman’s point resonates with  Foucault’s (2003 ) famous argument that the 
emergence of biopolitics represented a shift from a ‘territorial state’ to a ‘popula-
tion state’, that is from sovereignty to biopower. Sovereignty is here understood 
conventionally as the use of law to rule a specific territory. Territory, in this sense, 
is the foundation of the sovereign authority of the state. Yet, as argued for instance 
by Gupta (2012 ), the biopolitical concern with the people generally also presumes 
a territorial unit whose population is the object of either care or exclusion. Criti-
cal geographers engaging with Foucault’s work have further criticised the way 
territory is uncritically understood as a bounded space, arguing instead that it 
should be approached as the site, medium, and outcome of statecraft ( Brenner 
and Elden, 2009 ). Territory is, in this sense, a political technology for standardis-
ing, homogenising, and disciplining social and material reality, as well as an 
achievement that requires ongoing work. Territory is, in the context of this book, 
importantly a mechanism through which someone is customarily recognised as 
an insider or an outsider ( Brighenti, 2010 ). One central aspect of the increasing 
misalignment of territorial and legal borders, illustrated by Louila Tuban’s case, 
is, for example, that territorial presence no longer triggers access to legal rights or 
services typically envisioned as territorially distributed, such as healthcare. When 
migration control is emergent within states in the form of exclusion from welfare 
benefits, it tends to be justified in terms of the state’s right to regulate entry into 
its territory ( Bosniak, 1991 ). Hence, territory as an imaginary and legal mecha-
nism distinguishing between insider and outsider marked Louila as an intruder. 
In Louila’s case, healthcare providers’ decisions on treatment thus became condi-
tioned by the state’s attempt to maintain territorial sovereignty. 
The traditional geopolitical imagination of ‘container-borders’ has, even more 
than the concept of territory, been subject to re-examination in recent years. Etienne
Balibar, for example, has argued that the meaning of the term ‘border’ is chang-











little everywhere’ ( 2002 , 71). Hence, within border studies, there has been a shift in
attention from studying the material and physical dimensionality of borders towards
highlighting borders as socio-spatial constructions ( Van Houtum et al., 2005 ), and
borders as performed by and through the encounter between various actors ( Salter,
2008 ). In this perspective, restricting access to welfare services is not only a substi-
tute for exclusion at the border but is in itself a border(ing) practice.
Agamben’s retheorisation of sovereignty offers further ways to rethink the rela-
tions between territory and borders, as far more complex and differentiated than 
what is portrayed by more traditional notions of sovereignty. For example, his 
work draws attention to how state sovereign borders are about not only territorial 
ordering but also biopolitical ordering (Vaughan-Williams, 2009). By reconceptu-
alising the limits of sovereign power in terms of a decision about the (non-)value 
of life, state sovereign borders are linked to biopolitical decisions pertaining to 
who belongs to the population to be cared for rather than being understood as con-
tinuous linear structures enclosing a political territory. As such, the geographical 
expansion of borders does not mean that it necessarily materialises everywhere 
for everyone at all times, but that the attempt to preserve the function of state 
sovereignty involves a more dynamic delineation on state territory in terms of 
those who belong and those who do not belong ( Weber, 2006 ). Moreover, this per-
spective suggests that state borders not only are delocalised but also potentially 
blurred, as biopolitical and territorial borders are not necessarily coterminous. 
The temporalities of power relations 
The importance of temporality to sovereignty and biopolitics has been less 
explored than the spatial dimensions. Yet, Louila Tuban’s case, and the way it 
developed, clearly illustrates how time matters. For example, as time passed, it 
became more difficult for the doctors to justify denying her a new kidney and after 
nearly five years on dialysis, she received the transplant even though her legal 
situation had not become more predictable. In the following years, she would only 
receive temporary permits of one year, spaced by intervals without permits. Thus, 
she continued to live with the uncertainty of whether, and how long, she would 
be able to remain and receive the vital medical follow-up, as well as restrictions 
on what she could do while in Norway. Despite her difficult situation, Louila was 
still, in some ways, fortunate compared to many of the irregularised migrants I 
met during fieldwork. She had a local support network and a Norwegian fiancé, 
who was a well-known local musician with a broad network. In the summer of 
2017, she finally got the permit that allowed her to settle in Norway. 
Louila’s case, however, not only illustrates how situations may change over 
time but also draws attention to the temporalities involved in governing irregular 
migration. Temporalities are integral to power relations, yet not always in the same 
ways or with the same implications. I use temporalities in the plural to highlight 
precisely how different temporalities, and the tension between them, are central 
to governing irregular migration. Biopolitics, for example, is temporal in that it 






contributed to structuring and standardising a ‘normal’ life cycle through attach-
ing formal rules, rights, and obligations to chronological and biological life stages 
( Pinto, 2016 ). Yet, it is not simply the individual human taken care of from begin-
ning to end that is the concern of biopolitics but the population over time, within 
which individual life is just a transitory moment ( Braun, 2007 ). It is the future 
well-being of the collective social body of the nation-state that is the main concern. 
Hence, care of life is based or distributed on the basis of not just ‘past rights’ won 
but future potentiality ( Povinelli, 2011 ). Concern for the future well-being of the 
collective body thus contains a mechanism for distinguishing between which lives 
should be invested in and which lives can be neglected. 
Sovereignty as a decision on the exception is temporal, I suggest, in that it 
imposes a particular temporality, one that accentuates uncertainty and unpredict-
ability for certain lives. While the state of exception has mostly been explored in 
spatial terms, as ‘a piece of territory that is placed outside the normal juridical 
order’ to use Agamben’s words ( 2000b , 40), it can also be approached as a tempo-
ral structure of indefinite temporariness, as what was supposed to be a temporary 
state of emergency is normalised. A state of exception designates further a state 
of uncertainty in which activities of ordinary life become subsumed with con-
cerns about immediate survival. This provides a particular temporal frame for the 
administration of care. As noted by  Brun (2016 ), ‘there is no future in humani-
tarianism’, referring to how humanitarian action primarily aims for temporary 
solutions even in protracted situations. 
For irregular migrants, time is often conceptualised as indefinite temporariness 
through concepts such as ‘limbo’ and ‘liminality’. Migrants’ lives as such are seen 
to unfold within a ‘timeless present’ or ‘suspended time’ ( Griffiths, 2014 ). As ‘nor-
mal’ rhythms of time and life cycle become disturbed, migrants are thereby no 
longer seen as ‘in-time with others’ ( Khosravi, 2014 ).  Ramsay (2017 ,  2019 ), how-
ever, has criticised the tendency within migration scholarship to exceptionalise 
migrants’ time through concepts such as liminality. To place migrants in a different 
temporal reality from non-migrants, she argues, ignores the ways in which migrants 
share particular temporal rhythms with other people, and rests on assumptions that 
the ‘normal’ life of citizens is necessarily secure and stable. It further embeds an 
assumption of linearity onto the experiences of migrants’ life and implies that the 
condition of indefinite indeterminacy can be solved by the conferral of legal status. 
Ramsay (2019 ) proposes instead a focus on the shared uncertainty of migrants and 
citizens due to global capitalism and neoliberal restructurings. While I agree with 
her on the need to challenge simple binaries between migrants and citizens, and 
how certain frameworks normalise a particular temporal order, I also believe it is 
imperative to understand how state and market produce uneven temporal relations. 
Temporalities are in many ways central to the making of the difference between 
the state categories of ‘migrant’ and ‘citizen’.  Cohen (2015 ), for example, has 
shown how citizenship is patrolled through temporal formulas that confer various 
rights. This importantly shapes migrants’ relationship to the state, to the labour 
market, and to citizens in different ways. Moreover, as argued by  Sharma (2014 ), 

















allows for certain forms of interventions into people’s life. In Norway, I suggest, 
the notion that irregularised migrants are only temporarily present is central to the 
administration of care for this population. Temporalities do play an important role 
in differentiating within citizenship as well ( Anderson, 2019 ). Similarly, precari-
ous inclusion as a strategy of government is not necessarily exclusive to irregular 
migrants, although the mechanism of inclusion/exclusion within citizenship may 
be slightly different from for those excluded from citizenship. 
Exploring sovereign practices ethnographically 
The theoretical discussions outlined so far serve as a point of departure to criti-
cally examine practices of care, and how they relate to the valorisation of life, 
social rights, and the inside/outside of the state. An ethnographic approach in this 
context offers a way to investigate the conditional nature of sovereign practices 
by providing a disaggregated view of the state. According to  Gupta (2012 ), a 
disaggregated view makes it possible to understand how unintended outcomes are 
systematically produced by the friction between branches and levels that make 
up the state. Norway, which has tended to be characterised as having a strong 
statist tradition with a consensus-oriented, political-administrative system, also 
has an administrative system combining partly conflicting principles, values, and 
mixtures of different control devices, sometimes even located within the same 
institutions (Lægreid, 2003). As such, ethnography is particularly useful to shed 
light on how contradicting norms, knowledges, practices, and values assigned 
to various human categories can produce a range of contingent and ambiguous 
outcomes through which different degrees of care can be negotiated for the politi-
cally excluded. Yet, conducting such research has its own challenges. The follow-
ing example from my fieldwork illustrates some of these. 
Early in my fieldwork, I was conducting an interview with a doctor with whom
one of my interlocutors had been in contact. After introducing my study and ask-
ing my opening questions, the doctor turned the tables on me by asking, ‘How 
do you know if a person is illegal?’ Doctor Lars had been late for our appoint-
ment because, as he explained, he had been contacted by another doctor about a
patient he had referred and who turned out to be ‘illegal’. Doctor Lars, therefore,
hoped I could help him clarify this question.2 In Doctor Lars’ documents, the patient
was registered with a regular Norwegian personal identification number. However,
the patient, in one of his first appointments with the doctor at the specialist clinic,
revealed that he did not have legal residence. As such, he was not entitled to this
type of medical care. However, terminating treatment that had already begun could
do more damage and could conflict with professional ethical codes and knowledge
concerning safe medical conduct. Doctor Lars and the other doctor were therefore
in doubt about what they should do. I learned later from Doctor Lars that they even-
tually decided to end treatment in this case because the information came up in an
early session. Had it come up later, the outcome might have been different. 3 
Like Louila Tuban’s case, this example touches on many of the central topics 




   
 
Introduction 13 
implicated in migration control; how the configuration and enactment of the bor-
der not only is becoming a question of law but is also entangled with professional 
ethics and medical knowledge; and how irregular migrants’ access to healthcare is 
becoming insecure and negotiated. I bring this episode in here, however, because 
it also brings up some key methodological and ethical dilemmas when exploring 
sovereignty ethnographically. 
First, it draws attention to the difficulties of doing research involving an elusive 
and mobile population engaged in behaviour that is illegal from the point of view 
of the state. Irregular migrants are not easily identifiable to healthcare providers 
and researchers alike. This was not the only time during my fieldwork that health-
care providers with whom I came into contact asked me this question, and they 
were often unsure whether they had treated patients that were ‘illegal’. 
Second, the episode evokes the risk of reifying the category of ‘illegals’ and 
thus contributing to the surveillance of already stigmatised individuals when 
engaging in this type of research. As De Genova has importantly pointed out, 
‘by constituting undocumented migrants (the people) as an epistemological and 
ethnographic “object” of study, social scientists, however unwittingly, become 
agents in an aspect of the everyday production of those migrants’ “illegality” – in 
effect, accomplices to the discursive power of immigration law’ ( 2002 , 423). 
Research on irregular migration is a politically charged field, illustrated by the 
contested nature of the labels used to describe the migrants. Is the migrant illegal, 
irregular, undocumented, unauthorised, or something else? The different adjectives 
used tend to be associated with different political perspectives in polarised debates. 
‘Irregular’ is the term often used in European academic literature because it is seen 
as more neutral. In approaching Doctor Lars, I did not use the term ‘illegal’ ( ulov-
lig), but ‘irregular’ (irregulær), with ‘also referred to as undocumented (papirløs)4 
and people without legal residence (personer uten lovlig opphold)’ in brackets, as 
‘irregular migrant’ was not a known concept in Norway. This episode, however, 
may serve to illustrate that irrespective of the label used, it remains essentially a 
legal classification and carries the norm associated with immigration law. 
However, De Genova’s point just referred to goes beyond terminology. He sees 
it as ‘a central epistemological and conceptual problem, with significant method-
ological ramifications, ethical implications, and political repercussions’ ( 2002 , 
423). De Genova thus calls for a shift in attention away from concrete categories 
of ‘illegal’ migrants and towards a critical examination of how migrant ‘illegal-
ity’ is legally and politically produced in various contexts and over time. Here, he 
cites Susan B. Coutin’s research on Salvadoran immigrants’ legalisation struggles 
as a model. She describes her approach as ‘an ethnography of a legal process 
rather than of a particular group of people’ ( 2003 , 23). Along the same line, this 
book is not an exploration of a marginalised and excluded group but an anthro-
pological exploration of state sovereignty. Nevertheless, the ethical dilemmas of 
representation are still heavily present as it engages with a politically controver-
sial topic. Even by questioning and denaturalising the state’s production of illegal-
ity, when conducting ethnography, one is confronted with choices about what to 



























illegal, and one risks producing knowledge that the state can use to make the lives 
of those categorised as irregular migrants even more difficult. 
Introducing the study 
With the aforementioned dilemmas in mind, the book builds on ethnographic 
fieldwork of various intensities carried out in Bergen and Oslo, the two largest 
cities in Norway, between 2011 and 2018. The major part of the research was con-
ducted between October 2011 and October 2013 for my PhD, which was part of 
a larger umbrella project on the provision of welfare to irregular migrants (PRO-
VIR). I also draw on insights from five months of intensive fieldwork in Oslo in 
the autumn of 2017 related to a new multidisciplinary project on the temporalities 
of irregular migration (WAIT). 
Although my aim was not to study irregular migrants per se, recruiting them
as participants and following them in their daily activities was a key approach to
shedding light on state bordering practices and observing what service providers
and institutions ‘do’, and not only what they ‘say’. During my fieldwork, I spoke
and interacted with more than 100 migrants living irregularly in Norway. However,
the main source of data for this book comes from a core group of 15 with whom I
remained in contact over time, some of them for a period of several years. During this
time, I followed them, in the sense of having multiple encounters and conversations,
accompanying them in their various daily activities, including on a few occasions
to appointments to doctors and lawyers, getting access to their medical journals,
and interviewing the service providers with whom they had been in contact. The
group of 15 was highly varied; it included families with children as well as single
adults, both male and female. They were predominantly from sub-Saharan Africa
and the Middle East. While in the larger set of interlocutors, there were people with
various pathways into irregularity, within the core set, all had at some time applied
for asylum in Norway. Their time in Norway varied from 2 to 20 years. Contacts
with irregular migrants were made in various ways: through the healthcare centre
for undocumented migrants in Oslo, through NGOs and activists, gatekeepers in
ethnic communities, and at public events organised for and by irregular migrants. I
volunteered once a week for three months in 2012 at Robin Hood-huset, a meeting
place for those facing financial difficulties in Bergen, and I was present in the open-
ing hours of the volunteer-run healthcare centre for undocumented migrants in Oslo
once a week for six weeks in 2012 and four months in 2017.
Throughout the fieldwork, I also conducted interviews and had conversations 
with approximately 15 NGO employees and 50 public care providers, including 
nurses, doctors, social workers, and administrative personnel. Although, partici-
pant observation and interviews are considered the core of ethnographic research, 
it is increasingly recognised as insufficient for capturing the complexities of social 
relations, especially when one conducts ethnographic research among loosely 
connected actors who may not even know one another ( Feldman, 2011 ). Thus, in 
addition to following migrants in their various activities and encounters with those 
who came to represent the state in daily situations, I also followed the topics that 








regulations, consultation papers and guidelines, government press releases, com-
missioned reports, etc.). Conducting my research as part of an interdisciplinary 
research project comprising legal scholars and social anthropologists (PROVIR) 
was a great advantage when navigating and unfolding the implications of law in 
this study. Still, I treat the legal sources above all as ethnographic. Here, I follow 
Coutin and Fortin, in conceiving of ethnography as more than a research method, 
and instead as ‘a way of seeing, or a type of account dedicated to representing and 
explicating social and cultural realities that may be encountered in multiple ways’
( 2015 , 71). The approach of following people and the topics emerging in these 
encounters, in various texts with an aim to explicate state policies, is reflected in 
the structure of several of the ethnographic chapters. 
The ‘good’ welfare state as a context 
The Norwegian welfare state offers a particular context for understanding how 
and to what extent irregularised migrants’ lives are cared for. Norway, along with 
its Nordic neighbours, has been the object of significant interest both among 
academics and in international political circles for its combination of economic 
success and a comprehensive welfare system ( Andersen et al., 2016 ). Repeat-
edly topping international rankings of quality of life and happiness, the Nordic 
welfare states have been considered as successful and inclusive projects, creating 
conditions for equality and material security found hardly anywhere else in the 
world ( Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012 ; Vike, 2004 ). The comparatively high 
standard of welfare and care offered to the general population, though, has not 
been extended to include irregularised migrants. In fact, the Norwegian welfare 
state does not necessarily stand out as particularly generous or caring towards 
irregularised migrants. For example, countries such as France, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands grant more extensive rights to healthcare to irregularised migrants 
than Norway does ( Melberg et al., 2018 ). 
Researchers examining how migrant ‘illegality’ has been experienced in Swe-
den have suggested that in strong welfare states where large parts of social life are 
regulated through the state, migrant ‘illegality’ means an even harsher everyday 
life than in countries with weaker welfare systems ( Khosravi, 2010 ;  Sigvardsdotter, 
2013 ). Here, they refer in particular to the strict control systems represented by the 
use of a personal identification number supported by a central population register. 
In the Nordic countries, this number is required for most administrative purposes 
(tax, health and social services, passport, driver’s licenses, etc.). It is also needed in 
contact with many private actors, such as banks and insurance companies. 
Another aspect mentioned in the academic literature is the comparatively regu-
lated labour market and small informal sector ( Düvell, 2010 , 4). While deregula-
tions and a rise in subcontracting have contributed to the growth of the informal 
sector in certain areas (cleaning, construction, restaurants), the assumption has 
been that this sector to a larger extent employs migrants from the European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA) ( PU, 2017 ). Although Norway is not a member of the European 
Union, it is part of the common European labour market, in which all EEA citi-








states. The EU enlargement to the east in 2004 thus gave Norwegian employers 
access to a large reservoir of labourers who came from countries with wages that 
were considerably lower than Norwegian wages. While intra-EEA migrants may 
also find themselves in an irregular situation due to insecure employment and 
income ( Misje, 2020 ; Thorbjørnsen, 2020 ), irregular migration to Norway has 
generally been associated with migration from non-European countries. As such, 
it has been linked to asylum migration and refusal rates rather than demand for 
(precarious) labour. The geographical location of the Nordic region in relation 
to the main migration flows into Europe has therefore also been used, together 
with the relative high levels of regulation of welfare and labour, to explain the 
comparatively low numbers of irregular migrants, and relatively late political and 
academic interest in the issue ( Jørgensen and Meret, 2012 ). 
Estimations of the size of the irregular population are difficult to make and tend 
to be unreliable, with different estimates often used to support or challenge par-
ticular political frames ( Stenum, 2012 ;  Koser, 2010 ). In Norway, estimated fig-
ures of non-EU migrants living irregularly have ranged between 5,000 to 56,000, 
although the lower range of these estimates (10,000–20,000) seems to have most 
support both from NGOs in the field and the police ( Zhang, 2008 ;  Mohn et al., 
2014 ;  PU, 2017 ). While the numerical significance of irregular migrants cannot 
be said to be great, even in a country of slightly more than 5 million inhabit-
ants, political attention has been substantial during the past two decades. Issues 
related to irregular migration have featured prominently in the media and have 
been subject to several policy initiatives and changes ( Ihlen and Thorbjørnsrud, 
2014 ;  Johansen et al., 2013 ). In this regard, it is relevant to consider not only how 
the particular arrangements and institutions of the welfare state affect irregular 
migration but also how the particular norms and values considered to underpin 
the Nordic model, and as such the national self-image, affect the states’ treatment 
of irregular migrants. 
In the Nordic context, the welfare state is generally seen as constituting an 
important component of national identity ( Vike, 2004 ) and as somewhat of a 
brand positioning the Nordics in the world ( Marklund, 2017 ). The ‘Nordic model’
in this context is seen as an expression of a particular approach to welfare defined 
in terms of the broader objectives or norms that inform policies, rather than as a 
fixed set of policies or institutions ( Kuhnle and Kildal, 2005 ). The key norms are a 
commitment to social and economic equality through an equitable distribution of 
material resources, rather than simply alleviation of poverty, and universal stan-
dards of entitlement, rather than means-tested benefits. Entitlements thus tend to 
be institutionalised via social rights and financed by progressive taxation. As the 
strong commitment to equality in the Nordic countries has been considered as to 
equality of outcomes or condition, and not only equality of opportunity or status 
(Lister, 2009), poverty has tended to be seen as deeply disturbing ( Barker, 2017 ; 
Engebrigtsen, 2015 ). Furthermore, the commitment to equality has been associ-
ated with a disapproval of differentiated rights regimes ( Nielsen, 2016 ). 
Public responsibility for welfare is also considered a key characteristic of the 








welfare, and a way to enable individual autonomy and independence. The Nordic 
countries have thus often been characterised as ‘state friendly’, with research con-
tinuing to show a very high degree of trust in the capacity and the desirability of 
the state to solve problems ( Wollebæk et al., 2012 ;  Henriksen et al., 2018 ). Hence, 
in comparison to other welfare states, the Norwegian state tends to play a larger 
role as a provider of welfare in contrast to more informal arrangements through 
family, private organisations, or the market (Jacobsen, 2015). 
Research has, of course, complicated and nuanced this picture of the Nordic 
countries. Anthropologists, for example, have long problematised exclusivist 
aspects of Nordic egalitarianism evident in the way these countries have dealt with 
cultural difference, suggesting that the strong commitment to equality in these 
countries comes with a demand for ‘sameness’ or cultural conformity ( Gullestad, 
2002 ). Nordic integration policy and discourse, for example, has increasingly come 
to emphasise the ability to conform to ‘Nordic’ social norms and cultural values 
( Olwig, 2011 ). Migrants are thus problematised in a particular way that produces 
and reinforces an asymmetrical relationship between majoritised and minoritised 
populations (Rytter, 2019). Other researchers have cautioned against what they see 
as neoliberal welfare policy trends that modify the basic principles of the Nordic 
model. For example, by strengthening the link between contributions and benefits, 
the so-called workfare policies are understood to strengthen ‘the norms of reci-
procity at the cost of the principle of universalism’ ( Kuhnle and Kildal, 2005 , 28). 
The countries are also experiencing increasing social inequality ( Øverbye, 2017 ). 
Most welfare state research, though, still considers egalitarian norms to be relevant 
markers of the Nordic welfare states. Although the norms are not fully achieved 
or expressed in all policies, they are seen to inform national policy and identity 
( Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017 ;  Barker, 2017 ). 
Historically, the universalistic welfare approach has implied that migrants 
should have the same formal rights to welfare as every other citizen. The criterion 
to qualify for different kinds of rights is usually residence, rather than citizen-
ship.5 In this sense, the Norwegian welfare state has largely operated with a terri-
torially based conception of membership, rather than a status-based one ( Bosniak, 
2007 ).  Brochmann and Hagelund (2012 ) has argued that this approach rests not 
only on egalitarian norms but also on the social consideration that ‘good welfare 
states’ cannot function properly if a large part of its population is marginalised and 
socially excluded. However, this consideration has also motivated an assumption 
that the universally oriented Norwegian welfare model is particularly vulnerable 
to high level of migration ( NOU, 2011 , 7;  NOU, 2017 , 2). Restrictive admission 
has thus been seen, according to Brochmann and Hagelund (2011 ), as a prereq-
uisite for the sustenance of the system as such. Hence, Norwegian policies have 
generally come to follow what Bosniak (2006 ) has called ‘the hard on the outside 
and soft on the inside’ model of citizenship. 
Initially, the ‘hard’ outside involved a so-called ban on labour migration imple-
mented in the early 1970s. Although there were some exceptions for certain types of
skills, this ban made immigration essentially possible only through family reunifica-






























The ban on labour migration was partly liberalised when Norway became a member
of the European Economic Area in 1994. This membership committed Norway to
accept the free movement of workers from EEA-countries and created a distinction
between intra- and extra-EEA migrants ( Olsen, 2018 ). This distinction is not only
in terms of law and policy. Intra- and extra-EEA migration have come to be viewed
very differently in terms of their presumed ‘utility’ or ‘risk’ to the sustainability of
the welfare state ( Andreasen, 2019 ;  Guðjónsdóttir and Loftsdóttir, 2017 ). Hence,
in contrast to the liberalisation of intra-EEA labour migration, different Norwegian
governments have imposed, over the past two decades, a series of restrictive policies
with regard to both asylum and family migration, making these pathways to legal
migration more difficult for extra-EEA migrants ( NOU, 2011 , 7,  2017 , 2). These
restrictive policies have been largely motivated by pointing to the need to limit new
arrivals of asylum seekers (Grønningsæter and Brekke, 2017). For example, in 2008
the government increased the subsistence requirement and implemented a four-year
residency requirement for family reunification for those not granted a refugee status
(Staver, 2015), lowering the threshold for applying the ‘internal protection alterna-
tive’ (IPA) as a basis for denying refugee claims, including departing from the ‘rea-
sonableness’ criteria set out by UNHCR (Schultz, 2019), granting only temporary
permission until the age of 18 years to unaccompanied minors who do not meet the
criteria for either asylum or residence permit on humanitarian grounds ( Liden et al.,
2017 ), and raising the threshold for obtaining residence permit on humanitarian 
grounds (NOAS, 2013).6 Deportations of irregular migrants have also been a higher
priority in Norway compared to many other countries ( Weber, 2015 ), underlining
how the nations’ commitment to equality also fosters exclusion through coercive
tools to respond to mass mobility ( Barker, 2018 ). These policy trends were further
reinforced in the wake of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015.
Growing concerns over the potential impact of increased international migra-
tion on the future sustainability of the Norwegian welfare state have also put 
the ‘softer inside’ under pressure ( Hernes, 2018 ). Denmark, for example, saw an 
emerging break with the universal principle of the Nordic model already at the 
turn of the century, as conditions for receiving social benefits were tightened for 
immigrants ( Jønsson and Petersen, 2012 ). The issue of differential or gradated 
rights has also been repeatedly raised in Norway, including in two Official Nor-
wegian Reports on the relationship between international migration and sustain-
ability of the Norwegian welfare state ( NOU, 2011 , 7;  NOU, 2017 , 2). While the 
reports noted that the idea that access to rights should in some way be ‘earned’
was gaining traction in Norway, the main recommendations were still to con-
tinue the universal approach for migrants with a legal residence status.7 Irregular 
migration, though, poses a particular challenge to the ‘hard outside–soft inside’
model of citizenship, as it exposes the unsustainability of a notion of a territorially 
bounded space that underpins this dual logic. The challenge facing policymakers 
with regard to irregular migrants thus becomes: Should the welfare state approach 
to territorially present, but politically excluded, migrants be guided by the ‘hard’







The book consists of seven chapters, including an introduction and a conclu-
sion. The five ethnographic chapters are further divided into three parts, reflec-
tive of the three themes that inform the main argument developed, that is, the 
role of life, territory, and temporality in contemporary politics. Although, all three 
themes are always present, there is a different emphasis analytically in each part. 
In Part I of this book, I explore how care for irregular migrants has been politi-
cally and legally structured as well as legitimised in the Norwegian welfare state. 
In Chapter 1 , I examine how irregular migrants’ access to basic care such as shelter 
and economic support has been (re)structured in Norway, and to what effect, by 
situating some of the stories of the irregular migrants followed in the study within 
a broader account of shifts in Norwegian welfare policies and laws. These shifts 
include rejected asylum seekers changing access to work permits, shelter and eco-
nomic support through the asylum reception system, access to support from the 
social services, as well as the emerging new role of NGOs in providing care for 
irregular migrants. One of my main arguments in this part is that during the past 
decades, there has been a dual process whereby irregular migrants were increas-
ingly demarcated legally outside the scope of welfare legislation, while at the same 
time humanitarian exceptions were built into the system to relieve some of the ten-
sion between the welfare state’s commitment to basic security and the exclusion-
ary practices of migration control. The chapter is structured around the accounts 
of three different persons who had lived irregularly in Norway for more than ten 
years, showing how the limited inclusive practices contributed to their precarious 
circumstances of living. 
In Chapter 2 , I focus on the norms which govern irregular migrants’ access to 
welfare services and explore how these reflect wider societal values regarding the 
legitimate and illegitimate, and not only legal and illegal. I analyse and show how 
different and competing conceptualisations of irregular migrants in public policies 
and discourses construct this migrant category as more or less worthy of com-
passion and care, focusing specifically on how irregular migrants are conceptu-
alised in public texts (e.g. laws and regulations, background material for the laws 
and regulations (e.g. Official Norwegian Reports (NOU), consultation papers and 
guidelines), government press releases and public statements by government repre-
sentatives, Parliamentarian initiatives and debates, etc.). I also examine what con-
ceptions of the nation are installed in practices of care for the politically excluded. 
By addressing the moral bordering and ordering of various lives, I show how the 
exceptionalism surrounding the care for irregular migrants not only is legal in form 
and effect but also represents a broader departure from the norms of equality and 
universalism that have traditionally been considered core values shaping Norwe-
gian welfare policies in general. 
In Part II , I turn to the specific context of healthcare to explore how state bor-
ders are reproduced, negotiated, and tested in and through situated encounters 




seek to address the role of territory in contemporary government, particularly the 
changing meaning and location of state borders and the role of territory in valo-
rising and distinguishing between lives. Chapter 3 uses an ethnographic account 
of a medical appointment as a starting point to investigate the role of discretion-
ary decision-making in (re)producing or challenging state borders in the medical 
encounter. Understanding these decisions as a form of sovereign decision on the 
exception or (non-)value of life, I seek to contextualise sovereignty as a practice 
within mundane institutional practices and expert knowledge. The ethnographic 
focus in this chapter thus brings forth the multiple and dispersed, as well as nego-
tiated quality of the sovereign decision and hence the border in everyday practices 
and situations. It also shows how ambiguous outcomes were produced, by the 
friction not only between ‘decisions’ at different branches and levels that make 
up the state but also between different normalising frames informing those tasked 
with translating state policy into practice. 
In Chapter 4 , I shift the focus from the role of discretionary/professional 
decision-making in (re)producing or challenging state borders to how the border 
becomes materialised through administrative practices and routines, including the 
general practitioner scheme, the use of personal identification numbers, and the 
issue of payment. I show how these practices were not necessarily linked explic-
itly to migration and border control but linked to forms of control of the popula-
tion in general. As such, they were not primarily about the detection of irregular 
migrants for deportation but excluded irregular migrants in more subtle ways, 
including deterring them from exercising the limited rights that they actually 
had. In the chapter, I also explore how healthcare providers navigate bureaucratic 
structures in their situated responses to the ethical and practical dilemmas raised 
in their encounter with irregular migrants. These situated responses did not neces-
sarily pit formal law against informal inclusion but could be seen to operate in a 
grey zone opened up by ambiguities and tensions that simultaneously cut through 
law, policy, and practice. 
In Part III , I move from an analysis of spatiality (the changing location of state 
borders) to the temporal implication of migration control, examining what hap-
pens when control of the patient’s time in the medical encounter is challenged by 
the unpredictability and temporariness produced by migration law and enforce-
ment. How does the temporal lens of migration control frame and condition the 
medical gaze, and hence the medical care offered irregular migrants? In  Chapter 5 , 
I start by unfolding an ethnographic example where the different temporalities 
involved in medical practice and migration control, and the tension between them, 
come to the fore. Following the patient over time, I show his continuous negotia-
tion over time with healthcare providers and the immigration authorities. I also 
show how the threat of deportation and the emergency frame of the Healthcare 
Regulation concerning the right to health and care services to people without ordi-
nary residence in the country ( 2011 ) had a disciplinary effect in the sense that 
it oriented the medical gaze to the temporal present. Consequently, care came 
















1 Agamben’s Homo Sacer series consists of several books. My engagement draws primar-
ily on Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998), State of Exception (2005), 
Kingdom and Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (2011), 
and Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (2002a), as well as his more 
political work Means without end: Notes on politics (2000b). 
2 All the names are pseudonyms. Due to strong privacy concerns when doing research 
with irregular migrants, I have also chosen to alter what I considered non-essential infor-
mation (i.e. number of children, gender, age, years in the country, etc.). What I consid-
ered non-essential varied from case to case. 
3 Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Norwegian sources (whether written or oral) 
are mine. 
4 ‘Papirløs’ is the main term used by NGOs in Norway for irregularised migrants from 
non-EU countries. The direct translation is ‘paperless’ or ‘without paper’; however, in 
the book I will mainly translate the term to ‘undocumented’, as this is more commonly 
used in English. 
5 Citizens from the European Economic Area (EEA) and their family members are entitled 
to equal treatment as Norwegian citizens if the reference person has legal work. EEA
citizens who come to the country to seek employment under the EU mobility regime do 
not have access to social benefits and only limited access to healthcare. 
6 Although the effect of these changes on the arrival of asylum seekers to Norway has 
been questioned (Brekke & Aarset , 2009), they had an impact on my field. For example, 
one of the changes was that a stay granted on humanitarian grounds should be based on 
an individual treatment of each case and not a group assessment in relation to a particular 
geographical area. Until 2009, Palestinians had been one of the largest groups of asylum 
seekers arriving in Norway, and all Palestinians who could document that they were 
from the West Bank or Gaza had been granted residence. After the change in policy, 
acceptance fell to 24 per cent (NOAS, 2011). When I started fieldwork, Palestinians 
were among the most prominent groups of irregular migrants that I met, organising, 
among other things, a one-year-long protest camp outside a church in Oslo. 
7 One minor change, though, was agreed in April 2017: introducing a five-year residence 
requirement for parents to receive cash benefits for their 1–2-year-olds (Kontantstøtten). 
Norway has also introduced new civic requirements for restricting access to permanent 
residence and citizenship ( Hernes, 2018 ). 
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 1  Exceptional care 
Eba 
‘They gave me the rejection and the work permit together’, Eba explained, laugh-
ing at the irony. Eba was a 42-year-old man originally from Ethiopia whom I met 
for the first time in the early spring of 2012. In our conversations, he explained 
how he had initially applied for asylum in 2003, a time when it was easier for 
asylum seekers to receive a work permit while their cases were being processed. 
At the same time as his first asylum application was rejected, Eba received a 
work permit. At that time, he was living in an asylum reception centre in a small 
community in the Western part of Norway with few job opportunities. When he 
received the second negative answer to his asylum application, the so-called ‘final 
rejection’, he left the reception centre and moved to Bergen, the second largest 
city in Norway. With a valid tax card, he was able to find work in a Chinese res-
taurant three days a week, earning wages below tariff, on which he paid taxes. 
He supplemented his income by working as many hours as he could as a temp 
in the food industry in the district surrounding Bergen. Though the hours varied, 
he made a decent living. At best, he declared, he had an annual gross salary of 
470,000 Norwegian kroner. 
At one point, Eba learned that his wife Kija, and their ten-year-old son, Demeke, 
were in Norway looking for him. For a year, they had been living in a reception 
centre in another part of the country. Having already received their first rejection, 
Kija and Demeke joined Eba in Bergen, where they lived in a small studio apart-
ment close to the city centre, for which Eba paid 4,000 kroner a month. ‘It was a 
small place’, Eba stressed. ‘There was only one room where we ate, slept, and did 
everything’. Eba smiled when remembering the paucity of those days. For Eba, 
this was a time when he ‘lived’ because he could work. Demeke was enrolled in 
school and he and Kija had a second child. When recounting his story to me in 
2012, though, Eba was sitting in a much larger three-room apartment supplied by 
the Norwegian state in a decentralised asylum reception centre, living on a modest 
subsidy from the state. 
Although Eba saw some material advantages, particularly for his children (e.g. 
access to kindergarten for the youngest), he considered life in the reception centre 
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I didn’t think too much. I worked, I had money, I could go any place, I relaxed. I 
didn’t just sit around. I didn’t think about my case. But . . .’ ‘But now?’ I asked. 
‘Yeah, now I don’t work. I always sit at home. I always think about my situation. 
Later, little by little, maybe I’ll get sick. I know many people now that are sick.’
For Eba, as the quote illustrates, losing work meant more than losing a source 
of income. In his view, work protected him against the stress of being an irregular 
migrant. So how did Eba end up back in the asylum reception system? 
In this chapter, I explore how irregular migrants’ access to basic care has been 
(re)structured in Norway and to what effect. I am particularly interested in how 
shifting welfare laws and policies (re)produce state borders by distinguishing 
between the lives on state territory that should be cared for and those that should 
not. However, as I will show, the question is not only whether a life is cared for, 
but what kind of life, and how. 
The period during which Eba has lived in Norway has seen increasing atten-
tion and effort on the part of the state to come to terms with irregular migration, 
constantly changing and restructuring migrants’ survival options. My own entry 
into the field in the autumn of 2011 happened shortly after one such significant 
change, which greatly affected several of my interlocutors, including Eba. This 
involved changes in practices related to the issuance of tax cards. In 2010, a clean-
up in the Norwegian Tax Administration revealed that many rejected asylum seek-
ers had kept receiving tax cards even though they did not have residence permits. 
These were asylum seekers who, like Eba, had received a temporary work per-
mit while their asylum applications were being processed. The duration of these 
permits was set for six months or until a final decision was made in their case. 
The permits were renewable as long as the conditions continued to be met. Such 
renewals were common when the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) 
needed more time to examine the application. However, when the permit expired, 
neither the tax authorities nor the employers were informed, and until 2011, tax 
cards were issued automatically to previous tax card holders. 
Although employers were required to check that people had valid work and 
residence permits, there was a widespread misunderstanding that a person’s tax 
card was sufficient evidence. 1 However, from 2010 onwards, the government 
began to issue tax cards with a text explicitly stating that the card was not proof 
of a right to work or of legal residence. This policy was tightened even further in 
2011 as it became mandatory for people without a standard Norwegian personal 
identification number to personally visit a tax office to receive the card. After the 
new procedures were introduced, several people were exposed as working in both 
private and public sectors without valid residence permits. Subsequently, as new 
tax cards were not issued automatically, Eba and others in his situation lost their 
jobs. Unable to find an employer who would hire him without a tax card, Eba and 
his family contacted the Directorate of Immigration and ‘moved back into the 
system’, as Eba called it. However, to Eba, this policy did not make much sense. 
As he put it, 
I don’t want the government to pay me. Why do they pay me to sit instead 
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family, I can work, I can help my family. Before it was like that. Why won’t 
the government allow me to work? 
While Eba’s story is particular, it was not unique in Norway. During my field-
work, I met many with similar stories in both Oslo and Bergen, particularly 
among Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants. In February 2011, around 100 Ethio-
pians responded to the tax administration’s new practice with a hunger strike in 
Oslo Cathedral, highlighting their contribution to the Norwegian welfare system 
and their current suffering with the slogan ‘We were taxpayers, but now on the 
street’ ( Bendixsen, 2017 ). While many of those affected by the new immigration 
controls implemented by the Norwegian Tax Administration, like Eba and his 
family, did eventually register for accommodation with the UDI, some did not, 
including Aster. 
. . . and Aster
I first met Aster, a 45-year-old Eritrean woman, at the volunteer-run healthcare 
centre for undocumented migrants in Oslo in the autumn of 2012. She was there 
at the insistence of her friend Mehret, who was worried about Aster’s lack of ini-
tiative. ‘She doesn’t understand why this is happening to her’, Mehret explained 
to me, shaking her head. ‘She just sits at home’. Aster struggled with headaches 
and muscular pain. At the healthcare centre, she was attended by both a doctor 
and a physiotherapist. However, as Aster later admitted to me, it did not help. She 
went occasionally at Mehret’s insistence but, as Aster stressed, her problem was 
not really the headaches. 
Aster, at the time we met, had been ‘illegal’ for 22 years. First, she recounted, 
she lived and worked cleaning private houses in Saudi Arabia before coming to 
Norway and applying for asylum in 2000. Initially, she was sent to a reception 
centre in the Northern part of the country. After about eight months, however, 
her application was rejected. By then, like Eba, she had already received a work 
permit, and she left for Oslo. There she spent about five months looking for work, 
while earning enough to survive by looking after children. Eventually she was 
hired by a cleaning company, and for the next nine years she cleaned private and 
public buildings in Oslo, paying tax and saving money to enable her one day 
to buy an apartment. She managed to save enough to meet the bank’s require-
ment for a co-payment, and she explained that she even had meetings with them 
about getting a loan. However, everything changed when the tax card stopped 
being renewed. As in Eba’s case, Aster’s employer reluctantly let her go. For four 
months, he let her stay on without a tax card, withholding an obligatory 50 per 
cent tax on her salary. He also wrote a letter on her behalf to the UDI. 
Aster was very proud of her time working. Both she and Mehret repeatedly told 
me she was a ‘good worker’ and that her employer was very pleased with her and 
would take her back if she could get a work permit. Although she was ‘illegal’, 
the period she worked represented, as in Eba’s case, a happier time. It was also a 
time when she had her own place to live. After losing her income, Aster moved 
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network in Oslo, visiting friends from her time in the reception centre who now 
had received legal permits and with whom she had remained in contact. Often, 
though, she would live with Mehret, who shared a small council flat with her two 
minor sons. Mehret and Aster became friends shortly after Aster arrived in Oslo. 
Mehret, however, had received a residence permit ‘on the third attempt’, as she 
put it, shaking her head over why it proved to be so much more difficult for her 
friend. 
As I learned of Aster’s struggles to get by, I was curious as to why she did not 
move into an asylum reception centre, as many of the others that I encountered at 
that time eventually did. When I asked her whether she had considered moving 
back into a reception centre, she responded with a very sceptical ‘no’, indicating 
that this would be a last resort. The main reason she gave was that she would 
then have to leave Oslo. Asylum reception centres in Norway are geographically 
dispersed throughout the country, located in both small and large communities. 
Asylum seekers, rejected or not, have little say in where they are placed. Rejected 
asylum seekers who re-enter the system are sent back to the same region where 
they were initially placed. In Aster’s case, it was the northern region of Norway, 
a place where she had stayed eight months, compared to the nearly 11 years she 
spent in Oslo. 
Most of the rejected asylum seekers I met during my fieldwork who were liv-
ing outside the reception centre system told of very harsh living conditions, rely-
ing on the help from friends and at times having nowhere to stay. Nevertheless, 
they expressed a strong resistance to moving back into ‘the system’. The reasons 
given were not necessarily fear of detection and deportation, as one might have 
expected, but very often that, like Aster, they did not want to leave Oslo and their 
social network there. Next to geographical location, the most frequent answer I 
received as to why they did not want to live in asylum reception centres was the 
experience of undignified living conditions and the negative health effects they 
associated with it. Life in asylum reception centres has frequently been associated 
with a particular kind of social suffering in Norway. The literature has particu-
larly stressed passivity and the absence of a normal everyday life as factors that 
negatively affect residents’ health ( Kjærre, 2015 ;  Gasana, 2012 ;  Hjelde, 2010 ). 
Several of my interlocutors, like Eba, regarded life in a reception centre as ‘men-
tal torture’. 
An unstable and exceptional landscape of care 
Most of the stories I collected during fieldwork, like Eba and Aster’s, were 
accounts of increased hardship, stress, and anxieties. As such, they importantly 
illustrate some of the experiences migrants have as a result of government poli-
cies. In the following, I seek to situate these accounts within a broader context of 
shifts in Norwegian policies and laws to shed further light on the forces that shape 
the migrants’ life, particularly how the limited inclusive practices contribute to 
producing migrants’ precarity. In its broadest form, the concept of precarity can be 
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Most commonly, the precarity literature refers to particular experiences of insecu-
rity deriving from neoliberal labour markets in contrast to the ‘certainties’ of wel-
fare state labour markets and social arrangements ( Waite, 2009 ). Here, though, I 
draw primarily on Butler (2004 ,  2009 ), who distinguishes between ‘precarious-
ness’ as a shared human condition, exposing our interdependency, and ‘precarity’
as a politically created condition through which precariousness is maximised for 
some and minimised for others. Precarity thus concerns the dimension of politics 
that addresses the organisation and protection of bodily needs, drawing attention 
to the imposition of vulnerability that derives from different political decisions, 
social practices, and social norms (Butler in Puar, 2012 ). 
The relevant policy shifts I trace in this chapter include rejected asylum seek-
ers changing access to work permits, shelter, and economic support through the 
asylum reception system, access to support from the social services, and the role 
of NGOs in providing care for irregular migrants. The picture that emerge, I sug-
gest, is more complex than irregular migrants simply being excluded from welfare 
services. Instead, it shows a continuing and complex negotiating of administra-
tive practices and regulations at the national level. Here, the oscillation of poli-
cies between the perceived interests of immigration control and humanitarian 
concerns has produced a constantly changing landscape regarding how and to 
what extent irregular migrants’ basic needs should be addressed by the state. This 
changing landscape in itself, I suggest, reinforces migrants’ precarity. Another key 
characteristic was that while irregular migrants were increasingly excluded from 
the regular system, special measures were implemented that made it possible to 
address some of the most pressing bodily needs of this population. 
In Norway, membership in the National Insurance Scheme ( Folketrygden , liter-
ally ‘people’s insurance’) is the key to eligibility for rights to various welfare ser-
vices. Membership in the National Insurance Scheme is mandatory and is based 
on residence rather than formal citizenship. However, in order for someone to 
be considered a resident in Norway, their stay must last, or be intended to last, 
for at least 12 months, and the stay must be legal. If these requirements are met, 
membership starts from the date of entry into the country. Asylum seekers whose 
applications are under review are not full members of the National Insurance 
Scheme. While they have, at least in theory, the same rights as the general popula-
tion to public services such as healthcare and education, an important exception 
was made regarding rights under the Social legislation in 1988 when the asylum 
reception system was established. This exception produced a two-tier system as 
asylum seekers did not receive access to any of the social benefits administered by 
the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV), but were guaranteed 
housing and financial support based on distinctly separate regulations and lower 
standards through the Directorate of Immigration. 
Rejected asylum seekers generally received the same treatment as asylum
seekers awaiting an answer to their application until 2002, when the government 
began to reduce financial support to rejected asylum seekers, and then removed 
it completely effective 1 January 2004. Parallel with reducing the economic ben-
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accommodation in asylum reception centres would be cancelled for rejected asy-
lum seekers. The new measures, as argued by the government at that time, were 
put in place to prevent reception centres from being used as refuge for people who 
had no need for asylum or other forms of protection. The stated purpose of the 
new policies was further to force the migrants to cooperate on the procedure of 
their own return ( Brekke and Søholt, 2005 ). It was in this climate that Eba ‘chose’
to leave the reception centre in the spring of 2004 after receiving a note of evic-
tion. However, as seen, he did not leave the country. 
The so-called withdrawal scheme (bortfallsordningen) regarding rejected asy-
lum seekers’ access to accommodation in reception centres was highly contro-
versial. Using the words of Brekke and Søholt, who evaluated the policy changes 
in a report commissioned by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development in 2005, it turned out to be a minefield in the junction between the 
welfare state, local solidarity, and asylum policy goals. One of the main reasons 
for the controversies was that the policy challenged the established division of 
labour between state and municipalities. While rejected asylum seekers had previ-
ously been the state’s responsibility through the asylum reception system, munici-
palities were now faced with the dilemma of how to deal with their social needs. 
Many of those who lost the right to accommodation were difficult to deport, partly 
due to lack of identity papers and partly due to political reluctance and unstable 
conditions in the countries of origin ( Brekke and Søholt, 2005 ). 
The controversy over the withdrawal scheme led to a series of adjustments in 
the course of the subsequent years. The first one came already in November 2004, 
only 11 months after the new tougher line had been introduced and before any 
residents had actually been forcibly evicted from reception centres. A proposal in 
Parliament from the Socialist Left Party (SV) to create special reception centres 
that would offer rejected asylum seekers simple board and lodging pending depar-
ture received bipartisan support, including support from the centre-right govern-
ment parties behind the withdrawal scheme (Document No. 8:26 (2004–2005)). 
This proposal placed the responsibility for rejected asylum seekers’ well-being 
again clearly at the national level yet maintained the distinction between rejected 
asylum seekers and asylum seekers awaiting a decision. 
However, the new centres, which came to be called ‘waiting centres’ ( ventemot-
tak), quickly became controversial as well. According to an external evaluation 
commissioned by the Ministry of Justice and the Police in 2010 ( Valenta et al., 
2010 ), the centres were characterised by passivity, frustration, antisocial behav-
iour and substance abuse among residents, and a growing number of conflicts. In 
the period they operated, only two centres were actually established, hosting only 
a limited number of rejected asylum seekers. In June 2010, riots erupted among 
residents of both centres, and they were subsequently closed due to extensive fire 
damage. In September 2011, the government dropped the idea of special centres 
for rejected asylum seekers and announced that rejected asylum seekers again 
would be offered accommodation in ordinary reception centres. 
Although, this development may look like a return to the situation before 2004, 
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within the system based on legal status ( Thorshaug and Valenta, 2012 ). For exam-
ple, although rejected asylum seekers in reception centres would again receive 
economic support from the state, it was at a lower level than the support received 
by asylum seekers awaiting a decision and also significantly lower than what was 
considered the appropriate minimum for legal residents. 
Figure 1.1 shows standard rates of economic support for rejected asylum seek-
ers in state accommodation compared to asylum seekers ( RS, 2008 –0, 35V1;  See-
berg, 2017 ) and state guidelines for social benefits ( RS I-34/2001 ;  RS A-2/2011 ; 
RS A-2/2015 ) for 2001, 2012, and 2016. The monthly amounts should cover 
all normal expenses except housing costs. As the figure shows, rejected asylum 
seekers (single adults) received almost 70 per cent of what the state guidelines 
stipulated for those receiving social benefits in 2001. The support was reduced to 
approximately 36 per cent of the amount stipulated in the state guidelines in 2012 
and 30 per cent in 2016. In 2001, they received the same amount as asylum seek-
ers awaiting a decision. After they were allowed back into the asylum reception 
centres in 2011, they would receive only about 60 per cent of what asylum seekers 
got. The difference between the two categories decreased in 2016 as the support 
to asylum seekers was reduced more than the support to rejected asylum seekers 
in the wake of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015.
During the main part of my fieldwork (2011–2013), some 5,000 to 6,000 per-
sons with a so-called ‘duty to leave’ ( utreiseplikt) lived in reception centres. This 
constituted about one-third of all residents. In 2017, this number had dropped 
7000 
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 Figure 1.1 Economic support to rejected asylum seekers in state accommodation compared 
to asylum seekers and state guidelines for social benefits, 2001, 2012, and 2016 
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to 1,421 persons (which still constituted about 28 per cent of all residents, UDI 
(2011 –2017)). While the Norwegian state intensified its efforts to deport irregular 
migrants in this period, many also went ‘missing’. The majority were assumed to 
have gone to other European countries, with a smaller number going to the major 
cities in Norway ( PU, 2017 ). 
It was not possible for me to detect any changes in terms of the size of the
irregular population during the time I spent in the field. However, there was
one noticeable change in my conversations with my interlocutors. While the
question of moving back into the asylum centres was a key topic in 2011–2013,
moving out was a more pressing concern in 2017. During my fieldwork in Oslo
in 2017, I met several rejected asylum seekers who had stayed in Norway for
years that had either just moved out of a reception centre or were considering
it. One of them was Eshe, a woman in her forties originally from Ethiopia.
Unlike Eba and Aster, she had stayed continuously in an asylum centre during
the eight years she had lived in Norway. When I met her, she had just recently
left the centre and moved to Oslo. With a limited social network in the city, she
struggled to get by. She received some help from women at a mosque she went
to, but she could not always find a place to stay or money for essentials. In our
conversations, she spoke tearfully of the fear she felt having to spend some
nights outside. Although living in a reception centre for years had been difficult,
Eshe spoke warmly of the staff and the local community where the centre was
located. Fear of deportations was the main reason she gave when I asked why
she decided to leave the centre. The year 2017 was the first year the Norwegian
state carried out deportations to Ethiopia. Ethiopians at that time constituted the
major group with ‘a duty to leave’ in the asylum reception centres. However,
Eshe and others also mentioned deteriorating conditions at the centres as a rea-
son for leaving. These conditions included constant relocations as centres were
closed due to low numbers of new arrivals and the low benefit level that was
experienced as insufficient to survive on. A study carried out during the spring
of 2017 on food insecurity among asylum seekers living in eight different recep-
tion centres in Norway also found a high prevalence of food insecurity among
adults and children ( Henjum et al., 2019 ).
 Make survive 
The changing landscape of care, I suggest, shows how the state in its distribution 
of care increasingly came to operate with a differentiated ‘threshold possibility of 
life’ ( Redfield, 2005 , 330). Another policy trend illustrated by the accounts I col-
lected during fieldwork was how care to irregular migrants was reduced to subsis-
tence, or what Agamben (1998 ) would call ‘make survive’. Eba and Aster’s cases, 
for example, show how policy changed from giving rejected asylum seekers work 
permits so that they could take care of themselves to granting humanitarian relief 
through the asylum system. This exceptional care, though, came at the price of 
heightened visibility, state surveillance, and greater susceptibility to deportation 
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When Eba and Aster applied for asylum, there was a consensus across party 
lines that temporary work permits for asylum seekers were a constructive initia-
tive ( Innst. O. nr. 54 (1995–1996 ),  Innst. O. nr. 24 (1996 –1997),  Innst. O. nr. 66 
(1999–2000 ) [The Parliament committee’s recommendations on legislative deci-
sions to the Odelsting/Parliament]). It was considered to have a positive effect 
on asylum seekers’ mental health by combatting passivity and clientification, as 
well as making the asylum process more humane and cost effective, as the asy-
lum seekers would be able to provide for themselves and even pay taxes. The 
goal was therefore that as many as possible should get work permits. In 2000, 
the Immigration Act and associated regulations were further amended to explic-
itly allow rejected asylum seekers to be granted temporary work permits until a 
‘departure could be effected’ based on the same considerations (see  Ot.prp. nr. 31 
(1999–2000 ) [The government’s Proposition to Odelsting/Parliament], and circu-
lar RS G-72/00). As such, it was not only a glitch that Eba and Aster received a 
work permit even though their asylum applications were rejected but part of an 
established practice at that time. 
However, as authorities began to look for ways to limit the number of asylum 
seekers, temporary work permits came under scrutiny. The practice of granting 
work permits to rejected asylum seekers was cancelled through a circular issued 
by the Directorate of Immigration in 2003 ( RS UDI, 2003–021 ). In 2009, a new 
Immigration Act came into force wherein the requirement for asylum seekers to 
prove identity to obtain work permits also became more stringent. The conse-
quence of this change was that fewer asylum seekers were able to get work per-
mits ( Valenta and Thorshaug, 2011 ). This meant that Eba and Aster’s mode of 
inclusion in Norwegian society as regularly employed taxpayers with fairly stable 
and decent employment became less of a possibility for newcomers. 
Ironically, for Eba and Aster, paying tax and thereby contributing to financing 
welfare did not offer formal possibilities for claiming welfare benefits. Instead, 
access to welfare was primarily dependent on their status as ‘rejected asylum 
seeker’. Although the asylum reception system represents a departure from the 
‘normal’ frame of welfare provision through the Norwegian Labour and Welfare 
Administration (NAV), the centres could be considered to some extent a form 
of welfare state service specifically targeting this group. An Official Norwegian 
Report (NOU) on the asylum system published in 2011 noted, for example, that 
the reception of asylum seekers had primarily been guided by objectives and 
requirements characteristic of social and welfare policies rather than migration 
control ( NOU, 2011 , 10). However, the report acknowledged that the past decade 
had seen rising pressure to use reception centres as instruments for migration 
control. For instance, access to financial support as an asylum seeker (rejected 
or not) depends on people living in reception centres. Employees at these cen-
tres have increasingly been tasked with giving information to irregular migrants 
about voluntary return, and there have also been some amendments concerning 
the duty of confidentiality to make it easier for employees at the centres to share 
information with the Directorate of Immigration.2 Furthermore, asylum seek-
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governed by the Immigration Act (2008 ) and not the welfare legislation. This act 
had been amended to state that while asylum seekers ‘shall’ be offered accom-
modation, rejected asylum seekers ‘can’ be offered accommodation pending 
departure. Also, the right under the Public Administration Act to file complaints 
about bureaucratic decisions, such as the allocation of accommodation, does not 
apply to the decisions of the immigration authorities ( Søvig, 2013b ;  Ot.prp. nr. 
112 (2004–2005 )). 
The cancellation of work permits, the ‘can’ in the Immigration Act, and the 
denial of the right to file complaints about bureaucratic decisions underscore, 
I suggest, how care for irregularised migrants was increasingly administered as 
exceptional government charity rather than as a social right. As such, it was not 
the life of a rights-bearing subject that was being cared for, as was the norm in 
the biopolitical welfare states that developed during the 20th century ( Foucault, 
1998 ; Wells, 2011 ), but instead a form of exceptional life the value of which was 
reduced to merely survivability. 
This was evident, for example, in the negotiation between the state and the 
municipalities following the withdrawal scheme implemented in 2004. As pre-
viously mentioned, this scheme shifted the responsibility for rejected asylum 
seekers’ welfare needs to the municipalities. The regulations and political sig-
nals regarding what this would entail, though, were vague. The new restrictive 
measures were neither provided in the form of laws nor even regulations, but in 
circulars and letters from various governmental departments. These specified that 
while individuals without legal residence were not entitled to financial support 
under the Social Services Act, ‘no one should starve or freeze to death in Nor-
way’. Instead, it was suggested that they could be entitled to emergency aid based 
on a so-called ‘unwritten Act of Necessity’. Or, as the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs clarified in a letter to all municipalities 19 December 2003: 
[S]ociety as such has a general responsibility to provide urgent vital assis-
tance in an emergency. This follows from general considerations of necessity. 
This means that a person may be entitled to assistance in the form of social 
services in particular emergencies regardless of whether the stay is legal. 
( Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2004 ) 
The application of this ‘unwritten Act of Necessity’ was left to the discretion of 
each municipality, and this varied significantly ( Brekke and Søholt, 2005 ). The 
government was nevertheless reluctant to give specific guidelines, arguing that 
‘the duty to help people in need rests with us all’ (letter from the Department 
of Labour and Social Affairs to Centre Against Ethnic Discrimination, quoted in 
Aarø and Wyller, 2005 ). The ministry did, however, eventually issue a new letter 
on 4 October 2004 that made clear the following: 
The Ministry would like to emphasise that this [the quote above] means 
that no one shall starve or freeze to death, and that social services need to 
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legal residence. This is not regulated by law or regulations but follows from 
unwritten considerations of the duty to help people in need. 
( Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2004 ) 
These unwritten legal considerations of necessity thus clearly reflect the humani-
tarian moral principle of granting human life absolute priority. It is the survivabil-
ity of the body that becomes the grounds for compassionate attention. 
Zeki 
Not all irregularised migrants I met during fieldwork were eligible for accommo-
dation and economic support through asylum reception centres. One of them was 
Zeki. When I met Zeki, he had been addicted to heroin for more than a decade. 
Zeki, originally from Eritrea, came to Norway as an unaccompanied minor in 
1994, and after a brief stay in an asylum reception centre, he settled in Oslo. Talk-
ing about those first years, Zeki emphasised how he struggled at school, finding it 
difficult to concentrate. As he explained, ‘I came from war. I had no family. That 
was my problem. I couldn’t sit in the classroom, thinking about my problems and 
focusing on the school at the same time’. ‘But,’ he continued in the same sad quiet 
tone, ‘When I quit school, I started to become a criminal.’
In our conversations, Zeki described his encounter with drugs as a combination 
of naivety and love: ‘I was very young’, he repeated to me several times and he 
continued, ‘I tried because of love. With a Norwegian woman. She taught me. I 
did not know drugs when I came to Norway. But the cost of love was addiction. 
My girlfriend died, and I still suffer today.’ However, Zeki was increasingly feel-
ing his age. As he elaborated: ‘I am older now. I am an adult. I know what I am 
doing. I grew up, but I’m sinking.’ Explaining how his life in Norway was, he 
said, ‘I live just like a worthless human being. Imagine; I wake up every day not 
knowing where to sleep or where I will wake up tomorrow, where I will go to eat 
or change my clothes. My life is just exhausting.’ He later added, 
Every day is difficult. Every day I worry about the same things; where can 
I eat, where can I sleep. What shall I do today? I try to avoid doing crime. I 
don’t like to do it. Sometimes I feel they [the authorities] force me to do it. 
After Zeki came of age, he continued initially to live in a council flat. How-
ever, going in and out of prisons due to drug-related offenses, he was eventually 
stripped of his residence permit and was formally expelled from Norway in 2008. 
However, he could not be deported as there was no return agreement with Eritrea. 
Expelled, he also lost his council flat, and for the next five years, he was home-
less, sleeping on the streets or with friends from the city’s drug scene. 
Describing his life of crime, Zeki was keen to underline that he was not violent, 
and he only committed petty crimes because he had no other choice: ‘Sometimes 
I commit small crimes’, he explained. ‘And then I have to go to prison. In and out. 
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I have no home to go to.’ He felt harassed by the police, commenting cynically 
that he thought they just ‘liked to put him in prison’. ‘Sometimes I walk all night’, 
explaining what he did when he could not stay with friends. ‘But the police think 
I’m having fun and put me in prison. They are good at that. . . . But I don’t commit 
serious offenses so they can’t put me away for a long time.’
In the autumn of 2011, Zeki, with the help of a community outreach worker, 
applied for assistance from a local Labour and Welfare Administration office 
(NAV). He was initially denied assistance and referred to the Directorate of 
Immigration for accommodation in one of the so-called waiting centres. Ironi-
cally, though, Zeki received this letter over a year after the centres had been 
closed. Zeki was also unaware of the closure of these centres, and he was reluc-
tant to request accommodation there because of the centres’ bad reputation. Yet 
Zeki eventually applied, hoping his medical situation, that is to say his addic-
tion, would allow him to receive other form of accommodation. However, UDI 
rejected his request. 
According to UDI, their offer was only for (rejected) asylum seekers. Zeki, who 
initially had successfully been granted asylum and had formally been settled in a 
municipality, was still the responsibility of the municipality, in UDI’s view, and 
not the immigration authorities. With this letter, Zeki again applied for support 
from the local NAV office, and in the winter of 2013, nearly two years after he 
first applied for ‘emergency aid’, he was granted economic support and accom-
modation assistance. NAV was not willing to grant him a council flat but eventu-
ally decided to pay for a room at a homeless shelter (hospits), as Zeki was not able 
to enter the private housing market. In addition, Zeki received about 3,000 kroner 
a month to cover his living expenses (about 2,000 Norwegian kroner less than 
standard minimum rate at that time, but still more than he would have received 
in state accommodation). When I spoke to Zeki shortly after he had received the 
positive answer from NAV, asking what this meant to him in his everyday life, he 
replied that while he previously had to do ‘a little crime every day’, this was no 
longer necessary. Still, he found life in a homeless shelter hard. 
Municipal emergency aid 
While the changing accommodation policies for rejected asylum seekers has been 
well documented through various commissioned reports ( Brekke and Søholt, 
2005 ; Valenta et al., 2010 ; Thorshaug and Valenta, 2012 ), the situation for those 
not entitled to state accommodation has received far less attention. There is very 
little information regarding irregular migrants’ encounters with welfare offices. 
One of the main sources of information is two consultations conducted in 2011 
and 2013 concerning the regulation of emergency aid to people without legal resi-
dence (hereafter the Social Services Regulation, 2011 ). The statements received 
during these consultations indicate that irregular migrants’ access to social ben-
efits from local welfare offices was difficult and that this option was rarely used as 
irregular migrants were reluctant to approach welfare offices ( Red Cross, 2013 ). 
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Mehret, sought out the Red Cross, asking for help for her dire economic and hous-
ing situation. When they referred her to NAV, Aster did not even bother trying, she 
confessed to me, already convinced that they would not help her. 
Between 2008 and 2010, the Norwegian Red Cross and Juss-Buss, a free legal 
aid service operated by law students in Oslo, cooperated on a campaign to inform 
people without legal residence in Oslo about their rights. They also assisted irreg-
ular migrants in applying for emergency aid. The campaign ended, according to 
Juss-Buss (2011 ), because none of their clients was granted social assistance. As 
Juss-Buss commented in their statement to the public consultation concerning 
the Social Services Regulation in 2011, ‘We considered it unethical to spread 
information about a right that apparently was completely illusory’. In their expe-
rience, either irregular migrants were barred from applying for assistance at wel-
fare offices in Oslo or their applications were systematically rejected. They also 
pointed out that many caseworkers had little or no knowledge of the right to emer-
gency aid ( Juss-Buss, 2011 ). Statements from NAV offices, municipalities, and 
the county administrations ( 2011 ,  2013 ) also suggested that the number of appli-
cations from irregular migrants had been limited.3 However, the feedback from 
the local level indicated that though the cases were few, they were experienced 
as particularly burdensome due to their complexities. This was further reinforced 
by what the local authorities and welfare offices perceived as ‘legal ambiguities’. 
Irregularised migrants such as Zeki were eligible, in theory, for support from 
municipal welfare offices through the ‘unwritten Act of Necessity’. As described 
earlier, this ‘Act’ was first referred to as an option in circulars and letters from the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to municipalities during the 2004 experi-
ment during which rejected asylum seekers lost the right to accommodation in 
asylum reception centres. The Act of Necessity was eventually formalised through 
a new regulation that came into force on 1 January 2012 (the Social Services Reg-
ulation, 2011 ). This new regulation made it mandatory for municipalities to help 
people in ‘dire need’ with financial support and assistance in finding temporary 
accommodation. However, the support was supposed to be limited to the time 
required to obtain the necessary travel documents and availability of transporta-
tion out of the country – either to their country of origin or to another country 
( Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2010 ). Those who were eligible for state 
accommodation, that is rejected asylum seekers, were not entitled to this support. 
While the regulation specified a right to social benefits for irregular migrants, 
the Act of Necessity from a legal point of view still maintained much of the 
same vagueness as the unwritten Act and also contained contradictory elements 
( Andersen, 2014 ). For instance, it defined irregular migrants’ assistance in terms 
of both ‘dire need’ ( akutt nød) and ‘necessary care’ ( nødvendig omsorg ), which 
could have different implications. The consultation paper ( Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs, 2011 ) also specified that caseworkers should make individual 
assessments concerning when the migrant ‘in practice’ could leave the country. 
This illustrates how such case assessments were being tied to migration control 
that required knowledge about immigration policies that the social services did 
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Zeki’s case illustrates, case assessments also required knowledge about how to 
distinguish between irregularised migrants. For example, it was not obvious why 
Eba received state accommodation and Zeki did not, and why Zeki received sup-
port from the municipality and Aster did not. 
The significance of necessity 
To understand the unstable landscape of care, and the changing and differenti-
ated threshold of survival, I suggest, it is necessary to look at the form the policy 
changes have taken, particularly the legal instruments used. Irregular migrants’
entitlements can be explicitly or implicitly stated in law; that is, they are not 
excluded from an inclusive entitlement to use the service. In Norway, welfare 
provisions have generally been provided through legal regulation characterised by 
broad object clauses and legal standards determining societal objectives and the 
general principles of the regulation ( Aasen et al., 2014 ). For instance, the purpose 
of the Social Services Act (2010) is  ‘to improve the living conditions of disadvan-
taged persons, to promote financial and social security, including contributing to 
giving individuals opportunities to live and reside independently, and to promote 
the transition to employment, social inclusion and active participation in society’. 
Furthermore, the main body of Norwegian welfare laws concerning health and 
social security does not distinguish between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ residents. Both 
the Social Services Act (2010) and the  Patients’ Rights Act (1999 ) use the phrase 
‘everyone residing in the Realm’ when defining the scope of the law. 4 As such, 
there was a certain indecision for a time concerning the extent to which irregular 
migrants were entitled to services. 
However, the acts allow for exceptions as ‘[t]he King can issue regulations limit-
ing the application of the act in respect of persons who are not Norwegian nationals,
or who do not have a place of residence in the Realm’.5 This formed the legal basis
for various government ministries to issue regulations and circulars limiting irregu-
lar migrants’ access to various services, a tendency that has increased over the past
two decades. Although these new regulations and circulars still accorded irregu-
lar migrants a certain access, the explicit recognition of irregular migrants through
these legal instruments primarily served to circumvent their access to services. As
restrictions on irregular migrants’ access to welfare were mainly governed through
regulations, circulars, and letters issued by ministries and other governmental agen-
cies, there was no comprehensive national or parliamentary debate on how irregular
migrants’ access to welfare benefits should be governed ( Søvig, 2013b ,  2015 ). As
such, the regulations were issued piecemeal and by sector.
Scholars have questioned the legal basis for the welfare restrictions in relation 
to both due process and human rights obligations ( Andersen, 2014 ;  Süssmann, 
2015 ). Here, I wish to draw attention to another aspect, namely how the legal 
instruments used contributed to the production of migrants’ precarity by making 
access to welfare insecure and unpredictable. Administrative issued decrees, for 
example, are far easier to change than laws. More substantially, they could be 
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While Agamben’s work on sovereignty has inspired interest in exceptional pol-
itics across disciplines, there are different ways of approaching and understand-
ing what constitutes exceptions. Some key questions concern how the relation 
between exceptions and exceptional circumstances (emergencies or crisis) and the 
relation between exceptions, law, and practices of government are conceptualised. 
In exploring the ways and the extent to which irregular migrants are subject to 
exceptional measures, and what constitutes the exceptions in these cases, I follow 
Agamben in that designating policies as exceptional is as much a result of the the-
oretical lens as of the empirical designation of policies as such. Hence, the choice 
of the term implies a position taken on both the nature of the phenomenon under 
investigation and the logic most useful for understanding it ( Agamben, 2005 , 4). 
Agamben’s understanding of the state of exception as a ‘technique of govern-
ment’, for example, importantly highlights how social issues are increasingly 
framed as exceptions and emergencies to justify a departure from legal standards. 
As such, his work draws attention to how the production and manipulation of a 
sense of emergency is used as a tool of socio-political regulation ( McLoughlin, 
2014 ). Migration has increasingly been framed as crisis that needs to be addressed 
through the adoption of exceptional measures ( De Genova et al., 2018 ). In Nor-
way, increased arrivals during the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, for exam-
ple, was framed first as a current humanitarian crisis, and then increasingly as a 
(future) threat to the welfare state, the latter justifying a range of new emergency 
measures, including reducing financial support for rejected asylum seekers in 
reception centres ( Bygnes and Karlsen, 2017 ). Yet, the language of exception, 
emergency, and crisis was not necessarily proliferating prior to 2015 in the dis-
cussions and policies concerning whether irregular migrants should be denied 
access to basic care ( see Søvig, 2013b ). Instead, many of the important changes 
came about in an unspectacular manner, as a clarification of present praxis. I am 
therefore concerned more with how the juridical practices of the state of exception 
coincide with and have been integrated into the normal workings of state institu-
tions. To Agamben (2005 ,  2011 ), as I read him, law-making by administrative 
decree is not a practice associated simply with an extraordinary departure from 
the rule of law but with the rise of the regulatory or administrative role of the 
state. The legal structures of the regulatory state are thus ‘exceptional’ not simply 
because they first emerged in the context of crisis ‘but because they have been 
thoroughly ‘governmentalised’, as argued by  McLoughlin (2014 , 701). As such, 
they represent a form of law based not upon generality and order but upon the 
singularity of particular circumstances. 
Here, I follow attempts to read Agamben’s account of sovereign exceptional-
ism in the context of, rather than in opposition to, Foucault’s concept of gov-
ernmentality. Thus, to understand how exceptionalism is related to government 
practices, it is necessary to recognise two different conceptions of law at work: 
that is, the distinction between law as an autonomous and legitimating discourse 
of rights and law as an administrative and regulatory tool. In the latter, law is not 
constituted with respect to a set of universal principles but has become subordi-
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of the relationship between men and things ( Foucault, 2007 , 96). The problem 
with this, according to Agamben, is that ‘[t]he normative aspect of law can thus 
be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that – 
while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of 
exception internally – nevertheless still claims to be applying the law’ ( 2005 , 87). 
This perspective, I suggest, provides an entry point to understand why none 
of the markedly different approaches necessitated a change of law by Parlia-
ment but were regulated through changing regulations and circulars issued by 
ministries and directorates. While these administrative decrees facilitated an 
exceptional departure from the universal principles that supposedly characterise 
Norwegian welfare provisions, they were generally seen as part of the normal 
workings of law. 
This perspective also offers a way to explore the use and function of the emer-
gency provision (e.g. the written and unwritten Act of Necessity) by taking neces-
sity out of spectacular and exceptionalist settings and placing it in the context 
of mundane governing. To understand necessity as a legal concept, legal theory 
generally refers to the Latin maxim necessitas legem non habet, ‘necessity has no 
law’, variously understood as ‘necessity does not recognise any law’ and ‘neces-
sity creates its own law’ ( Agamben, 2005 , 24). As such, necessity is understood 
as having the power to render the ‘illicit licit’. To Agamben (2005 ), necessity can 
therefore be seen as a foundation for the state of exception. What it importantly 
does, he suggests, is that the perceived state of emergency allows for administra-
tive decisions without challenging the rule of law, thus ‘creating a zone in which 
application is suspended, but the law, as such, remains in force’ ( Agamben, 2005 , 
31). In this sense, necessity acts to justify a single, specific case of transgression 
by means of an exception. Or as Agamben puts it: ‘Necessity is not a source of 
law, nor does it properly suspend the law; it merely releases a particular case from 
the literal application of the norm’ (2005, 25). 
The institution of necessity can be found in constitutions, as in a state of emer-
gency, as well as in criminal and civil law. Here, necessity justifies a wide variety 
of actions that would be legally prohibited during periods of normalcy. The insti-
tution of necessity can also importantly be found, as in the case explored here, 
as a legal basis for decisions by public administration ( Andorsen, 1999 ;  Hovde, 
2006 ). In relation to irregular migrants’ access to welfare in Norway, necessity 
could be deployed both to include and to exclude. As shown previously, the case-
based suspension of the law through the Act of Necessity allowed welfare offices 
to grant financial assistance to irregular migrants, while the law that excluded 
irregular migrants from social welfare (and the state) remained in force. The Act 
of Necessity, in both its written and unwritten form, is in this context less spec-
tacular than a state of emergency, but it still poses a challenge to the classic liberal 
idea of the rule of law that emphasises order, regularity, and certainty, as opposed 
to the arbitrariness of royal rule. Thus, what is at stake is not only the question of 
universal versus particular law but the passage from general law to concrete case, 
and the role of professional discretionary judgements in this passage, which I will 
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again we see that it is the exceptional life, rather than the right-bearing subject, 
that is being cared for. 
Care beyond the state? 
So far, I have explored access to care administrated by the state, either at national 
or municipal level. Many irregularised migrants, though, do not seek public assis-
tance and rely on support within their own networks and from NGOs. Aster, for 
example, relied primarily on female friends in her ethnic and religious community. 
However, as the years went by, she, and others I met during fieldwork, experienced 
increasing strain on these networks. Tactics they would develop to deal with this 
involved rotating places to sleep, as well as constantly acquiring new friends. 
In this section, I will explore the role of NGOs in providing care and support to 
irregular migrants. NGOs have been seen as an important source of basic support 
for irregular migrants in many contexts ( Darling, 2009 ;  Castañeda, 2011 ; Van der 
Leun and Bouter, 2015 ). An important characteristic of the Nordic welfare model, 
though, is precisely the key role the state has as provider of welfare, compared to 
more informal arrangements through family, private organisations, or the market 
(2015). Hence, in this context, it is interesting to see how and where civil society 
comes to play a role as the provider of care for irregular migrants and particularly 
how national policies constrain or enable assistance from NGOs or individuals. 
Allowing or funding NGOs can be seen as another example of an exceptional 
measure built into the system to alleviate some of the tension between border 
enforcement and humanitarian concerns, contributing to irregular migrants’ pre-
carious inclusion. 
In the same period as irregular migrants’ access to public services has become 
circumscribed, there have been attempts to define more restrictively the legal bor-
ders of a humanitarian space in which NGOs and individuals can provide irregu-
lar migrants with basic care. When the Immigration Act was adopted in 1988, 
it contained only a penal provision concerning the facilitation of entry into the 
country. This activity had to be ‘organised’ and made with ‘the purpose of gain’
to be illegal. With the entry into the Schengen agreement in 2001, Norway was 
required to make certain revisions to the act, including sanctioning those who 
assisted foreigners in staying illegally. In the initial revisions, this act also had to 
involve financial or material gain to be illegal. When revising the Immigration 
Act in 2008, however, the government went even further, proposing instead that 
anyone who ‘wilfully (forsettlig) helps a foreign national to stay illegally’ ( Ot. 
prp. nr. 75 (2006–2007 ), 479, my emphasis [Proposals from the government to 
the Parliament that contain concrete proposals for decisions]) could be punished 
with a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.6 Hence, the new 
proposal replaced the requirement of gain with one of merely intent that could 
potentially affect non-profit humanitarian assistance. 
The proposal was strongly criticised by several NGOs, including the Norwe-
gian Red Cross, which petitioned Parliament to explicitly clarify that humanitar-
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the bill eventually came to Parliament, a broad cross-party majority of members 
expressed scepticism toward the provision in line with the Red Cross’ reserva-
tions. However, they approved the proposed act without amendments but urged 
the ministry to later specify the boundary ‘between legal humanitarian assistance 
to foreigners with illegal residence and what can be considered criminal complic-
ity’ ( Prop. 141 L (2010–2011 )). The Immigration Act was subsequently amended 
in January 2012 to this effect. The new provision (§108) read as follow: 
A person who provides humanitarian assistance to a foreign national staying 
illegally in the realm shall not be liable to a penalty for aiding and abetting 
the illegal stay unless (a) the person in question has had the intention of help-
ing the foreign national to evade the obligation to leave the realm, and (b) the 
assistance has made it more difficult for the authorities to implement removal 
of the foreign national. 
This paragraph thus clarifies that it is allowed to give humanitarian assistance 
as long as it is not intended to help the migrant evade government control
and efforts to deport the migrant in question. As examples of what the provision 
precludes criminal liability for, the ministry explicitly mentions  ‘humanitarian 
organisations that openly offer humanitarian assistance to people with unlaw-
ful presence, for example in the form of an offer of housing that is known to 
the authorities, food, medical care, etc.’ ( Prop. 141 L (2010–2011 ), 22).  Søvig 
(2013a ) points to shelter as the potentially most legally ambiguous form of assis-
tance. To what extent does sheltering an irregular migrant constitute hiding the 
migrant? Could, for instance, Mehret, as a private person, be punished for housing 
Aster? This is unclear, but as  Søvig (2013a ) notes in his legal review, the wording 
of the provision does not require that the offer of shelter be announced or in any 
way communicated to the authorities. The attempt to legally demarcate a space 
for humanitarian assistance thus illustrates the tension, but also the merging of 
pity and control in the policies towards irregular migrants. 
During the main part of my fieldwork, the volunteer-run healthcare centre in 
Oslo where I met Aster was the only NGO-run service explicitly targeting irregular 
migrants in Norway. This centre was established in 2009 and was run as a coop-
eration between the Norwegian Red Cross, its Oslo branch, and the Church City 
Mission. In October 2013, a similar centre was established in Bergen. This was a 
smaller operation run by activists after the local branches of the Red Cross and the 
Church City Mission initially decided against such a project. In 2018, however, 
the two organisations agreed to take over the administration of the already estab-
lished volunteer-run centre. While these centres were not only service providers 
but also important advocates for irregular migrants’ right to healthcare, they were 
caught in a double bind of having to interact with the state while simultaneously 
trying to remain critical of its policies ( Castañeda, 2011 ). 
Critical literature on humanitarianism has cautioned that focusing merely on 
humanitarian aid may, willingly or not, help build legitimacy for states’ exclusion-
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migrants ( Ticktin, 2011 ). These were dilemmas the centres were well aware of 
and struggled to deal with on a daily basis (see Chapters 4 and 5 ). An explicit aim 
of the healthcare centres from the beginning was to make the government take 
responsibility for irregular migrants’ healthcare needs. In this respect, the centres 
followed a ‘traditional’ approach of Norwegian NGOs, in which they act as ini-
tiators of activities to be taken over by the public sector (Sivesind et al., 2002).7 
A continuing challenge, though, was that while the humanitarian moral principle 
of securing biological life secured a space for care of irregular migrants, the care 
became premised on not challenging state sovereignty in determining member-
ship. For example, when Trygve Nordby, the then secretary general of the Norwe-
gian Red Cross, launched the initiative to provide healthcare services to irregular 
migrants he stated: ‘We do not dispute the sovereign prerogative to decide who 
should have legal residence in a country. This is only a matter of safeguarding 
basic needs and basic rights’ ( Norwegian Red Cross, 2007 , 6). This argument 
was used repeatedly to justify and defuse criticism against the centre and as such 
maintain a space for humanitarian assistance. Yet, as Agamben’s critique of mod-
ern rule highlights, the separation between humanitarianism and politics is ulti-
mately based on a faulty notion that it is possible to separate the biological or 
‘bare life’ of the individual from wider political questions. Thus, by relying on the 
political/humanitarian divide, humanitarian actors entrench a state sovereignty 
that is responsible for the very social suffering that they aim to minimise, accord-
ing to Agamben (1998 ). 
Beyond healthcare, there were few other services for irregular migrants, and 
access to food and shelter came to rely primarily on previous organisational struc-
tures and the norms of care and deservingness that informed these. Emphasising 
the ‘state-friendly’ context in the Nordic countries, academic literature on ‘civil 
society organisations’ has tended to see these organisations not as occupying an 
oppositional position in relation to the state but as part of a particular division 
of labour ( Wijkström and Zimmer, 2011 ;  Henriksen et al., 2018 ). Although vol-
untary sector providers of welfare exist, they have been considered so closely 
integrated into the public system of finance and control that they hardly constitute 
alternative providers of welfare services. 
This context has had some particular implications for irregular migrants’ access 
to humanitarian assistance from non-profit non-governmental organisations. First, 
the close integration of NGOs’ welfare services in the public system essentially 
meant that these services were not available for irregular migrants.8 For instance, 
while Zeki, received assistance from an NGO working with drug users both mate-
rially (food and money for health and dental care) and as mediator with the public 
system (applying for emergency aid, rehabilitation, appealing his expulsion), get-
ting treatment in an NGO-run rehabilitation institution was not an option. This 
is because the institutional places run by NGOs were generally pre-bought and 
administered by the public healthcare system. However, one of the low-threshold 
services for drug users in Oslo reported that in a few cases, they had initiated 
Medically Assisted Treatment for substance abuse with irregular migrants that 
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Second, in Norway, the NGO sector mainly plays an important role as a 
social service provider in some particular subfields, drug rehabilitation being the 
most prominent one, and (partly by extension) women in prostitution. Although 
clothes and food hand-outs by organisations expanded during the 2000s and were 
also increasingly directed towards those considered poor in general, most low-
threshold services were still primarily oriented towards these traditional areas of 
humanitarian assistance ( Nuland, 2007 ). Hence, irregular migrants such as Aster 
who were not suffering addiction were not necessarily able to benefit from these 
services. 
Most of the organisations providing basic material support (food, clothes) in 
both Oslo and Bergen during my fieldwork were Christian organisations (the 
Church City Mission, Blue Cross, and the Salvation Army). In addition, there 
were two non-religious self-help houses originally initiated by recipients of social 
benefits (Fattighuset in Oslo and Robin Hood-huset in Bergen). During my field-
work, these low-threshold services experienced the growing presence of irregular 
migrants in dire situations as challenging, and the organisations varied in their 
responses, that is, in the extent to which they were willing or able to offer their 
services to irregular migrants. In interviews and conversations, the staff members 
of organisations with whom I spoke pointed out two main dilemmas. The first 
dilemma was one of helplessness. While the organisations could offer irregular 
migrants some basic and temporal care under unfavourable conditions, their abil-
ity to serve as an entrance to public services, which many of the organisations saw 
as an important part of their role, was very limited. This limitation made some 
individuals and organisations reluctant to get involved. Second, some organisa-
tions feared that irregular migrants as new users of their services would push out 
the traditional users that they considered their target group (i.e. drug users). This 
led some NGOs to close their services to irregular migrants, while others decided 
to adjust their services to accommodate new user groups, including rejected asy-
lum seekers and poor jobseekers from the European Economic Area (EEA). 9 
In some cases, but not all, funding was an issue, as some relied on earmarked 
public support. The two main services targeting irregular migrants were explicitly 
funded by a combination of their own means, private funds and donations, and 
public support. The healthcare centre for undocumented migrants in Oslo was 
primarily financed by the Norwegian Red Cross and the Church City Mission, 
with only some minor earmarked funds directly from the Directorate of Health 
for projects considered important from a public health perspective. However, 
although the centre itself only received a small amount of public funding, the 
two organisations behind the centre received significant funding through vari-
ous state and local mechanisms. The centre in Bergen, in contrast, received most 
of its funding directly from the municipality and some from the county and the 
Directorate of Health. 
Access to shelter hardly existed in the two cities. When I started fieldwork, the 
only NGO-run shelters available in Oslo and Bergen were explicitly only for drug 
users and therefore were unavailable or considered inappropriate for irregular 
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fell below minus ten degree Celsius. In this sense, the shelter illustrated the con-
struction of a particularly minimalist biopolitics (‘no one should freeze’) and the 
arbitrariness in defining this threshold. The limit of ten degrees below zero, for 
example, was set by the health authorities in Oslo, and according to them, it was 
based on a ‘professional medical evaluation’ regarding when the weather con-
ditions would constitute a danger to life and health ( Vedeler et al., 2014 ). The 
shelters were, as such, regarded as acute medical care. However, in the winter of 
2014, the municipality was criticised for its strict interpretation. In response, the 
municipality adjusted its criteria to ‘perceived’ or ‘effective’ minus ten degrees 
rather than the exact temperature showed by the thermometer. In comparison, 
Trondheim tried out a similar offer in 2013 and 2014, where the criterion was first 
set at minus ten, then changed to zero, before it was changed again to minus five 
degrees Celsius ( Gullestad, 2013 ; Kilnes, 2013). 
In Oslo, the emergency shelter was run by the Salvation Army, financed in 
cooperation with the municipality, and access was administered by the munici-
pality through an after-hours social service office located at the main primary 
emergency care centre. To gain access, one had to register at the municipal office. 
The service considered its target groups primarily to be drug users and increas-
ingly ‘Roma-beggars’ and expressed scepticism to irregular migrants filling up 
the available space ( Drabløs and Holden, 2012 ). Hence, information about this 
possibility was not actively distributed among irregular migrants. 
No equivalent formalised offer existed in Bergen. However, in the spring of 
2013, the government launched a subsidy scheme for emergency services target-
ing ‘foreign beggars’. The bulk of the money went to shelters organised by the 
Church City Mission and the Red Cross in Oslo and Bergen. However, a require-
ment for funding was that these shelters were to be reserved for ‘travelling EEA-
citizens’. However, the shelters did not check ID and thereby made it possible 
for irregular migrants to gain access. People from countries outside the EEA, 
however, constituted generally a very small percentage of the reported guests at 
the shelters. 
Universalism and particularism 
Linda Bosniak (2006 , 31) has argued that universalism is the prevailing ethic 
within a political community whose boundaries and identity are taken for given. 
Likewise, the main characteristics of the Norwegian welfare state are thought to 
have developed prior to immigration becoming a politicised issue ( Brochmann, 
2017 ). In this sense, irregular migration has brought to the fore the limits and ter-
ritorial boundedness of the Nordic welfare model’s inclusionary ambitions. 
It should be noted here, though, that the Nordic countries have not necessar-
ily followed the same approach. At the turn of the millennium, when the debate 
over irregular migrants took off in Sweden, the migrants were defined as being 
outside the rights-bearing community of the welfare state. Since then, there has 
been a successive expansion of the scope of rights granted to irregular migrants. 







46 Producing precarity 
migrants were explicitly granted certain rights to subsidised healthcare beyond 
emergency care, although not equal to that offered legal residents, and irregular 
children access to schooling and healthcare. Hence, Swedish policy, previously 
often singled out as one of the most restrictive in Europe, has been revised in a 
more inclusionary direction ( Nielsen, 2016 ). However, these inclusive changes 
did not include access to social services, although these are provided by some 
municipalities ( Nordling, 2017 ). 
In Norway, irregular migrants’ position with regard to welfare rights was more 
inclusive to begin with. For example, in 1993, when several hundred rejected asy-
lum seekers from the Balkans, particularly Kosovo, sought sanctuary in Norwe-
gian churches, the Norwegian health authorities issued a letter that clarified that 
the Municipal Health Services Act (1982 ) did not distinguish between legal and 
illegal residence. Therefore, the municipality’s health services, which cover all 
primary healthcare, should include those that had sought church asylum ( Mathie-
sen, 2002 ). Irregular migrants are also still considered to be equally included by 
the scope of important welfare statutes such as the Child Welfare Act (1992 ), 
the Education Act (1998 ), and the Act on  Crisis Shelters (2009 ) ( Søvig, 2013b ). 
Irregular migrants’ access to welfare, particularly to healthcare and social sup-
port, though, has become increasingly limited. A common trait emerging from 
these accounts, is that although irregular migrants were not included in the regular 
system of social support, there were certain exceptional measures that made it 
possible to compensate for the harshest consequences of their lack of legal status. 
In this sense, it was not the absence of state support per se but substandard and 
exceptional care arrangements that produced migrants’ precarity. 
Notes 
1 This practice was recognised by the courts in 2013 when Gulating lagmannsrett (appeal 
court) acquitted a company of criminal enterprises for having employed an asylum 
seeker without a valid work permit in 2009 and 2010. The court noted that the company 
had built on a widespread misconception that a person’s tax card was sufficient evidence 
for a work permit. This judgement is final as the Supreme Court rejected the state’s 
appeal ( UDI, 2013 ). 
2 Employees at private and NGO-run centres can share information concerning residents 
with the UDI. This is part of their tender agreement through a clause used since 2003. 
However, employees at municipally run centres, as public employees, were bound by a 
stricter code of confidentiality and therefore could not legally share information with the 
UDI ( NOU, 2011 : 10, p. 10). 
3 Local authorities were explicitly encouraged to give feedback on this issue in the consul-
tation round of 2013. Few did, which could be an indication that there were few experi-
ences or that knowledge was limited. 
4 It should be noted that while social assistance can be considered universal in the sense 
that the circle of people who can apply for such support is very broad, it is not so uni-
versal in the sense that it is awarded on assessment, and the amounts conferred can vary 
( Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012 ). 
5 This affirmation of sovereign prerogative in the welfare legislation was implemented 
in the Social Services Act first in 1991. Also, whereas the Patients’ Rights Act of 2001 
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or who do not reside permanently in the realm, the Social Services Act of 2010 uses 
‘limiting’. See Andersen (2014 ) for a discussion of possible implications of this distinc-
tion. For instance, from a legal perspective, Anderson criticises the government min-
istries for going too far in restricting irregular migrants’ access to social benefits in 
relation to this opening given by the law. 
6 The current provision in the Immigration Act concerning humanitarian aid was a pre-
liminary end product of a series of amendments of a fairly technical nature. For a more 
detailed review, see  Søvig (2013a ). 
7 Trygve G. Nordby, the then secretary general of the Norwegian Red Cross, stressed this 
point at the inauguration conference by comparing the healthcare centre to the Women’s 
crisis shelter movement. Women’s crisis shelter is a case in point in Norway exemplify-
ing activities that originally were initiated by voluntary associations, then becoming 
almost totally financed by public sources, before becoming an obligatory municipal 
task, often run by the municipalities themselves (Sivesind et al., 2002). 
8 There were some variations. For instance, the healthcare centres in Oslo and Bergen 
were able to make deals with the diaconal hospitals in the cities for access to certain 
types of healthcare (see Chapter 4). These hospitals were independent diaconal institu-
tions within the Church of Norway. Both also function as local hospitals for Bergen and 
Oslo under contract with the regional health enterprises through which they receive the 
majority of their funding. 
9 Irregular migrants here were just one category of a broader group of new users. So-
called ‘Euro refugees’ and ‘Roma-beggars’ generally constituted a larger presence. 
‘Euro refugees’ was a term frequently used in the media during my fieldwork in 2011– 
2013 primarily to denote an influx of people coming from Spain to seek work due to the 
financial crisis and who found themselves in a precarious situation in Norway without 
shelter. ‘Roma-beggars’ and ‘Euro refugees’ seeking employment, whom these shelters 
were supposed to be for, often found themselves in a form of irregular situation as they 
did not necessarily conform to the requirements of self-sufficiency stipulated for free 
movement within the EEA. Nevertheless, as Europeans, they were constructed as a dif-
ferent problem field than non-EEA travellers (or irregulars). However, how this worked 
out for each category is ambiguous. EEA-citizens would not have access to the safety 






 2  Moral bordering 
In February 2013, only a year after it went into force, the emergency aid provi-
sion that granted Zeki economic assistance from local welfare offices came under 
attack. Several Norwegian newspapers reported that a man from the Middle 
East, convicted of attempted rape in Sweden and expelled from Schengen, had 
been granted social assistance and housing benefits from the Norwegian Wel-
fare Administration (NAV). Like Zeki, this man had initially come to Norway as 
an unaccompanied minor, before moving to Sweden in 2010. On his return, as 
the media account reported, the local office in the city of Skien first granted the 
man emergency aid for ten days during the summer of 2012. Later that year, the 
man applied for regular social support, which he was denied. However, the man 
appealed to the county governor, who concluded that he indeed was entitled to 
financial support and temporary accommodation until he ‘in practice could leave 
the country’, a phrase used in the regulation of the so-called emergency aid provi-
sion (the Social Services Regulation, 2011 ). 
In response to the media coverage of the case, several prominent politicians 
reacted with strong condemnation. Torbjørn Røe Isaksen, a prominent conserva-
tive Member of Parliament, exclaimed that this gave anyone staying ‘illegally’
in Norway a ‘carte blanche’ to get money from the welfare administration. The 
Progress Party’s Robert Eriksson, who 8 months later would become the Minis-
ter of Labour and Social Inclusion, claimed that ‘we now find ourselves in the 
insane situation that we have become the social welfare office for the entire world’
( Hegvik et al., 2013 ). The Minister of Labour and Social Inclusion at the time ,
Anniken Huitfeldt (the Labour Party), was also quick to declare that granting 
benefits to this man was contrary to her opinion about who should receive wel-
fare benefits. However, while the opposition seemed to protest giving support to 
people staying ‘illegally’ in general, the Minister focused on this man’s criminal 
background. In a statement quoted in VG, the largest Norwegian newspaper, she 
said, ‘If the current emergency provision has such unreasonable effects, I will 
change it. I want to make sure that it is not abused by persons who have commit-
ted crimes and who have been expelled from the country’ ( Hegvik, 2013 a). Five 
months later, the Minister, on the basis of this particular case, initiated a consulta-
tion on changing the regulation. As the regulation was only a year old, it became 
the second consultation on the so-called emergency provision in less than two 
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Thus far, I have explored how irregular migrants’ limited access to basic ser-
vices is legally and administratively structured in Norway. But how is it legiti-
mised? While the opening case underscores the instability of the care granted to 
irregular migrants as shown in the previous chapter, it also draws attention to how 
this relates to moral judgements and discourses about deservingness surrounding 
irregular migrants. In this chapter, I am interested in understanding how the norms 
that govern irregular migrants’ access to welfare services reflect wider societal 
values and norms regarding the legitimate and illegitimate, and not only the legal 
and illegal, and how these norms can contribute to irregular migrants’ precari-
ous inclusion. Under what conditions does it become easier or more difficult to 
deny irregular migrants basic support such as food, shelter, and healthcare? Or 
more specifically in the context of Norway: How could the exclusion of irregular 
migrants from regular welfare be justified within a system supposedly based on 
equality? 
Judith Butler (2009 , 25) has argued that precarity, that is the differential dis-
tribution of precariousness, should be understood at once as a material and per-
ceptual issue, as those not regarded as valuable are made to bear the burden of 
starvation, underemployment, legal disenfranchisement, and so on. Hence, to 
Butler, a central question when exploring the conditions under which certain 
human lives acquires a right to protection, and under what conditions they do not 
is what makes for a grievable life. For example, people who are deemed respon-
sible for the ills that have befallen them or those that are considered dangerous to 
the community are generally less likely to be mourned or pitied and thus protected 
and cared for. 
The persons who are cast as a threat or responsible for their own ills varies 
between societies and must be studied in a historical and socio-spatial context. 
In the Nordic context, structural explanations for deprivation and poverty, rather 
than individual blame, have been thought to have stronger support than in coun-
tries with other welfare regimes. With its normative basis, Nordic political culture 
has therefore been considered a least-likely case for a deservingness frame to be 
effective regarding policy design ( Van Der Waal et al., 2013 ;  Larsen, 2008 ). Nev-
ertheless, in the Nordic countries, a ‘deservingness rank order’ similar to other 
European countries has been indicated, following to varying degrees criteria 
such as blame/innocence, ‘us’/‘them’, and future/past reciprocity ( Van Oorschot, 
2007 ). A central stake regarding irregular migrants’ access to welfare, as illus-
trated in the opening case, is whether all irregular migrants are undeserving, or are 
there some who are more (or less) worthy of compassion and care? 
The moral economy of a society is also not only related to how the ‘we’ con-
struct ‘the Other’ but also to how the ‘we’ perceives itself in relation to ‘the 
Other’. Welfare is not simply about particular institutional arrangements but 
must also be approached as expressions of norms, values, and social goals hav-
ing a significance as to how problems are understood and responded to ( Kuhnle 
and Kildal, 2005 ). Such an understanding of welfare draws attention to the kinds 
of conceptions of the nation are installed and enacted in the institutions of wel-
fare and how the basic cultural norms and values that underpin different welfare 
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on moral bordering practices can shed light on how care for irregular migrants is 
both moulded by and helps mould transformation in the welfare state. In the fol-
lowing, I will therefore first investigate how irregular migrants are constructed 
as deserving or undeserving in state policies and discourse before exploring 
how these constructions relate to national self-perception, and norms and values 
embedded in the welfare state. 
Between blame and pity 
The way irregular migrants are increasingly cast as ‘undeserving’, and not merely 
‘unwanted’, in public discourse is widely commented upon within migration lit-
erature. In particular, the ‘culture of disbelief’ surrounding the category of asylum 
seekers in Europe, and the distinction increasingly made between legitimate and 
deserving refugees and bogus asylum seekers, has been seen to justify harsher 
policies, including restricted access to basic service provisions for those deemed 
undeserving. In this context, terms like ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘irregular migrant’
become not simply descriptions of legal status but value-laden and negative 
( Anderson, 2013 ). Constructed as undeserving and denied a political voice, irreg-
ular migrants are excluded not only from the political community but also, Willen 
argues, from ‘the moral community of people whose lives, bodies, illnesses, and 
injuries are deemed worthy of attention, investment, or concern’ ( Willen, 2012b , 
806). The question of deservingness as such becomes central to the way migrants’
civic value is defined, measured, and translated into care. 
Despite the fact that irregular migrants are surrounded by discourses portraying 
them as a threat to society, research has shown that humanitarian discourses also 
portray them as human beings variously in need and deserving of care. Which 
particular suffering is recognised in the public domain, however, is a question of 
struggle and construction and not of inherent ‘merit’, as argued by Ticktin (2011 ). 
Moreover, as suggested by  Fassin (2012 ), the flip side of a politics of compassion 
that emphasises deservingness is that policies become more vulnerable to moral 
panic. This introduces both instabilities and an ambivalence in regard to how 
irregular migrants are perceived and managed. It also contributes to an increased 
differentiation and hierarchisation as certain categories of irregularised migrants 
evoke more or less compassion. The literature on the role of humanitarianism 
in governing migration in Europe has particularly highlighted the importance of 
the sick body ( Fassin, 2012 ), but also how humanitarian exceptions are shaped 
by classed, racialised, and gendered notions of innocence and dangerousness 
( Aradau, 2004 ; Ticktin, 2016 ). Here, foreign women in prostitution are a prime 
example, as various mechanisms have been introduced in many countries to dis-
tinguish between women who are deserving and innocent victims of trafficking 
or undeserving and criminal irregular migrants ( Plambech, 2014 ). Much of this 
literature has focused on the significance of humanitarianism for protection in 
the form of residence. However, many of the central characteristics identified 
can also be seen operating in regard to questions of what kind of care should be 
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recognition of need, vulnerability, and deservingness produce further differenti-
ated access to services. 
In Norway, parallel to the changing social policies, there has been a growing 
state effort to distinguish discursively between the migrants who are ‘worthy’ and 
‘unworthy’ receivers of welfare state benefits, I propose. As irregular migration is 
largely associated with the asylum system in Norway, this in particular has been 
pursued by an increasing tendency to distinguish the rejected asylum seeker from 
the asylum seeker, both in terms of welfare entitlements, as shown in the previous 
chapter, but also in terms of labelling. The term ‘asylum seeker’ has not neces-
sarily had a negative connotation in Norway and was the term most often used by 
my interlocutors. To explore the moral ambiguity surrounding irregular migrants, 
I will first look at how irregular migrants’ deservingness is expressed in various 
labels used within Norwegian public discourse, before examining how deserving-
ness is used to differentiate between irregular migrants. 
 Whose responsibility? 
The central contested issue that is expressed in the various labels used to describe 
irregular migrants in Norway, I suggest, is who is to be held morally responsible 
for their precarious situation – the migrants themselves or the state that fails to 
deport them. What is at stake in the labels is thus the question of individual-
versus-social responsibility for suffering. In 2004, the term  ureturnerbar (unre-
turnable) was a prominent label introduced in the discussions surrounding the 
withdrawal scheme implemented in 2004 regarding rejected asylum seekers’
access to state accommodation. The term was widely used among academics, 
politicians, and bureaucrats, and it contributed towards enlisting public sympathy 
(see for instance Brekke and Søholt, 2005 ; Aarø and Wyller, 2005 ). Many of those 
who lost access to state accommodation at that time were difficult to deport, either 
because the country of origin did not accept deportees or because identity was not 
established. However, since 2004 the government has made several attempts to 
define and delimit to whom the term ‘unreturnable’ should refer. 
In a bill presented to the Parliament, the following definition was introduced: 
Only when the person respects the rejection [of his/her asylum claim] by 
actively cooperating in his/her return to the country of origin, but still is pre-
vented from returning by the home country’s authorities, can he or she be 
referred to as a ‘genuine’ unreturnable. 
(Ot.prp. nr. 112 [2004–2005]) 
In 2007, this definition formed the basis for changes in the Immigration Act, 
making it possible for the immigration authorities to grant work and residence 
permits as a last resort when there were ‘practical obstacles for return’. Although 
‘genuine’ here seems to signal that many of those who currently fell under the 
label ‘unreturnable’ were not so in the view of the state, the provision can be seen 
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however, the official view became categorical, namely that no one was ‘unreturn-
able’; there were only ‘return refusers’ ( returnektere). 
The labelling of irregular migrants as ‘return refusers’ can be seen as an active 
attempt by the authorities to contradict the more established terms of ureturner-
bare and papirløse (‘undocumented’, or more literally translated, ‘paperless’) and 
also to question the victim-status that these terms implied. The ‘return refuser’
label was first introduced by State Secretary (junior minister) Pål K. Lønseth, 
who acted as the government spokesperson on asylum issues between 2009 and 
2013, in a newspaper comment in October 2011 (Lønseth, 2011). This comment 
was a response to concerns raised by several municipalities, including some of the 
largest cities in Norway, about irregular migrants’ living conditions. These con-
cerns were again spurred by various political mobilisations on the part of irregular 
migrants, including an asylum march from Oslo to Trondheim in August 2011 and 
a hunger strike in Bergen in October 2011, leading to a number of city councils 
adopting resolutions urging the government to re-evaluate current policies con-
cerning work permits, healthcare, and regularisation. In continuation, two mem-
bers of Parliament representing the Liberal Party (Venstre) submitted a proposal to 
the Parliament to ask the government, among other things, to ‘ensure that undocu-
mented (‘papirløse’) immigrants receive necessary physical and mental health-
care’ and ‘create conditions to ensure that undocumented immigrants can work 
legally and pay taxes until known departure date’ ( Innst. 199 S (2011–2012 )). 
In her written response to the Parliamentarian committee considering the pro-
posal (Parliament’s Standing Committee on Local Government and Public
Administration), the Minister of Justice and the Police Grete Faremo responded 
by first ‘clarifying the terms’: 
Initially, I find it appropriate to have a conceptual clarification. The term 
‘undocumented’ (‘papirløse’) is unfortunate as it can be misunderstood to 
mean that the person in question does not have identity documents or written 
decision from the Norwegian immigration authorities. I assume that ‘undocu-
mented’ here refers to people without legal residence in Norway.  A more 
appropriate term, which I will use in what follows is ‘return refusers’. 
( Innst. 199 S (2011–2012 ), my emphasis) 
‘Person without legal residence’ is the official term used in public documents 
and regulations. Therefore, it might seem strange that ‘return refuser’ should be 
‘a more appropriate term’ in this context. The different labels preferred by the 
MPs and the minister, however, have significantly different connotations regard-
ing responsibility, morale, and agency and, as such, represent different ways of 
framing the problem and the solutions. In the dominant Western model of per-
sonhood, the individual is generally characterised as rational, autonomous, and 
unitary. Notions of agency therefore become central to attributing responsibil-
ity and accountability ( Jacobsen and Skilbrei, 2010 ). ‘Unreturnable’ and to an 
extent ‘undocumented’ assign the migrant a passive subject-position and signals 
a failure on the part of the state to act, whereas ‘return refuser’ puts the agency 
 
 
Moral bordering 53 
and the moral responsibility of not returning clearly on the migrant. It also makes 
the migrant, and not the state, responsible for their own and their children’s liv-
ing conditions while they are irregular. It is the migrants themselves that hold the 
solution to their problems. As then State Secretary Pål K. Lønseth put it, ‘They are 
themselves responsible for putting their own and their children’s lives on hold by 
refusing to return’ (Lønseth, 2011). This was followed by similar statements made 
by the Minister of Justice and Police Grete Faremo. In a newspaper comment 
regarding children of irregular migrants, with the telling title ‘Parental responsi-
bility’, she writes, ‘The important thing to remember is that the state is responsible 
for the [asylum] procedure and the time this takes. Everything happening after the 
final decision is the asylum seekers’ own responsibility’ (Faremo, 2012). Faremo, 
by ‘clarifying the terms’ in her letter to the Parliamentarian Committee, could thus 
be said to place the blame for the difficult situation on the migrants themselves, 
justifying the state’s lack of compassion. Her response to the concerns raised by 
the two members of Parliament and the municipalities of Trondheim, Bergen, 
Stavanger, Sandnes, and Kragerø was, not surprisingly, that there was no need for 
the government to soften their current policies. 
Mismanaged life and humanitarian exceptions 
Several scholars have commented upon the trend within neoliberal governmental-
ity to place the moral blame on individuals for their own predicament, rather than 
pointing to structures of inequality based on class, race, and gender. Accordingly, 
a ‘mismanaged’ life becomes evidence of and grounds for (an Agambenian form 
of) abandonment ( Pratt, 2005 ). It becomes a ‘banishment by choice’ ( Mitchell, 
2006 , 103). This is clearly implied in the term ‘return refuser’, as, in the view of 
the Norwegian government, they were themselves responsible for putting their 
lives ‘on hold’ by refusing to return to their country of origin. Nevertheless, as 
shown in the previous chapter, irregular migrants were (and still are) entitled to 
certain benefits. Throughout the past decade of changing policies, certain groups 
have been continuously singled out for special care. For example, families with 
children and individuals with health problems could remain in ordinary state 
accommodation during the period the withdrawal scheme was in effect. This 
draws attention to how recognition of vulnerability and perceived blame were 
used to distinguish between irregular migrants deemed to be more or less deserv-
ing of care. In this case, there seem to be two different mechanisms operating. 
The first mechanism relates to the distinction between the ‘good’ and ‘bad ille-
gal migrant’ as illustrated in the opening passage. Here, the minister singled out 
‘convicted criminals’ as those who should be excluded from services that other 
irregularised migrants receive. In this sense, these are lives that are seen as ‘extra 
mismanaged’ or ‘ungrievable’ as they are perceived to have failed in some impor-
tant moral ways and therefore do not deserve even humanitarian compassion. The 
second category is the so-called ‘humanitarian exceptions’ based on particular 
notions of suffering and vulnerability through which certain individuals and cat-
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Several scholars have pointed out how the deservingness discourse constructs 
particular subject-positions for the irregular migrant. For example, while the 
focus on irregular migrants as ‘bogus refugees’ or ‘criminals’ has helped con-
struct the category of the ‘bad illegal’, irregular migrants are also encouraged 
to make themselves ‘good illegals’ to counter these associations in an attempt to 
gain both moral and legal acceptance ( Coutin, 2003 ;  Khosravi, 2010 : Anderson, 
2013 ). According to  Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas (2012 ), the good character 
of irregular migrants in various EU countries and in the USA has been increas-
ingly defined in terms of noncriminal conduct, economic reliability, fiscal contri-
bution, identity stability, and bureaucratic traceability. As such, irregular migrants 
can make themselves ‘less illegal’ and more deserving by working and avoiding 
crime. Through their exploration of ‘the moral economy of illegality’ in France, 
Spain, the Netherlands, and the USA, Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas (2012 ) 
suggest that work participation in the workforce is an important currency in the 
moral economy in these countries. Work, as they point out, is both a major path-
way towards legal recognition and an area where irregular migrants can access 
formal rights. In most European countries, labour law formally protects all work-
ers irrespective of their legal status. In France, the Code du Travail specifically 
states that illegally employed workers are entitled to the same guarantees as the 
regularly employed, including the calculation of pay based on seniority. 
Whereas wage labour is a key marker of inclusion in most countries, including 
Norway, Eba and Aster’s cases in the previous chapter illustrate how, for legal and 
political reasons, they were not considered, or not allowed to be considered, as 
‘contributing members of society’. However, through their protests in Oslo Cathe-
dral following the loss of the tax card, the Ethiopians still attempted to inscribe 
themselves in what Anderson (2013 ) calls ‘the community of values’ by empha-
sising their deservingness as taxpayers ( Bendixsen, 2013 ). Moreover, as shown in 
the previous chapter, Eba and Aster stressed their attributes as ‘good workers’ in 
their conversations with me, referring to the recommendations they had received 
from previous employers. Scholars have pointed out that such statements must not 
be understood just as conveying an aspect of their identities but also as challeng-
ing the discursively and institutionally produced positionality of the ‘unproduc-
tive Other’ (Haas, 2012, 253; Bendixsen, 2013 ). Nonetheless, labels may mould 
in subtle ways the identities of those who are consigned to a label ( Dauvergne, 
2005 ). For instance, when I asked Aster if she had tried to look for informal work, 
she replied that she had thought about it. She had considered knocking on doors 
in her neighbourhood and asking if people needed domestic help. ‘But you know’, 
she explained, ‘I didn’t do it because I’m ashamed. Ashamed that I am illegal.’
In Norway, being good workers and taxpayers neither created formal possibili-
ties for gaining access to welfare for Eba and Aster nor did it lead to becoming 
regularised. Consequently, it could be argued that their moral capital as work-
ers did not translate into rights, but rather worked to document their lengthy 
breach of immigration law, thus making it a more serious offense in the view of 
the immigration authorities. Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas (2012 , 253) also 
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at constant risk of being framed as ‘more illegal’ for the same economic features 
assumed to increase their civic capital. 
When it comes to questions of deservingness and humanitarian exceptions, 
Norway’s moral economy resembles to a large extent that of various other Euro-
pean countries, where children and women in certain circumstances are consid-
ered particularly vulnerable and have been targeted in policies. Based on her 
research on irregular migration in France and the USA, Ticktin (2016 ) has argued 
that perceived innocence is important for suffering to become recognised. As she 
writes, ‘The quintessential humanitarian victims bear no responsibility for their 
suffering. . . . As innocents, they are pure, without guile, and without intent – they 
are seemingly outside politics and certainly outside blame for their misfortune’
(p. 257). With innocence increasingly being required in order to designate the 
sufferer as worthy, ‘blameless children’ become in theory the ideal recipients of 
humanitarian care, she suggests. 
In Norway, the so-called ‘long-staying asylum children’, a term that generally 
refers to children who have lived in asylum reception centres for more than three 
years and whose families’ asylum cases have been rejected, have received signifi-
cant attention in the media and at the government level. This category has been 
the main subject of Norway’s limited regularisation schemes, through which chil-
dren’s ‘affiliation to the Realm’ has become a key issue in evaluating whether a 
family should get residence on humanitarian grounds (Meld. St. 27 [2011–2012]). 
Children are also granted the right to education and to most healthcare services. 
However, caught in the tension between states’ commitments to protecting chil-
dren and their governments’ desire to limit unwanted migration, asylum children’s 
position has increasingly become ambivalent ( Vitus and Lidén, 2010 ). For exam-
ple, Norwegian policies have adopted a distinction between children under or 
above the age of 15. Unaccompanied minors younger than 15 years, since 2008, 
are entitled to live in special care centres administered by the Child Welfare Ser-
vices to ensure that they are entitled to the same standards of care and support as 
were the children in child protection institutions. Minors aged 16–18, however, 
are placed in asylum centres for unaccompanied minors under the jurisdiction of 
the Directorate of Immigration. Since 2009, unaccompanied minors over the age 
of 16 at the time of the decision may also be given only temporary permission to 
stay until they reach the age of 18 ( Lidén et al., 2017 ). 
Women in prostitution are also an ambiguous category in terms of innocence. 
In Norway, irregular migrants suspected of being the victims of human trafficking 
have the right to temporary residence by entering the so-called reflection period. 
In this six-month period, they are granted the right to accommodation, financial 
support, and healthcare services. However, without being recognised as a vic-
tim or witness whose presence is necessary for an investigation and prosecution, 
these women lose the residence status and the rights that accompany it ( Jacobsen 
and Skilbrei, 2010 ;  Jahnsen, 2014 ). As irregular migrants, they have very lim-
ited access to healthcare, but both Bergen and Oslo municipalities have particular 
healthcare arrangements for women in prostitution in general that also extend to 
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at women in prostitution that include irregular women. However, the care services 
these can offer are very restricted and do not involve access to shelter or money. 
As such, NGOs I spoke with would sometimes assist women with applications 
for asylum as a way of temporarily regularising their stay and gaining access to 
housing in asylum reception centres for certain periods of time. 
However, what appeared as the clearest and most particular example of human-
itarian exception in the Norwegian context was rejected asylum seekers’ access to 
state accommodation and economic benefits through the asylum reception system 
and the Act of Necessity that I described in detail in the previous chapter. While 
it is difficult to say whether the distinction between rejected asylum seekers and 
other irregularised migrants was based on some moral judgement of deserving-
ness due to an attachment to the asylum system or based on pragmatic concerns, 
both systems could be said to be grounded in what Fassin (2009) has called ‘biole-
gitimacy’, as they primarily were premised on the basic survivability of the body. 
However, in contrast to  Fassin’s (2012 ) France, it was not the sick body that was 
the primary object of compassion but the starving and freezing body. Thus, while 
inclusion in healthcare services was a more prominent feature of precarious inclu-
sion in France, state accommodation in asylum reception centres became, I sug-
gest, a more central characteristic in Norway. This relates in part, I believe, to how 
visible poverty has been seen as deeply disturbing in the Nordic countries ( Barker, 
2017 ) and thus the manner in which it touches on questions of national identity. 
National identity and care for the excluded 
Humanitarianism as a form of government rationality not only makes a distinc-
tion between the deserving and undeserving ‘Other’ but could also be said to 
say something about national identity. Catherine  Dauvergne (2005 ), for example, 
makes this argument. By examining the role of humanitarianism in Australian 
and Canadian immigration law, she notes that humanitarianism defines national 
identity not only through creating ‘the other’ who is the target of ‘our’ generos-
ity but also by presenting a mirror in which the nation seeks a reflection of its 
benevolence. As she writes, ‘The need that is met by humanitarianism is the need 
to define and understand the nation as compassionate and caring’ ( 2005 , 75). 
Norway and the Nordic countries are not alone in sustaining a self-image as 
good and moral states. Fassin (2005 ) and Ticktin (2011 ), for example, observe 
how France’s self-image as the ‘homeland of human rights’ contributed to a 
particular humanitarian government of migration in which the ‘suffering’ body, 
rather than the political or labouring migrant body, gained recognition. In a simi-
lar vein, Norway, together with its Nordic neighbours, has long fostered a self-
perception and image as exceptionally compassionate and good nations through 
its commitments to welfare both domestically and internationally ( Lawler, 2013 ). 
Domestically, the comprehensive welfare system, and high degree of social level-
ling, has been highlighted. Internationally, the countries have defined themselves 
through such things as a strong commitment to an UN-centred world order, the 
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the provision of overseas development assistance. As pointed out by Trägårdh 
‘many countries engage in foreign aid, but outside the Nordic region few have 
been as vocal in proclaiming as their national mission such a strong commitment 
to foreign aid efforts and human rights ideals’ (2018, 94). Particularly, Norway 
and Sweden have promoted an image as ‘moral’ or ‘humanitarian great-powers’
( NOU, 2003 , 19;  Fuglerud, 2005 ;  Marklund, 2017 ). In much scholarly literature, 
the Nordic brand of ‘normative internationalism’ has been closely linked to the 
countries’ domestic political cultures in which the values of solidarity, equality, 
and social justice are emphasised (Bergman, 2007; Witoszek and Midttun, 2018). 
In this sense, a commitment to solidarity and equality at home and human rights 
and development aid abroad are seen as two integrated aspects of ‘the Nordic 
model’ (Trägårdh, 2018). Although the thesis of Nordic exceptionalism and soli-
darity is somewhat overstated, it has undoubtedly been influential in shaping the 
nations’ self-perception and has enjoyed considerable popular legitimacy. 
The Nordic countries initially pursued a liberal asylum and refugee policy 
in line with their commitment to internationalism ( Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017 ). 
However, this has been changing over the past decades as the Nordic countries 
have imposed a series of restrictive policies with regard to both asylum and family 
migration (Staver, 2015;  Liden et al., 2017 ;  Brekke et al., 2020 ). The restrictive 
changes have come in different degrees and paces in the various countries, with 
Norway generally placing itself somewhere between Denmark, which has tended 
to take the lead in the turn towards restrictive policies, and Sweden, generally 
considered the most liberal of the Nordic countries ( Brochmann and Hagelund, 
2012 ;  Hagelund, 2020 ). In all countries, and particularly after the increase in the 
numbers of asylum seekers in 2015, these restrictive policies have increasingly 
included what Gammeltoft-Hansen (2017 ) calls indirect deterrence. Unlike direct 
deterrence, these policies do not physically or legally restrict access to seek and 
obtain asylum but include measures designed to discourage applications for asy-
lum or divert them to other countries by making conditions for asylum-seekers 
and recognised refugees appear as unattractive as possible. Gammeltoft-Hansen 
(2017 ) sees these policies as a form of ‘negative nation branding’ that could 
potentially create dilemmas with regard to the wider ‘branding’ of the nation, as 
well as the country’s self-image. 
In the following, I will explore the role played by notions of goodness as part of 
national identity in relation to care for irregular migrants in Norway. Two aspects 
emerge as particularly significant. The first aspect relates to the tension between 
the ‘goodness’ implied in humanitarianism and in the universal welfare state. The 
second is the ambiguous role public discussions of goodness have had in terms of 
justifying more restrictive policies towards irregular migrants. 
Welfare nationalism and humanitarianism 
Exploring how the Norwegian welfare state embodies a form of community that 
is emotional and moral, anthropologist Halvard Vike (2004 ) has suggested that 
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considered solely the sufferer’s own problem. Instead, he argues, suffering is a 
kind of stain that testifies to an incomplete and somewhat immoral society. 1 In this 
regard, safeguarding and providing care to groups defined as weak is important 
to maintaining the welfare state’s legitimacy and, as  Rugkåsa (2010 ) suggests, 
citizens’ identity as citizens in an inclusive society. This creates a strong norma-
tive pressure or expectation on the part of the state to address suffering of differ-
ent kinds and to ensure that no one lives under conditions defined as undignified. 
Vike (2004 ) has characterised the Norwegian welfare state as ambitious and virtu-
ally limitless in the way it assumes responsibility for citizens’ needs. 
It is, however, unclear whether this kind of welfare nationalism could extend 
to those who are not deemed to belong, politically or morally, in the state or the 
nation. A basic premise in the Nordic model, for example, is that welfare policy 
should be universal and not limited to certain social groups, such as workers or 
the poor ( Rugkåsa, 2010 ). Yet, as argued by  Gullestad (2002 ), there is also an 
ethnically defined nationalism embedded in the seemingly egalitarian rhetoric in 
that equality is conceived as ‘sameness’. This could potentially be used to dis-
criminate. In Norway, scholars have further shown how the politics of migrant 
admission and incorporation is increasingly shaped by gendered, ethnicised, and 
classed notions of deservingness and desirability ( Guðjónsdóttir and Loftsdóttir, 
2017 ; Staver, 2015). Moreover, as previously noted, the welfare state’s idea of 
distributive justice is often seen to presuppose a bounded world within which dis-
tribution takes place, a view inherent in the hard-on-the-outside soft-on-the-inside 
approach to migration ( Bosniak, 2006 ;  Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012 ). Irregu-
lar migrants represent in this context a tricky problem for welfare states by putting 
core welfare and national norms at odds. On the one hand, there is the bounded 
notion of membership represented by citizenship. On the other hand, there is the 
egalitarian notion of justice, redistribution, and equality. 
The Norwegian form of welfare state nationalism to which Vike (2004 ) points 
can thus be said to include grounds for both inclusion in and exclusion from wel-
fare for irregular migrants. The argument that suffering not only is the sufferer’s 
own problem but testifies to a somewhat immoral society was definitely present 
within debates about irregular migrants and welfare, and it could be seen as creat-
ing a bottom line to what ‘illegal residents’ are allowed to suffer. For example, 
Brekke, who conducted the commissioned evaluation of the withdrawal scheme in 
2004, has linked irregular migrants’ continued access to food and shelter despite 
political efforts to remove it to core values underpinning the welfare system. As 
he argues in relation to the unwritten Act of Necessity: 
[T]he debate over the rights of these people showed that at rock-bottom there 
is a limit to what people can be allowed to suffer, which is frost and star-
vation. On the basis of the legislation prevailing in 2005, rejected persons 
can be pressured thus far, but not beyond that limit. The norm that provides 
emergency aid in such extreme cases is not a formal obligation of the welfare 
state and was not based on any formal entitlement. These softer norms that 
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tradition of provision of welfare, or even more possibly as the result of basic 
humanitarian concerns and ideas of equality, which have served as the basis 
for the establishment of the welfare state. 
( Brekke, 2008 , 21, my emphasis) 
During my fieldwork, prominent voices supporting a more ‘humane’ approach 
to irregular migrants, including bishops, politicians from different political par-
ties, humanitarian organisations, and local activists, similarly referred to irregular 
migrants’ dismal situation as a ‘disgrace to the welfare state’ or even characterised 
the policies as ‘un-Norwegian’. Human suffering as a disgrace to the welfare state 
can be seen in this sense to play a similar role as the alternative ‘homeland of 
human rights’ rhetoric Fassin observed in  France (2005 ) in appealing to a national 
identity as good and compassionate to justify access to basic care for irregular 
migrants. 
In Norway, scholars have linked the discourse of national goodness, and its 
political legitimacy, with its success in being able to combine the solidarity con-
cept of the labour movement and the Christian concept of compassion ( Loga, 
2002 ;  Gripsrud, 2018 ). While the interconnection between these concepts is seen 
as important for understanding Norwegian history and political culture, they also 
represent different and diverging commitments and projects, a fact often underap-
preciated in academic and public discussions of Norwegian ‘goodness’. Impor-
tantly in this context, there is a difference between welfare based on notions of 
social rights and redistribution, and on compassion and charity. In the Nordic 
model, these different welfare commitments have largely been projected onto 
two separate stages – humanitarianism internationally and universality domesti-
cally. The interesting question here becomes: What happens when the principles 
of humanitarianism are not only applied to a geographically distant stranger but 
applied in the domestic field in regard to irregular migrants? 
Scholars of humanitarianism in the field of migration have tended to empha-
sise three particular characteristics of humanitarian care. First, humanitarianism 
is about feelings rather than entitlements. Actions are based on compassion and 
benevolence and oriented towards ‘victims’ rather than bearers of rights ( Fassin, 
2012 ). Second, humanitarian discourse and practice rest on a distinction between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ and are grounded in a specific type of difference created by mate-
rial inequality ( Dauvergne, 2005 ). Third, humanitarianism is oriented towards 
alleviating human suffering rather than fostering equality ( Feldman and Ticktin, 
2010 ). By focusing on individuals and not structural realities, humanitarianism 
includes a tendency to de-politicise and individualise suffering ( Ticktin, 2014 , 
277–283). Humanitarianism as a moral principle guiding welfare policy has 
mainly been associated with support for more modest and means-tested measures 
directed at poverty relief ( Feldman and Steenbergen, 2001 ). 
As shown in the previous chapter, the basic safety net granted to irregular 
migrants resembles more a form of humanitarian exceptions than how the Norwe-
gian welfare state traditionally frames and addresses suffering. Nilssen and Kildal 
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and expresses ‘a resource-based egalitarian notion of justice, including ideas of 
redistribution, equal opportunity and equal respect’ ( 2009 , 313). 2  Kuhnle and Kil-
dal (2005 , 23) further note that an essential historic reason for adopting the twin 
concepts of social rights and universalism in Norwegian welfare politics was to 
remove the humiliating loss of status, dignity, and self-respect that goes along 
with exclusion from programmes and entitlements. Human dignity,  Kuhnle and 
Kildal (2005 ) argue, was a salient theme in the Norwegian socio-political debates, 
expressing first and foremost a deep dissatisfaction with the pre–World War II 
poor relief system. The legacy of this has been seen as a welfare state character-
ised by an aversion to differential treatment in the system. The emphasis on public 
responsibility for welfare has further meant that the tradition of philanthropy and 
charity has been comparatively weak in the Nordic countries ( Henriksen et al., 
2018 ). Yet, despite this political commitment, certain groups of citizens in Nor-
way have had to rely on charity for their needs to be met (e.g. drug users, women 
in prostitution), as noted in Chapter 1 . 
My suggestion here is that the humanitarian exceptions through which irregu-
lar migrants gained access to basic care builds on and reinforces this tendency 
in the Norwegian welfare state to address the needs of certain populations that 
fall outside the norms of society through poor relief and charity. Moreover, the 
very modest and substandard humanitarian services given to irregular migrants 
served to some extent to protect the integrity of the welfare state by hiding pov-
erty and social suffering. Hence, they allowed the Norwegian state to maintain a 
self-image of a compassionate and caring state while simultaneously departing 
from the core norms and values of security, solidarity, and equality assumed to 
underpin the welfare state.3 
A ‘tyranny of goodness’? 
The perceived centrality of ‘goodness’ to Norwegianness, and its effect on policy, 
however, has increasingly been criticised, particularly in relation to migration. 
In November 2015, at the height of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, Sylvi 
Listhaug, a government minister, launched a blistering attack on bishops of the 
Church of Norway, claiming they were part of a ‘tyranny of goodness’ haunting 
the Norwegian immigration debate. According to her, the church leaders labelled 
those who wanted stricter immigration policies as ‘nasty people’, thus reducing 
the complexities of immigration policies to a question of being good. 
Listhaug belonged to the Progress Party (FrP), a right-wing populist party 
that has positioned itself as the most anti-immigration party in the Norwegian 
Parliament. Its history of dog-whistling contributed for a long time to other par-
ties refusing to formally collaborate with them. Norwegian sociologist Anniken 
Hagelund, for example, argued in an article in 2003 that the distinction between 
the Progress Party and the remaining political parties in regard to immigration 
policies was often formulated in terms of decency (anstendighet in Norwegian), 
with the Progress Party constructed as the indecent part ( Hagelund, 2003a ). This 
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election in 2013, they joined a minority coalition government with the conserva-
tive party (Høyre), supported by the Liberal Party (Venstre) and the Christian 
Democratic Party (KrF). Listhaug, at the time of her critique of the Norwegian 
bishops, was the minister of agriculture and food. However, only six weeks later 
she was appointed to a newly created cabinet position of minister of immigration 
and integration, vowing that she would make Norway’s asylum policies ‘one of 
the strictest in Europe’ ( Elster, 2015 ). 
By attacking the ‘tyranny of goodness’, Listhaug not only played on the out-
sider position that had proven popular among parts of the electorate but also con-
tributed to a problematisation of ‘goodness’ as a positive national characteristic. 
Such problematisation was not new in the field of migration policies. Most nota-
bly there was the ‘snillisme’ debate, which began in the 1990s and has had a 
significant impact on Norwegian integration policies and practices ( Hagelund, 
2005 ). The term ‘snillisme’ is constructed by combining the Norwegian word 
for kind (snill) with the suffix ‘-ism’ – kind-ism. Used by both right-wing popu-
lists and social democratic reformers, the term tried to capture what was seen as 
a misguided and counterproductive kindness and naivety shown by Norwegian 
politicians, policy-makers, and academics towards immigrants. This mistaken 
‘kindism’ explained, according to the proponents of the term, why integration 
seemingly had failed. 
Similar problematisations of the role of ‘goodness’ in the field of immigration 
were formulated by prominent Norwegian scholars. Social anthropologist Unni 
Wikan (2002 ) used the term ‘generous betrayal’ to describe how the state in its 
effort to be kind failed or ignored to address problematic cultural practices among 
immigrants. Sociologist Ottar Brox characterised already in 1991, in his book 
‘Jeg er ikke rasist, men . . .’ (I’m not a racist, but . . .), the Norwegian immigration 
discussion as a moral championship where legitimate criticism of immigration 
was excluded ( Midtbøen, 2017 ). 
The ‘tyranny of goodness’ claim had also a scholarly corollary. In the public 
debate that followed Listhaug’s criticism of the church leaders, Terje Tvedt, a 
professor in human geography, quickly claimed the term, referring to how he had 
coined this and the related term ‘regime of goodness’ in a report evaluating Nor-
wegian foreign aid policy issued in 2003 ( Tvedt, 2016 ). Tvedt claimed that these 
were analytical terms meant to uncover certain power mechanisms in society. 
‘The tyranny of goodness’ was a technique of power that reduced complicated 
political questions to a simple moral dichotomy of good and evil, he argued. As 
such, it set a framework for what could legitimately be discussed and what was 
acceptable criticism. According to Tvedt, a particular elite had emerged in Nor-
way who legitimised their power by staging themselves as the wardens of ‘the 
good’. The central task of this ‘regime of goodness’ was to shape the nation in the 
image of a new humanitarian-political complex ( 2017 , 271). 
In 2017, Tvedt launched a book where he combined his initial analysis and 
critique of Norwegian foreign aid policy with a critique of Norwegian immi-
gration and integration policy, arguing that both fields were dominated by the 
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within and outside academia. One of the harshest criticisms of Tvedt’s book came 
from Jostein Gripsrud, professor of media studies. He wrote a counter book as a 
response, criticising Tvedt’s perspective on the role of goodness in Norwegian 
history and politics. In addition to accusing Tvedt of poor academic craftsman-
ship, including random use of sources and inaccurate and misleading language, 
Gripsrud criticised Tvedt for failing to recognise how immigration and integration 
have been highly contested issues in the public debate. He also criticised Tvedt for 
neglecting the deep historical roots of ‘goodness’ as part of Norwegian national 
identity and culture. 
In this regard, it is interesting to observe how both seem to agree that notions of 
‘national goodness’ importantly inform immigration policy debates and decisions. 
But how? While Listhaug, Tvedt, and Gripsrud, all seem to equate the ‘goodness’
discourse with a push for liberal policies in this field, Hagelund has shown how 
the establishment and implementation of a relatively strict immigration regime 
in Norway have actually taken place within a vocabulary of equality, humanity, 
social justice, and decency: 
A whole rhetoric has evolved where immigration politics appears as a matter 
of decency, somehow apart from the more pragmatic tug-of-wars affecting 
other fields of politics. On the one hand, a ‘restricted and controlled’ immi-
gration is necessary in order to protect certain moral qualities of Norwegian 
society. But on the other hand, immigration politics has also appeared as an 
indicator of the moral qualities of the Norwegian nation-state thus requiring 
‘decent policies’ in order not to threaten the image of a nation embodying 
such moral qualities. 
 ( Hagelund, 2003b , 177) 
The arguments for restrictive immigration policies have thus been both to protect 
the state of equality in Norway and to be able to protect adequately ‘those who 
really need it’, in accordance with Norway’s ‘humanitarian traditions’. 
It is possible to identify a similar discourse of decency used to justify restrict-
ing welfare services to irregular migrants, for instance by portraying irregular 
migrants as a potential threat to ‘legitimate’ refugees’ well-being. As State Sec-
retary Pål K. Lønseth (Labour Party), wrote in a commentary printed in several 
major newspapers, ‘The Government will not agree to proposals that would 
undermine the work done to ensure return . . . . It would undermine confidence in 
the asylum system and our ability to take care of those who need it most – namely 
refugees’ (Lønseth, 2011, my emphasis). This commentary was a response to the 
call mentioned earlier from several major cities in Norway for work permits and 
better healthcare for irregular migrants and was also significant as it marked the 
government’s first official use of the term  returnekter (‘return refuser’). 
Listhaug’s attack on the ‘tyranny of goodness’ as well as her vow to imple-
ment one of the strictest asylum policies in Europe was a break from the ten-
dency identified by Hagelund (2003b ) and can be seen as a deliberate attempt 
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immigration. According to  Gammeltoft-Hansen (2017 ), such negative branding 
aims to achieve a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ effect by diverting flows to other coun-
tries but also largely serves symbolic or domestic political purposes. In the Nor-
wegian case, it is interesting to observe how Listhaug’s claims sparked an intense 
political discussion about asylum policy, rhetoric, national identity, and values, 
yet there was a broad political consensus regarding the actual restrictive policies 
implemented in the wake of the 2015 increase of asylum seekers in Norway. Also, 
interestingly, Listhaug and the Progress Party came increasingly to frame their 
restrictive policies within a vocabulary of decency by arguing that it was better for 
refugees to be helped in their geographical and cultural vicinity ( Stokke, 2016 ). 
This underlines, I suggest, both the centrality of ‘goodness’ to national identity 
and the contradictory role it plays in relation to migration policy. 
Deservingness and discourses of rights and justice 
in the welfare state 
By returning to the debates surrounding the emergency aid provision in February 
2013, it is possible to see from the way it developed that it did not only become a 
question of migrants’ deservingness but also about the nature and moral limit of 
the welfare state. For instance, the consultation paper issued by the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs (2013 ) clearly shows a tension between social policy 
and immigration control concerns, and between politicians and bureaucracy, on 
these issues. Whereas the minister stated to the media that the changes she initi-
ated were to prevent the system from ‘being abused to enable illegal residence’
( Hegvik, 2013b ), particularly by perceived criminals, the consultation paper sent 
out by her department directly contradicted this objective. Instead, it stated that 
there was no evidence that the limited right to support from NAV offices was con-
ducive to maintaining ‘illegal residence’. Furthermore, it underlined that it was 
‘important that the welfare services were not attempted used as a tool for solving 
problems related to illegal immigration’ ( Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
2013 ). Moreover, in the public debates, the minister, as all previous ministers, 
still specified that no one should starve or freeze to death in the streets in Norway, 
regardless. As such, it became highly unclear what the suggested amendments 
were meant to achieve. 
This case thus reveals some of the contradictions and tension that can exist 
within what is referred to as ‘the state’ and which can be the source of unintended 
outcomes ( Gupta, 2012 ). In this case, the politicians’ inability to remove a mini-
mum of humanitarian aid for irregular migrants despite several efforts is perhaps 
a somewhat surprising outcome. The case also illustrates the difficulties arising 
when moral questions of deservingness intersect with juridical questions of rights. 
While moral assessments of deservingness are typically relational, the juridical 
discourse of rights presumes blindness to individual particularities. As Sarah Wil-
len points out, ‘Whereas rights claims are expressed in a formal juridical discourse 
that presumes universality and equality before the law, deservingness claims are 
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context-dependent’ ( Willen, 2012a , 813–814). However, as noted in the govern-
mentality literature ( Dean, 2010 ), as law assumes administrative functions, the 
distinction between law as an autonomous discourse and an administrative and 
regulatory control becomes blurred. I suggest that the attempts of moral border-
ing led to the right to emergency aid becoming governed by a flexible regulatory 
framework and one in which vagueness would mask disagreement and doubts 
about policy. 
In the consultation paper, the  Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2013 ) 
initially presented two options: going back to the system of granting assistance 
based on an unwritten Act of Necessity or explicitly specifying that the benefit 
could be tied to specific requirements pertaining to return efforts on behalf of 
the recipient. Neither of the two suggestions was considered to have any signifi-
cant economic or administrative consequences for the welfare state. However, 
the suggestions would neither necessarily lead to a separate treatment of ‘good 
illegals’ and ‘bad illegals’, as the minister initially signalled the motive was, nor 
to deny emergency aid completely to ‘(bad) illegals’. In this sense, the debates 
were rather about the extent to which the provision of emergency aid should be 
formally regulated or not, not whether irregular migrants should have access to 
emergency aid. Still, a return to an unregulated state would potentially mean 
less security for the applicant as it would remove their right to appeal individual 
assessments of need. 
In this regard, the response of the Welfare Administration to this consultation 
is interesting because the directorate declared strong support for the Social Ser-
vices Regulation ‘as it was’ ( NAV, 2013 ). In their opinion, the current regulation 
was sufficiently clear, and they found a return to a state of ‘unauthorised granting 
of relief’ particularly undesirable. Reports received from local NAV offices and 
county governors also made it clear that the problems they experienced differed 
from the ones raised by the consultation. As an example, they mentioned pos-
sible rights for the ‘so-called unreturnables’ not entitled to state accommodation 
( NAV, 2013 ). So, while the government’s official view at the time was that no 
one was unreturnable, this was still experienced as a reality and concern for the 
bureaucrats in NAV who did not want the explicit responsibility of deciding on 
the exception. 
In the end, few consultative bodies supported the amendments. In the midst of 
the consultation, there was a general election, and a new right-wing government 
coalition came to power. Erna Solberg, the minister who had initially been in 
charge of the tough ‘withdrawal scheme’ in relation to accommodation in 2004, 
became prime minister, and Robert Eriksson, who had strongly criticised the 
emergency aid to irregular migrants, became the minister of labour and social 
inclusion. In March 2014, Eriksson announced new amendments to the regula-
tion concerning emergency aid to people without legal residence: aid should now 
primarily be offered as food stamps and as ‘a bed to sleep in’, rather than cash 
( Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2014 ). Hence, even with the change of 
government, the bottom line still remained; that is, no one would be denied food 
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amendments to the Social Services Regulation, however, were not as clear as 
Eriksson claimed. The amendments only specified that aid should be granted ‘for 
a short period’ and that NAV offices ‘may’ demand that the person contribute to 
his or her own departure, for example by obtaining travel documents ( Regulation 
amending the social services regulation, 2014 ). Thus, for Zeki, a ‘convicted and 
expelled criminal’, these amendments had no practical significance as he contin-
ued to receive emergency assistance for years. 
Time is here revealed to play an ambiguous role in terms of deservingness and 
welfare rights. While in some European countries, irregular migrants can receive 
access to certain services, for instance to healthcare in France or local social ben-
efits in Spain, by documenting (length of) residence ( Da Lomba, 2011 ;  Burchi-
anti, 2013 ), length of stay does not grant irregular migrants any formal benefits 
in Norway. Services, when authorised, are explicitly meant to have a short time 
frame. However, in practice this creates difficulties for service providers, which is 
illustrated in the opening case through the difficulties NAV Skien and the county 
governor had in determining what leaving the country ‘in practice’ meant. While 
NAV Skien found ten days of emergency aid sufficient, as ‘emergency’ generally 
implies a short time frame, the county governor instead tried to ascertain what ‘in 
practice’ realistically means. After learning from the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM) that they used two to three months to process applications 
for assisted return, and that it was unclear whether a person expelled for crimes 
would be eligible for IOM support at all, the county governor concluded that NAV
Skien had ‘a duty to assist’ as long as the person was actually in the country. Thus, 
in a sense, the county governor recognised emergency as an enduring aspect of an 
irregular migrant’s life. 
From a legal perspective, Andersen (2014 ) has criticised the  Social Services 
Regulation (2011 ) for seemingly departing from the basic principle of social right 
that social benefits should be based purely on needs assessment and that it should 
be irrelevant whether the needy can be blamed for their situations. However, he 
also concedes that it is legally unclear whether this is the intention of the regula-
tion, as it remains vague. Despite requests from the bureaucracy, the ministry was 
not willing to clarify whether this was their intent. Andersen (2014 ) also notes 
that municipalities still retained ‘discretionary freedom’ to grant social benefits to 
irregular migrants beyond legal rights. It could thus be argued that the difficulties 
of drawing a moral border primarily contributed to legal vagueness, and rather 
than a strict divide between included and excluded, inside and outside the state, 
an Agambenian zone of indistinction was produced. 
Notes 
1 Welfare nationalism in this sense should not be confused or equated with welfare chau-
vinism, i.e. that only national citizens should receive welfare. For example, in their com-
parative study of people’s attitudes toward welfare for immigrants, Van Der Waal et al. 
(2013 ) found lower levels of welfare chauvinism in social-democratic regimes. Though 
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2 It should be noted that although the norms of the welfare state arguably remain important 
for governing in Norway, Norwegian welfare researchers have cautioned against what 
they see as recent trends in the development of welfare policy that modify the basic prin-
ciples of the welfare state, not least through new ‘workfare approaches’. The movement 
from a policy of ‘social rights’ to a policy of ‘rights and duties’ represented by these 
policies implies, according to Nilssen and Kildal (2009 ), that the traditional egalitarian 
notion of justice is being replaced by an idea of ‘justice as reciprocity’. In regard to 
the politically excluded, those not allowed to contribute, humanitarianism, I suggest, 
similarly dilutes the egalitarian notion of justice by building policy on notions of charity 
and poverty relief. Both ‘justice as reciprocity’ and charity can be said to emphasise and 
introduce different notions of deservingness into the welfare state. 
3 It should also be acknowledged that care for the irregular population is justified not only 
by humanitarianism but also by more traditional biopolitical concerns of the welfare 
state related to public health and order. For instance, the image of ‘ticking bombs’ or 
‘pressure cookers’ was present in discussions regarding medical care. Here, ‘ticking 
bombs’ generally refer to potentially contagious diseases spread by irregular migrants 
or mental problems that could lead to violence. Treatment for communicable diseases 
is one of the few services free of charge for irregular migrants. The  Healthcare Regula-
tion (2011 ) also states explicitly that mentally unstable persons, who may be a threat to 
themselves or to others’ lives or health, have a right to psychiatric care. The rights to 
(free) healthcare for communicable diseases and psychiatric care for mentally unstable 
patients were, as the Ministry wrote in the consultation paper to the Healthcare Regula-
tion, not only ‘to help the patient, but also to ensure public interests’ ( Ministry of Health 
and Care Services, 2010 , p. 14). Since 2013, the state, also funded, as shown in the previ-
ous chapter, NGO-run shelters in Oslo and Bergen as part of their programme to combat 
public begging and vagrancy. 
 Part II 






  3 Healthcare providers as petty 
sovereigns 
In this and the next chapter, my aim is to explore how state borders are repro-
duced, but also negotiated and tested in everyday encounters between service pro-
viders and irregularised migrants in the context of healthcare. How (and to what 
extent) are healthcare services becoming involved in migration control? What 
happens when frontline service providers translate migration control policies into 
daily, situated practice on the ground level? 
Several scholars have drawn attention to how state borders are no longer only 
at the external territorial outer-limit of nation-states but spread out throughout the 
territory and are materialising wherever mobility exists and is controlled ( Balibar, 
2002 ; Vaughan-Williams, 2009 ). In this sense, state borders have come to follow 
irregularised migrants in their daily life ( Bosniak, 1991 ;  Coutin, 2003 ). However, 
there is still a need to better understand how these internal borders are materialised 
in different settings and contexts. For instance, territorial borders have often been 
imagined as walls or barriers, comprising watchtowers, fences, detection devices, 
and armed guards, emphasising surveillance and exclusion. Obviously, the repro-
duction of state borders in the context of healthcare provisions does not share such 
topographies or materiality. Nevertheless, there are practices that can be seen as 
reproducing state borders in daily situations and settings. Studies of the internali-
sation of borders have particularly emphasised the dividing lines drawn by and 
within the law itself in terms of rights ( Bosniak, 2006 ), and the spread and decen-
tralisation of surveillance and control measures aimed at detecting and exposing 
irregular migrants for deportation (e.g. police controls at workplaces, controls in 
the streets or on public transport) ( Broeders and Engbersen, 2007 ). Importantly, 
the concept of internal borders has also drawn attention to the proliferation of new 
actors involved in migration control through the devolution of responsibilities 
to frontline public officials, non-profit organisations, and others who come into 
direct contact with migrants. 
In this chapter, my aim is to investigate the role of discretionary decision-
making in (re)producing or challenging state borders in the medical encounter 
by engaging Agamben’s concept of sovereignty as a decision on the exception. I 
will begin the exploration of the relation between discretionary judgements and 
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expert knowledge with a short extract from a medical appointment, which I was 
allowed to attend. 
A medical encounter
Hind was a young primary school girl living in an irregular situation whom I 
met early in my fieldwork. She needed extensive surgery. Children left untreated 
could survive into adulthood, but morbidity was severe, and the condition posed 
significant physical, functional, social, and psychological burdens on patients and 
families. It was also a condition that was challenging to manage for healthcare 
providers and in normal circumstances would be treated with surgery from a very 
early age, with lifelong follow-up care. Upon learning that she and her family’s 
asylum application had been rejected, the surgeon who had initially examined her 
was not willing to carry out the complicated procedures. 
Hind and her family had received the so-called ‘final rejection’ in 2009, and 
when I met them, their residence status was no longer considered legal. How-
ever, they had remained living in an asylum reception centre, working on vari-
ous appeals and trying to get surgery for Hind. About a year after I first met her, 
Hind’s condition started to worsen. She complained of pain, making it difficult 
for the parents to carry out the daily care necessary to keep her condition under 
control. After a while, her GP, not being able to help her, referred her to a pae-
diatrician at a local hospital. This hospital, however, did not have the necessary 
technical competency to perform the surgery. 
Doctor Olav, the paediatrician, had not met Hind before, but he was familiar 
with her situation through her patient journal and he had received the discharge 
summaries from the first hospital that had seen her. He was therefore well aware 
of Hind’s medical situation, that surgery was necessary and that the main obstacle 
to surgery was her legal status. Inside the doctor’s office, after we had all intro-
duced ourselves, Doctor Olav started the appointment by trying to get a better 
understanding of the family’s situation: 
‘Has anything changed regarding your social situation recently’, he asked. 
After exchanging confused glances with her husband, the mother started 
explaining Hind’s new symptoms. ‘Yes, we will get to this part’, Doctor Olav 
interrupted, ‘but first I need to know if there is any new information about 
how long you can stay [in the country]’. The parents still looked confused 
and he tried to explain that if he were to convince the surgeon to start operat-
ing, it would help if he could say something new about this particular ques-
tion. ‘We have been here for many years now and he still won’t start’, the 
mother exclaimed. ‘There is nothing new. There is no set date for us to leave’. 
She continued explaining that they had received two negative replies to their 
asylum application, but that they were still working on another appeal. The 
parents were getting agitated. Feeling that this might be their last chance to 
get a doctor to listen, they started unloading their frustration of years of rejec-
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calmly, focusing only on the question that mattered to him in this case: ‘But, 
you don’t have any idea of how long you can stay?’ He also added, ‘It is not a 
doctor’s job to find out about these things’, referring to Hind’s legal situation. 
‘A surgeon will not do this job, but I will try to see what I can do’. 
Not satisfied with the parents reply, he then asked if there was a social 
worker or anyone else who knew their case that he could contact to get infor-
mation. The parents seemed puzzled by the question but offered a name at 
the asylum reception centre where they were living. ‘You can also contact 
the UDI [the Directorate of Immigration] if you want’, the mother offered. 
‘Please do. We also told this to the surgeon, but he wouldn’t. Sometimes I feel 
like we are trapped between doctors and the UDI. The UDI wants informa-
tion from the doctors, which the doctors don’t give, and the doctors won’t 
do anything without answers from the UDI’. ‘You know’, Hind’s uncle who 
was there as an interpreter intervened, ‘if the surgeon would just start the 
operations, she would probably be allowed to stay at least until it is over’. 
To this Doctor Olav responded, ‘It is not the doctor’s job to decide your des-
tiny’, before he added, more consolatory, ‘but I will see what I can do’. The 
consultation was drawing to an end and Doctor Olav moved on to ask briefly 
about the girl’s new symptoms before he quickly examined her and scheduled 
a new appointment. 
Sovereign decisions and professional discretion 
Hind’s medical appointment illustrates, I suggest, how border control in the
context of healthcare not only has become about detecting and excluding
migrants at the hospital’s doorstep but draws the territorial rationality of migra-
tion control into the diagnostic act itself in terms of deciding a course of treat-
ment. In this case, the whole medical consultation and the relationship between
the involved parties were structured by the possibility of Hind’s deportation. As
shown, it became more important for Doctor Olav to assess her legal status and
its temporal implications for treatment options than to address her new somatic
symptoms. Hind’s case thus draws attention to the role of professional discre-
tion in the intersection of immigration law, expert knowledge, and professional
integrity, and its significance for reproducing and contesting state bordering and
ordering of life.
By exploring how the decision is made within a particular institutional frame-
work, my aim in this chapter is to contextualise the sovereign decision. One of 
my arguments is that healthcare providers not simply are reconfigured as border 
guards patrolling the welfare state border but are also becoming petty sovereigns 
defining the threshold of exclusion in their everyday encounter with irregularised 
migrants. Petty sovereigns, according to Butler (2004 , 65), are professionals who 
use discretionary power and who have an important say in matters of life and 
death. Yet, petty sovereigns are agents who often do not recognise the full impact 
of the work they do, ‘but perform their acts unilaterally and with enormous con-
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In the following, I will contextualise the sovereign decision within the context 
of healthcare by showing how the decision about whether or not Hind should get 
treatment involved (1) government decisions translated into law, (2) administra-
tive decisions about the category in which she should be placed, (3) expert judge-
ment on severity and treatment, and (4) managerial decisions about whether to 
proceed. Furthermore, all these decisions were conditioned by the immigration 
authority’s decision not to grant Hind legal residence. However, before I proceed, 
it is necessary to address the question: How can professional decisions be under-
stood as an expression of sovereignty? 
To address this question, it is necessary to look more closely at the concept 
of sovereign decisionism and its relation to professional discretion within the 
medical context. In an Agambenian framework, sovereignty is not a pre-ordained 
power, identifiable through constitutions or laws, but instead rests on a concrete 
political fact – the decision that positions a certain individual or category of people 
outside the protection of the law. Agamben’s (1998 ) concern is not  who has power 
within the political order, but the role of sovereignty in constituting a threshold 
of the juridical-political order. Still, Agamben’s concept allows us to think of the 
location of sovereignty beyond institutions such as the parliament, the president, 
or the government ( Dean, 2007 ). Agamben for example proposes that modern 
biopolitics, which is characterised by the integration of medicine and politics, 
implies a displacement and gradual expansion of the sovereign decision on bare 
life beyond political life. The result, he suggests, is that the sovereign decision 
moves into a more ambiguous terrain in which ‘the physician and the sovereign 
seem to exchange roles’ ( 1998 , 143). 
The idea of doctors exercising a sovereign-based power over patients’ bodies 
is not new. For instance, within what  Lupton (2012 ) calls the political economy 
perspective within medical anthropology and sociology, medical sovereignty is 
tied to doctor’s exclusive and legitimate right to define medical reality and claim 
authority over issues defined by them as medical (rather than caused, for example, 
by social inequalities). In this perspective, doctors have their professional position 
and authority achieved from their state-sanctioned, socially accepted, and ascribed 
exclusive knowledge and competence which gives them the right to make authori-
tative judgements about diagnosis and to prescribe treatments. However, this way 
of understanding medical dominance has been criticised from a more Foucauld-
ian perspective as having a simplistic and negative understanding of power by 
emphasising professional exploitation of power instead of understanding power 
as what enables the doctor to act as situationally and institutionally competent 
( Måseide, 1991 ). 
Agamben offers a different perspective on medical sovereignty through his 
focus on a particular type of decision that can be seen to operate within or along-
side a biomedical concern with fostering life. This is both a decision about the 
(non-)value of life but also one that marks the passage of law – or (healthcare) 
rights – to fact. To Agamben (2005 ), the problem with law is first and foremost 
that it cannot recognise singularity, and because it cannot recognise singularities, 
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life. In this sense, the state of exception becomes the central device for articulat-
ing and holding together sovereignty and government, law and life. Thus, Agam-
ben’s argument goes further than only claiming that all law requires interpretation 
and the use of discretion. 
Engaging Agamben’s work,  Dean (2007 ) offers a slightly different definition of 
sovereign decisions. To him, what makes certain decisions in the medical encoun-
ter sovereign, and not merely governmental or even ‘biopolitical’ choices, is that 
they concern matters of life and death. As such, he reserves it to cases such as 
euthanasia, abortion, genetic screening, the removal of life support systems for 
an individual in a coma, notions of brain death, and so on. These decisions are 
sovereign decisions in Dean’s view : 
because they involve not merely a matter of letting die but a form of kill-
ing without the commission of homicide. Or at least they involve a point at 
which it is difficult to know whether we are letting die or exercising a right 
of death. 
 ( 2007 , 93) 
Here, though, as my interest is in how healthcare services become involved in 
territorial border control, I will use an understanding of sovereign decisions in 
the medical encounter that differs somewhat from both Agamben’s and Dean’s 
definitions. In this chapter, I am concerned with decisions by healthcare provid-
ers on treatment that is not necessarily a question of biological life and death 
but that reanimates a sense of territorial state borders, or contests them, and thus 
irregularised migrants’ political exclusion, which can be seen as a form of ‘death’. 
The decisions by healthcare providers are sovereign decisions in the sense that 
they are still decisions on the (non-)value of life. The decisions can involve a 
withdrawal of assistance and thus a withdrawal of the means of life, but they can 
also grant treatment. However, these are ultimately in the case of irregularised 
migrants, as I will show, conditional decisions making healthcare providers not 
‘the ultimate’ medical sovereign but rather petty sovereigns as the delegation of 
sovereignty is only partial. This highlights how discretionary decisions of health-
care providers in the case of irregular migrants are to some extent different from 
other areas where they decide on eligibility for services. 
I will illustrate this point briefly by returning to the case of Louila Tuban ( Chap-
ter 1 ) and by comparing it to another case that received significant media attention 
in the same period. This was the case of Siv Tove Pedersen, a 40-year-old woman 
from Bergen, Norway, with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) grade 
4, respiratory failure, and 12-per cent lung capacity who was denied access to 
being on a donor recipient list for lung transplantation. Siv Tove was a Norwegian 
citizen, and a lung transplant was considered medically necessary; however, she 
was denied access to the list because she was a patient who received methadone as 
Medically Assisted Treatment for substance abuse. According to the doctors who 
evaluated her case, daily methadone use constituted a disqualifying drug addic-
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hope of a new lung, Siv Tove opted for assisted suicide in a clinic in Switzerland 
in January 2015 ( Ryste et al., 2015 ). 
Louila Tuban, as previously described, was initially denied a kidney transplant, 
first because she did not have legal residence and later because she could only get 
a temporary residence permit. However, in her case, the hospital decided, as her 
health was deteriorating, to depart from their internal guidelines, and a transplant 
was performed in February 2015. At that point, her temporary residence permit 
had expired, and her future legal status was still undecided. 
In both cases, the doctors’ decision on whether Louila and Siv Tove were eli-
gible for transplants could be said to not only have rationed services but also, on 
some level, to have made an evaluation and decision on the value or quality of 
their lives. Siv Tove and Louila’s cases are interesting to compare because they 
reveal some of the complexities of sovereign decisionism in every day medical 
situations and its intersections with state territorial jurisdiction. First, while the 
doctors in Louila’s case decided to perform the transplant to save her life despite 
her precarious legal status, she still had to wait for the immigration authorities to 
make another decision on whether she could stay and get the vital follow-up she 
needed, as well as gain access to other means to sustain her life, such as social 
support, the legal employment market, education, and so on. Siv Tove, however, 
formally remained a citizen with access to other attributes of a so-called ‘quali-
fied life’ but was denied the means to preserve her biological life. Hence, both Siv 
Tove and Louila’s cases, I suggest, blur any clear distinction between qualified 
and bare life as sovereign decisions on life becomes multiple and dispersed. Sec-
ond, both cases had territorial and biopolitical implications, but in different ways. 
Siv Tove, by travelling to Switzerland for assisted suicide, evaded and challenged 
both the doctors and the Norwegian state’s jurisdiction over her life. In Louila’s 
case, healthcare providers’ decisions on treatment contested her exclusion, yet 
remained conditioned by the state’s attempt to maintain territorial sovereignty 
by not granting her legal residence. In both cases, the doctors’ power to deny 
treatment was absolute, but in Louila’s case, their ability to grant treatment was 
circumscribed and conditioned by decisions made by the immigration authorities. 
It is this latter entanglement of territorial and biopolitical dimensions of sover-
eignty that is expressed in the doctors’ decisions on whether irregular migrants 
should get treatment, and what type of treatment they should get. This is the issue 
I will explore now by turning to how different forms of ‘decisions’ framed Hind’s 
access to healthcare. 
 Legal bordering 
In Norway, over the past decades, welfare law has undergone several changes that 
can be seen as an attempt by the sovereign to withdraw protection from irregular 
migrants through administrative reinterpretation concerning the scope and content
of existing laws ( Chapter 2 ). Access to healthcare services is a prime example. 
While the laws governing healthcare have not been changed, the Ministry of Health 
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In 2010, the ministry initiated a review of existing laws due to what they called 
‘continuing doubt and varying practices’ regarding irregular migrants’ access to 
healthcare. One of the major challenges, according to a consultation paper issued 
by the Ministry of Health and Care Services (2010 ), was precisely how to inter-
pret the words ‘all’ ( alle) in the Patients’ Rights Act (1999 ), ‘reside or temporally 
reside’ ( bor eller midlertidig oppholder seg) in the Municipal Health Services 
Act (1982 ) and ‘permanent domicile or residence’ ( fast bopel eller oppholdssted) 
in the Specialised Health Services Act (1999 ). As the consultation paper argued: 
The wording seems to imply that the scope of the [Patients’ Rights] Act is 
very broad, see ‘all’, so that people residing illegally in the country are cov-
ered. However, it could be questioned whether it ought to be interpreted in 
a legality requirement, i.e., that lawful residence in the country should be a 
requirement although it is not directly stated in the text? 
Also, in the Municipal Health Services Act and the Specialist Health Services Act, 
there were no explicit requirements that the residence had to be legal. Although, 
the ministry conceded that the wording seemed to imply that the scope of the 
acts covered people residing illegally, they eventually concluded that it would be 
reasonable ‘to interpret into the law’ a legality requirement so that ‘one cannot be 
considered to be “a resident” when unlawfully staying in the country’, referring 
to similar practice in other areas of the law, such as the  National Insurance Act 
(1997 ). 
In Agambenian terms, the sovereign could be seen here as making a decision on 
the exception under which the law’s application is withdrawn through an admin-
istrative decree. However, the government not only decided to withdraw irregular 
migrants’ access to healthcare but also specified certain rights in a new Health-
care regulation concerning the right to health and care services to people without 
ordinary residence in the country (hereafter the Healthcare Regulation, 2011 ). As 
argued in the consultation paper, the new regulation meant to clarify the law in a 
way that would both limit and extend rights in relation to current practice ( Min-
istry of Health and Care Services, 2010 ). Thus, while irregular migrants were to 
be given some specified rights to specialist healthcare beyond emergency care, 
their access to primary healthcare was to be restricted.2 In this sense, irregular 
migrants, I suggest, were not only included through an exclusion (i.e. an inclusive 
exclusion) but precariously included, that is, a restricted and unstable inclusion 
based on the assurance of survival 
The wording of the new regulation was further designed in a general way so 
that the rights specified for those residing illegally would apply to ‘all persons 
staying in the Realm’. This was done, according to the consultation paper, to 
ensure that individuals staying legally in the country, for example tourists, should 
have at least the same rights to healthcare as people who were staying illegally. 
Irregular migrants and tourists thus came to form one common legal category, 
referred to in the regulation as ‘persons without ordinary residence in the country’
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Their rights specified in the regulation applied primarily to emergency primary 
and specialist healthcare services. In addition, ‘people without ordinary residence’
were entitled to (1) health services which are absolutely necessary and cannot wait 
without the risk of imminent death, permanent and seriously reduced functional-
ity, serious injury or severe pain; (2) necessary healthcare before and after birth; 
(3) termination of pregnancy under the provisions of the Abortion Act; (4) health-
care for communicable diseases; and (5) healthcare that cannot wait until depriva-
tion of liberty is lifted (i.e. detention in remand, prison, an involuntary psychiatric 
ward or an institution for minors under the Norwegian Child Welfare Act). In 
contrast, citizens and legal residents were entitled to what is called ‘necessary 
healthcare’, a legal term introduced in the Patients’ Rights Act in 1999 . This right 
applies if (1) the condition is sufficiently severe, (2) the patient can be expected 
to benefit from the healthcare, and (3) the costs are reasonable in relation to the 
effect of the measure. 
Children (i.e. persons under the age of 18) without a legal right to stay were 
entitled to necessary primary and specialist healthcare services but were not enti-
tled to be part of the general practitioner scheme or receive support for transporta-
tion to treatment facilities. Furthermore, and of particular importance to Hind, the 
regulation states that these children have the right to necessary healthcare ‘unless 
concern for the child dictates that assistance should not be provided’. 
To understand how the regulation draws the territorial rationality of migra-
tion control into the medical evaluation, it is necessary to look more closely at
the way ‘concern for the child’ and ’healthcare that cannot wait’ were defined.
At first glance, ‘concern for the child’ may look like a reference to the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) specifying that ‘the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’. However, as the
background documents and guidelines to the healthcare regulation make clear,
this was not what the clause referred to. Instead, the clause primarily stipu-
lated that treatment should not interfere with state efforts to deport the child
( Karlsen, 2015 ). As the circular issued by the Ministry of Health and Care Ser-
vices clarified:
This [concern for the child] will be a professional evaluation, and may for 
example include cases where healthcare professionals have certain knowl-
edge that the child is about to leave the country, and it would be irresponsible 
to start a treatment that cannot be completed. 
 ( RS I-5/2011 ) 
For adults, what was deemed ‘healthcare that cannot wait’ was also to be based 
on individual medical assessments. In the background documents and guidelines, 
the ministry gave a temporal guideline of two to three weeks, indicating that treat-
ment that could wait beyond these weeks should not be initiated. This time frame 
of three weeks was not medically justified but was set according to what the 
Ministry of Health considered to be ‘a reasonable time frame’ for the irregular 
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are so standardised that they enable uniform guidelines to be established, thereby 
making it necessary for doctors to decide in each case. 
As shown here, the territorial and political rationality of immigration control 
became part of the diagnostic act, while leaving the exact demarcation of the 
border (or the threshold of inclusion) to a certain extent to the discretionary judge-
ment of the healthcare provider. As official government decisions that are trans-
lated into law or decisions that suspend the law constitute the most common way 
of understanding sovereign decisionism, the legal framework in itself could thus 
be understood as a decision. However, it can also be seen as a normalising frame 
for decisions by other agents. In this sense, the law does not act through coer-
cively enforced constraints, but rather in more decentralised and diffused forms 
of power relations that regulate and discipline conduct ( Rose and Valverde, 1998 ; 
Foucault, 2003 ). Hence, one of the main consequences of the healthcare regula-
tion regulating irregular migrants’ access to healthcare, as I see it, was that it 
established the person with legal residence as the norm and thus legal status as a 
criterion for judgement rather than simply prohibiting access to healthcare. 
 Fuzzy categories 
To make a (sovereign) decision on whether or not law applies involves making a 
judgment on what categories in which to place individuals. As Agamben (1998 ) 
points out, law can only relate to life through juridico-political categories. In prac-
tice, categorisation is not necessarily a straightforward practice, as indicated in 
the following statement by Linda, an experienced nurse who had worked on and 
off in the reception centre at a primary emergency care centre for the past fifteen 
years. 
I think it is very difficult to know whether they are undocumented (‘papir-
løs’) or not. Because it [the asylum system] is a jungle. It is difficult to know 
whether they’re from the reception centre, and if they are from there, what 
kind of card they might have and so on. If they live at the reception centre, 
they’re still kind of in the system. There are also some who choose to live 
with their families but are still here legally. Sometimes people forget their 
ID. Or they have overstayed. It’s a jungle. So, you just have to kind of trust 
what they are saying. And I don’t know all the rules about when they become 
[illegal]. . . . And the rules keep changing. Also, [the authorities] don’t tell us 
what kind of papers they should have. 
 Linda, nurse 
As the quote illustrates, categorisation depends on the providers’ knowledge. In 
this case, it particularly requires health personnel’s familiarity with the asylum 
process and changing immigration policies as well as healthcare laws. How the 
patient categorises herself can also have an impact on how the healthcare provid-
ers perceive the patient. Patients do not generally fit into only one defined cat-
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with a severe condition. Which category would be most important in this case? 
More informal ways of categorising people, such as those implied in the moral 
economy of deservingness ( Chapter 2 ), may also have an important impact on the 
process of categorisation. 
In Norway, ‘legal residence’ is not a clearly defined category in immigration 
law and has been given a somewhat different content in different legal contexts 
(e.g. the Marriage Act and the Social Security Act, see  Knapskog, 2013 ). When 
the Healthcare Regulation was implemented, there were no guidelines that clari-
fied specifically who should be considered legal residents. The consultation 
paper ( Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2010 ), however, mentioned that 
foreigners placed in Norwegian prisons, or similarly detained in the country by 
force, and persons falling under the Dublin agreement should be considered to 
be legal in terms of healthcare rights. Asylum seekers who had ‘a final rejection’
and had overstayed their departure date were explicitly mentioned as people not 
to be considered to have legal residence and should be assessed according to the 
new regulation. The paper further specified that patients who were in the course 
of treatment or regular follow-up care and had his/her formal residence status 
changed to ‘illegal resident’ were not automatically entitled to receive continued 
medical care that was planned or started. 
Most of my interviews with healthcare providers were conducted one to two 
years after the implementation of the new Healthcare Regulation (2011 ). How-
ever, few that were not already involved in the volunteer-run clinic had heard of 
it and had even less knowledge of the content of the consultation paper. However, 
they did generally have an idea that irregular migrants were only entitled to emer-
gency healthcare, at least when it came to specialist care, but did not necessarily 
know when people ‘became illegal’ or how to identify them. 
The exchange between the doctor and the patient in the beginning of this chap-
ter, where the doctor tried to get information about the patient’s legal situation, 
can be seen as an attempt to categorise Hind and was not unique to this inci-
dent. Accompanying Hind to different doctors’ appointments, I witnessed several 
attempts to clarify her legal status and the subsequent consequences for treat-
ment. The healthcare providers’ reception would vary to some extent depending 
on whether she was categorised as an ‘asylum seeker’ or as ‘rejected’/‘illegal’. In 
the following, I will reproduce two brief field note excerpts from Hind’s medical 
appointments, this time with Doctor Knut, to illustrate the difficulties as well as 
the negotiated process of categorisation. 
Field note excerpt: 
This time we were met by a younger doctor. He had seen Hind before 
(although a while ago). He starts the appointment by expressing sympathy, 
saying that he thinks it is regrettable that nothing has been done yet. He sits 
at the end of his desk with a piece of paper and pen and looks at the mother. 
‘Can you say something about your situation?’ He asks. The mother is unsure 
of what he means by this. Doctor Knut notices her hesitation and tries to 
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mother smiles relieved and answers ‘ah, yes’. The doctor makes a note of 
this on his piece of paper. He explains that he and the hospital are not able to 
perform the major surgery she needs, but they will try to do what they can to 
help her as Hind clearly needs medical care. He listens to the mother describ-
ing the symptoms, asks various questions, and expresses that he finds the 
symptoms and the situation serious. 
After checking Hind and asking a number of questions about her somatic 
symptoms, Knut starts asking questions about Hind’s social situation (school, 
friends, etc.) to find out how her condition affects her in her everyday activi-
ties. Hind’s mother answers these, but also starts to explain in more detail 
their legal situation (two negatives, but no exit dates or plans) to make sure 
he understands their difficult situation. Both she and her husband also explain 
how they feel trapped between doctors and the UDI and how they are con-
tinuing to appeal their case. Doctor Knut looks more confused, however, 
and Hind’s mother asks if I can help explain in Norwegian. I do, but neither 
Hind’s mother nor I use the term ‘illegal’ or ‘final rejection’, just ‘two nega-
tives’. The explanations do not seem to affect Doctor Knut’s opinion about 
what to do next. 
In this case, it was a deliberate choice on my part to use the same terminology as 
Hind’s parents used. Although I knew that they did not try to capitalise on the con-
fusion regarding categories and terminology, the situation presented the dilemma 
of whether or not I as a researcher would reproduce state-defined categories, thus 
contributing to the everyday production of certain migrants’ ‘illegality’. In the 
Norwegian system, the Directorate of Immigration makes the initial decision in 
asylum cases. In case the UDI rejects an application, it can be appealed to an 
independent Immigration Appeals Board (UNE). If UNE rejects the appeal, it 
is referred to as ‘the final decision’. If the rejected asylum seeker fails to leave 
before the departure date set for him/her, his/her stay is generally no longer con-
sidered legal and thus formally demarcates the border between ‘legal’ asylum 
seeker and ‘person without legal residence’. However, rejected asylum seekers, 
as shown in previous chapters, were still allowed to stay in asylum reception 
centres and receive a small subsidy from the state. It was also still possible to 
request a ‘renewed consideration’ ( omgjøringsbegjæring) from UNE numerous 
times. However, filing such a request would not change their (il)legal status and 
they could still be deported at any time. 
The irregularised migrants I met during fieldwork categorised themselves in 
various ways. For instance, Aster, and even Eba ( Chapter 2 ), would sometimes 
refer to themselves as ‘paperless’ ( papirløs) and even ‘illegal’. However, they 
would often reject the latter label as something the state had imposed on them. 
Hind’s family, and most of the migrants I met, however, still primarily consid-
ered themselves asylum seekers as they continued to work on their appeals. They 
would not refer to the second rejection as ‘the final rejection’, but instead as ‘the 
second negative’. Some would even say that they had three or four ‘negatives’, 
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who got ‘a positive’ after several ‘negatives’. For instance, Mehret, Aster’s friend, 
got one, as she said, ‘on the third attempt’. In the public discourse the catego-
ries of refugees, asylum seeker, and undocumented/illegal migrant are also often 
interchangeable, and children such as Hind were almost always referred to as 
long-staying asylum children (lengeværende asylbarn), even by public officials. 
When asked, Hind’s parents would always carefully explain their situation to 
the various doctors: that they had applied for asylum and that they had received 
two ‘negatives’ but were appealing. As such, they did not try to hide their status. 
However, being unfamiliar with the asylum procedure, the doctors did not neces-
sarily recognise the significance of the second rejection and were unsure how to 
categorise them. This was not limited to Hind’s case, but a general uncertainty I 
met among healthcare providers. For instance, when I asked a GP, who had many 
asylum seekers on her patient list, whether she had many patients without legal 
residence, she was aware of only two. One had told her in an appointment and the 
other’s referral to a specialist had been denied because of his (lack of) legal status. 
When I asked the doctor how many of her patients had two or more negatives, she 
estimated about 25. This illustrates that although the categories of asylum seeker 
and person without legal residence have been more clearly demarcated legally, the 
discursive and practical border between them in Norway remained blurry. 
A point that further illustrates this was that while residents at asylum recep-
tion centres were not legally entitled to more healthcare than those living outside 
of the centres, they often had better access in practice. This was often due to a 
combination of the efforts and facilitation on the part of centre staff, and doc-
tors’ unawareness of immigration law, or that they considered it unethical to end 
a doctor-patient relationship already established. Reception centres would also 
at times assist their residents financially with medical expenses. This was done 
either by giving residents loans, which they would then deduct directly from the 
financial support the migrants received from the state every two weeks, or by 
assisting them in applying to the UDI for extra support. For instance, for Eba, 
who had type 2 diabetes, paying for medicine became a serious concern after 
losing his job. By moving back into ‘the system’, he received support to cover 
his medical expenses. The centre also arranged for the family to get a regular GP
even though they were not entitled to it. As an employee at the reception centre 
explained, she had a list of sympathetic GPs who would accept rejected asylum 
seekers if she called. 
Access to specialist healthcare seemed to vary more even for rejected asy-
lum seekers staying in reception centres. Some of my interlocutors continued to 
receive regular treatment by specialists and were never charged more than regular 
user fees. Hind, however, was not so fortunate. Friends of the family had at one 
point contacted the specialists to explain the gravity of their situation, that is, that 
they could be deported anytime, in the hopes that it would speed up the process 
for setting a date for surgery. With this information, the surgeon and his superiors 
instead backtracked on the possibility of surgery. 
Hind’s (lack of) legal status, though, was never written in her medical journal. 





Healthcare providers as petty sovereigns 81 
serious and worsening, her GP continued to refer her to specialist care. The next 
time Hind met Doctor Knut, she received a different reception: 
We were sitting in the consultation room when the doctor arrived. It was 
Doctor Knut again. Walking across the room towards his chair, he began to 
explain that he had been informed by his colleague that they had received a 
final rejection. When this did not seem to make an impression on the parents, 
he asked if it was not correct that they had talked to his colleague. The par-
ents responded that they did not recognise the name, but that she might have 
talked to someone from the reception centre. 
The doctor’s attitude was now clearly different from the last appointment. 
He appeared very uncomfortable throughout the meeting (perhaps reinforced 
by my presence. He often looked at me this time). He explained that there 
was no more they could do for Hind when the other hospital would not accept 
her and the surgeons at this hospital said they did not have the necessary 
expertise. ‘I cannot tell the other hospital what to do,’ he said. He did not 
seem to want to be further involved. The parents asked him (as they did all 
doctors they met) if he could write a report to the UDI about Hind’s medical 
situation. To this, he replied that he did not have the necessary expertise and 
that they would have to ask the surgeon. The parents explained that they had 
repeatedly and unsuccessfully tried to contact the surgeon. Doctor Knut gave 
only brief answers. He listened to the parents’ frustration but looked mostly 
away or down and offered little solace or understanding. Upset with the doc-
tors’ refusals, the father asked in frustration, ‘What should we do? Should we 
pay someone to smuggle us to France?’ Doctor Knut just apologised again 
and said he could not help, and he did not know what they should do. It was 
a short session, with no examination. At the end, the doctor got up and said 
goodbye, patted Hind on the head and washed his hands before leaving the 
room. Having observed Hind and her family’s struggle for medical care and 
residence for over a year now, I found the symbolism of the doctor’s routine 
action painful to watch. 
In this case, it seemed, having been informed that Hind and her family had a ‘final 
rejection’ and not merely ‘a second negative’ had a negative impact on Doctor 
Knut’s willingness to help and promote Hind’s case within the healthcare system. 
This, of course, raises the obvious point of a possible moral economy at work, 
where asylum seekers and irregular migrants’ legitimacy and deservingness are 
valued differently (even for children). In this case, though, it should also be noted 
that Doctor Knut was a junior doctor in a hierarchical structure. His uneasiness 
could thus be related to a sense of helplessness confronting a particularly difficult 
case for which he did not personally have a solution and to which he responded 
with evasion and inaction. This was a response I encountered in other cases (see 
Chapter 4 ). It also became clear later that there was another (incorrect) assump-
tion in circulation that affected the doctors’ decisions, namely that a final rejec-
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after she was supposed to have left the country became a headache not only for 
the immigration authorities but increasingly so for the healthcare system as well. 
While the surgeon and Doctor Knut, in the second field note extract, might have 
acted in accordance with the letter and intention of the Healthcare Regulation for 
‘persons without ordinary residence in the country’, it became increasingly more 
difficult to defend as a medical decision. Nonetheless, the two fieldwork extracts 
illustrate both the difficulties and relative importance of the administrative deci-
sion on category. 
Expert decisions in the intersection between law, 
politics, and medicine 
So, how does the Healthcare Regulation (2011 ) become mediated through the
judgements of disciplinary experts? Sovereign decisions on the exception, as
noted by Dean (2007 ), are always made within various normalising frames.
These do not necessarily derive solely from law but also from more general
social norms about gender, class, race, and so on. In this study, professional
codes of ethics and expert knowledge represented important normalising frames
that clashed with ‘the law’, represented by the Healthcare Regulation (2011 ),
complicating the decision on the exception. For example, both the Norwegian
Medical Association (2010 ) and the  Norwegian Nurses Organisation (2010 )
have clearly stated that the Healthcare Regulation was, in their view, in con-
flict with the general ethical guidelines to which health professionals should
relate. This was also a view shared by most of the healthcare providers whom
I met during fieldwork. The requirement to take migration concerns into con-
sideration was predominantly experienced as a political interference in medical
practice (see Chapter 4 ). Moreover, it frequently challenged established under-
standings of what clinical knowledge is (or should be) and particularly what
factors should be deemed medically significant and relevant information. Thus,
for most, the regulation was seen as putting them in an ‘impossible situation’ 
since they felt called upon to make judgements based on non-medical criteria
or knowledge they did not have or were not qualified to evaluate (i.e. the extent
to which departure was likely or whether adequate medical follow-up or treat-
ment would be available if sent out). Still, the regulation can be seen as having
a disciplinary function on healthcare providers by discouraging them from pro-
viding healthcare services for fear of acting against the law, while at the same
time delegating to them the responsibility for the decision that marks the exact
threshold of exclusion.
A good example that may illustrate the dilemmas and conditional character of 
the decision-making process is the case of Adam Dzortov, a case that has many 
similarities, but also important differences, with Hind’s case. Adam was a nine-
year-old boy, originally from Ingusjetia in Russia, who needed extensive surgery. 
Adam had a crooked spine and spinal pressures on his lungs made it difficult for 
him to breathe. According to Adam’s doctors, his spine was so curved that it could 
not be corrected in a single operation. This meant that he would need follow-up, in 
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he would become disabled and most likely die young. However, as in Hind’s case, 
surgery was initially denied by the hospital. 
In June 2014, his doctors, relieved of their doctor-patient confidentiality by 
Adam’s parents, were interviewed by the Christian-oriented newspaper  Vårt land. 
In this interview, one of his doctors, Arild Egge, chief surgeon at the neurosurgical 
department at Oslo University Hospital (OUS), was quoted as saying, ‘If law can 
trump medicine in this case, it is shocking.’ He continued, 
As doctors, it is our duty to save lives and health. Adam’s condition is life-
threatening. Here we see that the system is speaking with two tongues. Had 
we failed to treat another patient in this way, we would have been held legally 
responsible for not doing anything. 
 ( Huseby, 2014a ) 
Egge’s statement was followed up on by Adam’s attending doctor, Rolf Riise: 
Adam’s critical condition puts us as doctors in a huge ethical dilemma. On 
the one hand, we have a duty to help – and we fully have the opportunity 
to treat him. On the other hand, we are not allowed to operate on him now 
because of his unresolved asylum-seeker status. 
 ( Huseby, 2014a ) 
As the quotes clearly illustrate, the doctors saw the law as preventing them 
from doing what they thought was medically right, that is to operate on Adam. 
Adam’s story was quickly picked up by most of the major media in Norway 
through an article by the news agency NTB with the headline: ‘Terminally ill 
nine-year old denied help because of his asylum seeker status’ ( NTB, 2014 ). 
Many news channels followed up immediately with different individual articles 
published online. Svein Aarseth, head of the Council for Medical Ethics in the 
Medical Association, was one of those interviewed. He stated that the doctors 
would not be doing anything ‘illegal’ if they chose to operate on Adam because, 
as he specified, ‘it is still not illegal to help anyone in Norway – fortunately’
( Huseby, 2014b ). Within hours of the story breaking in the media, the hospital 
retracted their decision, and the following statement was made by Olav Røise, 
head of the Clinic for Surgery and Neuroscience (OUS): 
We see now that we have interpreted the regulation too strictly. Our original 
decision was based on the fact that the patient’s future possibility to obtain 
follow-up with us had not been resolved. However, since the patient is under 
18 years of age, he is entitled to treatment on a par with other patients who are 
presently in Norway. We find, therefore, that our responsibility is to provide 
healthcare to the patient. 
 ( Huseby, 2014c ) 
Fifteen days later, Adam had his first surgery. Røise, who was the one ultimately 
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surgery), explained in a later interview that it was the last sentence of the  Health-
care Regulation (2011 ) that had been difficult to interpret. ‘The sentence can be 
understood as both a “yes” and a “no” to healthcare’, Røise added, referring to 
the exception implied in the sentence ‘unless concern for the child dictates that 
assistance should not be provided’ ( Huseby, 2014d ). 
Røise’s comment – that the clause in the Healthcare Regulation could be under-
stood as both a ‘yes’ and a ‘no’ to healthcare – seems to point to an experience of 
legal indeterminacy. As Hind and Adam’s cases showed, both denying and grant-
ing treatment at various stages in their contact with healthcare providers did not 
contradict ‘the law’. In this sense, it resonates with Agamben’s observation that 
one of the paradoxes of the exception as a technique of government lies in the fact 
that it becomes impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from execution 
of the law ( 1998 , 57). Hence, the issue is not only that law is suspended but that 
fact and law are completely confused. 
While the doctors felt restrained by law from acting, as seen in Adam’s case, 
representatives of the government confronted by the media with difficult cases 
could, and would, refer to it as being the healthcare providers’ decision. This, 
for example, was the political response in Adam’s case. After his story received 
broad media coverage, the Minister of Health and Care Services Bent Høie speci-
fied that the government’s position was that all children residing in Norway, ‘as 
a general rule’, should be entitled to necessary healthcare and that children’s best 
interests should be a ‘primary consideration’. As he elaborated further: ‘Current 
regulations do not prevent children who are in the situation that was featured in 
Vårt Land on June 10, from getting the help that doctors deem necessary’ ( Bjåen, 
2014 ). Yet, what the minister actually clarified, in line with the regulation, is that 
the decision to deny or grant treatment is deferred to the doctors’ discretionary 
judgement. So, whereas the media coverage in Adam’s case may have contributed 
to getting him surgery, no actual changes were made to the regulation. One practi-
cal consequence of delegating the decision to expert discretion thus seemed to be 
to obscure responsibility and controversy in official policy. 
While Adam’s doctors, as soon as it was clarified that the law was no obstacle 
to surgery, made no reservation to the treatment they provided him, this was not 
the case with Hind. The difference in approach occurred even though the question
of what was considered medically essential follow-up care remained uncer-
tain in both cases and would remain so as long as the children continued to be 
deportable. In Hind’s case, the surgeon seemed aware from the beginning that it 
was ultimately his decision, and he did not base his rejection on the regulation 
directly, but on the professional evaluation of what was ‘medically safe’. In his 
view, as long as Hind was deportable and necessary medical follow-up was not 
guaranteed, it could be deemed ‘irresponsible to start a treatment that [could] not 
be completed’, as the circular specified ( RS I-5/2011 ). 
Over the years that I followed Hind and her family, Doctor Johan, the surgeon, 
had in many ways become the villain in this story, and the parents directed a lot 
of their anger for being rejected, both by the immigration authorities and by the 
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Hind’s medical treatment and to their aspirations of approved residence, as they 
believed Doctor Johan had not adequately explained Hind’s medical situation in 
the report sent to the UNE, the appeal board. 
Doctor Johan, however, when I finally met him, was clearly uncomfortable 
with being the villain. He tried to explain to Hind’s parents in an appointment to 
which I accompanied them that it was not a case of not wanting to help them. He 
sympathised much with their situation, he said, and he ‘was not judging them’
for trying to stay in the country. His main dilemma, as he laid it out, was that 
the best medical option for Hind depended upon whether she would be deported 
or was allowed to stay. If he performed the same surgery as he would for legal 
residents, and Hind was deported and left without proper medical follow-up, her 
situation could become fatal. Doctor Johan could perform another type of surgery 
which would be less risky in case of deportation, but which would have a less 
satisfactory result in terms of life quality for Hind, and could entail more rounds 
of surgery to rectify this, if she were allowed to stay. Doctor Johan found this to 
be a very difficult decision to make, and one that was also difficult for the parents 
to respond to. Doctor Johan had thus appealed to his superiors who initially, in 
agreement with Doctor Johan, decided not to do anything as they believed Hind, 
as Doctor Johan explained, would shortly be leaving the country, having received 
a ‘final decision’. Two years later, with no change in Hind’s legal situation, still 
rejected but not deported, and with her health situation worsening, the doctors 
decided they had to do something. Again, Dr Johan appealed to his superiors 
to make what he found to be a very difficult medical decision. In the end, they 
decided to go for the safer surgical option in case of deportation. 
‘Managerialisation’ of healthcare and the clinical gaze 
I believe that the more bureaucrats are employed in an institution to ensure that the 
rules are followed, the harder it is to help people who do not fit into the box. [. . .] 
There are lots of people in Norway who work in the healthcare services to prevent 
people from being treated outside of the rules. And at the major hospitals, this 
group of people is very big, which makes it much harder to find some kind of 
arrangement where one, based on ordinary humane considerations, may overlook 
some things that concern the government. 
Doctor Lena, GP
The last point I will address in this chapter is how doctors’ decisions in the medi-
cal encounter were framed or conditioned by hospital structures and management 
forms. Besides ‘the law’, management and the relation, or relative power, between 
the administration and the professional expert were mentioned by the healthcare 
providers I interviewed as factors that impacted the decisions made. Doctor Lena 
was thus not alone in the viewpoints expressed in the previous quote. Also, in 
Hind’s case, those who had the difficult task of explaining to Hind’s frustrated 
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after a particularly heated exchange with Hind’s father, ‘all the doctors and nurses 
here want to help you, but our bosses won’t let us’. 
The differences between administrative managers and frontline workers have 
been pointed out in the literature on irregular migrants’ limited incorporation in 
service provision, also called ‘bureaucratic incorporation’ ( Lewis and Ramakrish-
nan, 2007 ). For instance,  Marrow (2009 ) found that service providers in the USA, 
like schools and hospitals, aim to serve and help by ignoring, circumventing, or 
protesting barriers, while regulators and enforcers tend to ‘go by the book’ and 
minimise exceptions. Van der Leun (2006 ), exploring internal border control in 
public services in the Netherlands, also suggests that the tendency to be more 
lenient towards irregular migrants appears to be correlated with a high degree of 
face-to-face contact with clients on a more personal basis. 
Like other bureaucratic organisations, hospitals have a hierarchy. Decisions are 
therefore not necessarily only up to the autonomous professional’s sole discre-
tion. However, while I believe many of the service providers that I met, including 
Hind’s doctors, sincerely felt, and were at times demonstrably restricted by hos-
pital bureaucracy, it is worth noting that managerial decisions could potentially 
be used by frontline service providers as an excuse to relieve themselves of a dif-
ficult responsibility. In Hind and Adam’s cases, the managers were also doctors. 
In this case, it can therefore be useful to look at how governmentality-inspired 
literature on hospital reform has drawn attention to the more complex ways 
‘managerialism’, implying an increased emphasis on management techniques 
and rationalities, has affected hospital practices and decisions and also what is 
understood by expert knowledge ( Harrison, 2002 ; Teig, 2012 ). In Norway, as in 
many other welfare states, reforms inspired by a market ideology that strength-
ens the administrative logic have been implemented. With the introduction of 
the so-called New Public Management (NPM) in the hospital sector in Norway, 
health professionals are frequently regarded as having lost much of their previ-
ous independence, because they have been enlisted into new professional roles 
and subjected to increased indirect control, where professional standards are not 
necessarily the determining principle anymore ( Teig, 2012 ). 
While these reforms are seen as strengthening and creating new hierarchical 
administrative relations, they also blur managerial and professional jurisdic-
tions ( Waring and Currie, 2009 ). This process of blurring jurisdictions is often 
described as involving ‘re-stratification’, the drawing of professional elites into 
bureaucratic roles and ‘bureaucratisation’, the standardisation of work operating 
procedures. For instance, Harrison (2002 ) describes the New Public Management 
modernisation agenda as signalling a shift from reflective clinical practice to 
scientific-bureaucratic medicine as medical knowledge, whereby medical prac-
tice becomes rationalised and standardised. This has raised the question of the 
extent to which managerialist and accounting values are colonising the medical 
profession, thus leading to the hybridisation of medical expertise. It is also seen 
as reconstructing the professional role itself by drawing management duties into 
professional work ( Waring and Currie, 2009 ). Ong, in her work on refugee medi-
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clinicians, constrained by a market-driven healthcare system, have ‘their gaze on 
their patients distracted by an eye on the bottom line’ ( Ong, 2003 , 92). 
In Norway, the legal term ‘necessary healthcare’, introduced in The Patients’
Rights Act in 1999, can be seen as part of the process of drawing management 
duties into professional work because the term can be read as an attempt to merge 
medical prioritisation theory and practice with economic concerns by directly 
linking rights to priority level ( Halvorsen, 2004 ). In this sense, the right to health-
care applies, as previously noted, if (1) the patient can be expected to benefit from 
the healthcare; and (2) the costs are reasonable in relation to the effect of the mea-
sure. This means that the question is no longer merely what is medically feasible 
and sensible but also what the best cost-benefit ratio of treatment is. 
As with the cost-benefit perspective introduced through the legal concept of 
‘necessary care’, taking migration control concerns into consideration before ini-
tiating treatment is becoming part of the discussion of what should count as medi-
cally significant and relevant information informing medical decisions. Regarding 
Hind and Adam’s cases, medical treatment would be accorded to legal residents in 
similar situations based on established scientific-bureaucratic routines. As such, it 
is treatment the patient is normally expected to benefit from with costs considered 
reasonable in relation to the effect of the measure. However, with the new Health-
care Regulation, healthcare professionals are expected to prioritise not only based 
on a cost-benefit perspective but also according to legal status. To paraphrase 
Ong (2003 ), their gaze on their patients was now also distracted by an eye on the 
territorial border. However, while hospitals have acquired financial expertise in 
management, they still do not have ‘expertise’ in evaluating migration concerns 
(e.g. means of acquiring necessary information about healthcare availability in 
other countries, etc.). 
The ground on which to prioritise is a question not only of expert knowledge 
but also of the way the professionals see and understand themselves and their 
roles. Health professionals are generally socialised to see themselves as ben-
eficial helpers and not as powerful gatekeepers or controllers ( Grimen, 2009 ). 
Nonetheless, they are both. Even according to their professional codes of ethics, 
healthcare professionals are even expected to balance patients’ interests against 
the assumed interests of the society. Hence, setting a ‘medical purist’ stance aside, 
healthcare professionals are directly and indirectly in charge of public resources 
and to varying degrees experience this as a responsibility. One doctor explained 
this dilemma to me as the duality he felt between doing what was right for the 
patient and his loyalty to ‘the publicly financed healthcare system that pays my 
salary and paid for my education’. 
Doctor Johan, in Hind’s case, clearly felt this conflicting responsibility, and in 
conversation with Hind’s family and me, brought up, in addition to his ‘purely’
medical doubts about the best course of medical action, issues such as the danger 
of ‘medical migration’, not as a current problem but as a possible future challenge 
if access to healthcare were to be liberally granted. Though he did not accuse 
Hind’s family directly of medical migration, he elaborated examples of cases he 
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obliged to take into consideration. In the discussion, he also brought up Hind’s 
country of origin. The medical care Hind needed existed in theory there, as far as 
Doctor Johan knew, so the question was to a larger extent if it would actually be 
available to her for economic reasons. To Johan, this seemed to complicate the 
question of deservingness, as he suggested that the decision would have been 
easier to make if she had been from a country ‘such as Somalia or Afghanistan’, 
where it was clear that such medical expertise did not exist at all. Hind’s case, in 
this sense, points out the manner in which what has been called a ‘culture of dis-
belief’ (Watters, 2007) surrounding the category of asylum-seekers in Europe also 
becomes part of the medical encounter and how the ways to determine which indi-
viduals are worthy subjects of compassion are classed, racialised, and gendered. 
In contrast to Doctor Johan, Adam’s doctors not only provided medical care but 
also actively supported him in his asylum appeal. They were convinced that ade-
quate medical help would not be available to him in Russia, despite the immigra-
tion authorities’ assurances that it was, and they even testified as expert witnesses 
in a court case for Adam. The different approaches by Hind and Adam’s doctors 
thus illustrate the blurriness of the borderline not only between managerialism 
and expert knowledge but also between medical views and the prevailing political 
and moral views on immigration and deservingness. 
Muddled and entangled decisions 
While my focus in this chapter has been on the sovereign decision within the 
specific context of healthcare institutions, the cases explored also illustrate the 
dilemma arising from the medical decision being separate from the decision on 
legal residence. In Norway, there is no formal system for how medical claims in 
asylum cases should be assessed. Reports are generally written by regular health-
care professionals requested by the patients themselves and not by some specially 
appointed experts who issue medical statements in immigration cases. In this 
respect, Norway differs, for instance, from France, where specific state-appointed 
healthcare professionals are involved in assessing cases, writing country of origin 
reports, and categorising illnesses that can provide the basis for temporary or 
permanent residence permits ( Ticktin, 2011 ). In my study, healthcare providers 
frequently expressed the complaint that their expert views were being ignored by 
the immigration authorities, questioning the authorities’ competence in doing so 
( Chapter 5 ). 
Nonetheless, as suggested by Hind’s uncle, doctors could still potentially exer-
cise a form of sovereign power by simply commencing treatment. For example, 
when the doctors attending Adam initiated surgery, they arguably bound him to a 
healthcare system of a certain type and standard. This surgery involved the inser-
tion of extendable rods along his spine that needed to be lengthened every six 
months to keep up with Adam’s growth. He would also need close and continu-
ous follow-up in the event of complications, which in these cases is not uncom-
mon. Yet, what may become a sovereign decision cannot necessarily be known 
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surgery, Adam’s fate was still undecided. When Adam appealed his case to the 
immigration appeal board (UNE) after surgery, he was only given a temporary 
and conditional permit of one year to receive treatment. Although this could be 
renewed, it still meant that Adam and his doctors would have to cope with uncer-
tainty. Hind, on the other hand, was granted legal residence shortly after surgery. 
The permit, however, was not granted for medical reasons but because Hind’s 
‘affiliation to the Realm’ was seen to outweigh migration concerns, as she had 
lived in Norway for six years. This was in line with political signals in a new 
White Paper that made children’s integration into Norwegian society a key issue 
in evaluating residence on humanitarian grounds ( Meld. St. 27 (2011–2012 )). 
Notes 
1 This was initially done as amendments to the so-called Priority Regulation (2000) imple-
mented in June 2011 and continued in a new regulation implemented in January 2012 
called ‘Regulation concerning the right to health and care services to people without 
ordinary residence in the country’. 
2 While irregular migrants were generally seen to only have the right to emergency spe-
cialist healthcare, there appear to have been some ambiguities and diverging views on 
the extent to which they also had a right to necessary, not only emergency, healthcare 









  4 Materialising and negotiating 
borders through administrative 
practices 
We do not experience many requests from undocumented migrants because we do 
not know who is undocumented and who is not. If they don’t tell us themselves 
that they are undocumented, then we don’t know. 
Doctor Lena, GP
During fieldwork, when I asked healthcare providers how they knew their patients’
legal status, most would answer like Doctor Lena, that they did not know as long 
as their patients themselves did not tell them. In Lena’s case, she also added, ‘And 
we don’t care’. 
In this chapter, I shift the focus from the role of professional decision-making 
in (re)producing or challenging state borders to how the border becomes mate-
rialised through administrative practices and routines that contributed to deter-
ring and excluding irregular migrants, even in cases where they were entitled to 
healthcare. Recognising the situated, material dimensions of bureaucratic knowl-
edge, as argued by Colin  Hoag (2011 ), may help us attend to bureaucratic prac-
tice without fetishising the bureaucratic (or sovereign) decision. In the first part, 
I will look at how certain technologies came to mediate social interaction and 
knowledge production in the encounter between healthcare providers and irregu-
lar migrants. For example, the problems of categorisation described in Chapter 3
were somewhat related to the limited ways of identifying irregular migrants. This 
provided healthcare providers with both challenges and opportunities in regard to 
treating irregular migrants. In the second part, I explore healthcare providers’ situ-
ated responses to the ethical and practical dilemmas raised in their encounter with 
irregular migrants. How did healthcare providers navigate bureaucratic structures, 
contradictory demands, and ambiguous expectations of how they should treat 
irregular migrants? 
Detection and deterrence 
Detection, detention, and deportation are perhaps the most visible forms of inter-
nal border control, and scholars have explored how welfare services have become 
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and institutions. Broeders and Engbersen, for example, have argued that as part 
of the internal border ‘the state raises a protective wall of legal and documentary 
requirements around the key institutions of the welfare state and “patrols” it with 
advanced identification and control systems’ ( 2007 , 1595). The aim, they suggest, 
is to discipline the institutions and social networks irregular migrants use and 
need for their daily lives: ‘It is a strategy of exclusion through the delegitimisa-
tion and criminalisation of all those who may be employing, housing, and aiding 
irregular migrants’ ( 2007 , 1596). 
In the context of Norway, the legal exclusion of irregular migrants from health-
care was not followed up with specific control systems through which irregu-
lar migrants could be identified. Due to doctor-patient confidentiality, the only 
way to know a patient’s legal status was if the patient themselves disclosed this 
information ( Søvig, 2015 ). There was also no sharing of information between 
healthcare institution and immigration authorities and the police. Importantly, it 
was not illegal to give medical assistance to irregular migrants ( Søvig, 2013a ). 
It was just that they had limited rights to it. Nonetheless, the healthcare services 
did comprise various administrative practices and technologies through which the 
state border materialised for irregularised migrants. In Norway, what emerged as 
particularly important was the extensive use of personal identification numbers 
and the financial framework. These practices were not necessarily linked explic-
itly to migration and border control, but to forms of control of the population in 
general. Hence, as I will show in the following, ‘the protective wall’ of documen-
tary requirements was not principally about detection of irregular migrants for 
deportation but excluded and deterred them in more subtle ways. 
The personal identification number as bordering practice 
The extensive use of the same personal identification number (PIN) supported by 
a central population register is a particular characteristic of the Nordic countries. 
The fødselsnummer, which it is called, has been in use in Norway since 1964 and 
is well integrated into all administrative routines and allows for a comprehensive 
and detailed record of the population.1 This PIN is perhaps the most significant 
biopolitical technology for controlling the population in general. 
Within literature on irregular migration, the extensive use of personal iden-
tification numbers to identify inhabitants has been seen as a factor that makes 
irregular living particularly difficult in the Nordic countries ( Sigvardsdotter, 
2012 ;  Khosravi, 2010 ). For example, the  fødselsnummer is among the first things 
all persons will be asked about when attempting to access healthcare. The number 
can be used to distinguish individuals from one another but cannot be used to 
authenticate that a person is who she claims she is. Hence, the PIN is not an ID, 
though it is sometimes used and experienced as such in the Nordic countries. This 
makes it an ambiguous bureaucratic tool for identifying and excluding irregular 
migrants from healthcare.2 
In Norway, the responsibilities for healthcare services are divided between 










92 Blurred borders 
and nursing care) is a municipal responsibility and is based on a list system with 
regular general practitioners (GP). Everyone who is registered in the population 
register as a resident in a municipality is entitled to be registered as a patient with 
a GP. As GPs are responsible for all initial assessment, investigation, and treat-
ment of patients, they play a key role in the healthcare system. Access to second-
ary care is based on referral by a GP. 
The introduction of the general practitioner scheme in Norway made it more 
difficult to seek out a GP without already being associated with the doctor as a list 
patient. This has become a particular challenge for irregular migrants, including 
the children, as they are not entitled to be registered as list patients. However, all 
municipalities are required to have a primary emergency care service. In the larger 
cities, these are drop-in centres open 24/7. Formally, these have become irregular 
migrants’ main access point to healthcare. 
Even though ‘all persons staying in the Realm’ have a right to emergency care, 
the primary emergency care centres routinely ask for the  fødselsnummer, and 
increasingly an ID, when people come to register. In the healthcare system, the 
PIN is mainly used as a unique identification of patients in different treatment-
oriented information systems such as the electronic medical record and patient 
administration systems. The PIN’s primary purpose is thus to facilitate the record-
ing and exchange of medical information. 
When I interviewed employees at the primary emergency care centres in Oslo 
and Bergen, they stated very clearly that they did not reject people for lacking a 
fødselsnummer or ID. As Linda, an experienced emergency nurse, explained: 
‘We don’t differentiate based on whether people have papers or not. If they 
need help, we register them. Where would we refer them otherwise? We are 
not supposed to reject people. We never reject them. We sometimes refer 
them [for example, to their regular GP]. But then you have to be sure [they 
have one], right?’ And she added later: ‘I don’t know what happens further 
on in the system, but for the care we give, it does not matter [whether they 
have a PIN or not]’. 
Part of Linda’s job was registering patients who arrived at the primary emergency 
care centre. As such, she performed an important gatekeeping function. If pro-
spective patients were not able to provide the PIN, Linda, or other nurses on duty, 
could register the patient using a support number. Hence, lack of ID and personal 
identification numbers was not necessarily a physical barrier to primary emer-
gency healthcare. The lack of a PIN, paired with the increasingly computerised 
registration and record keeping, however, caused administrative complications 
for registering irregular migrants as patients, and required separate routines, and 
often complex instructions.3 
In Norway, most public healthcare services are connected to a database con-
taining information from the national population register based on the personal 
identification number. The healthcare provider is thus automatically able to check 
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there are irregularities and delays in the system, and people are forgetful, as Linda 
pointed out. Establishing identity nonetheless remained an important part of the 
registration process. As Linda explained: 
We have many who come in without a personal identification number, but 
whether they are undocumented or have just forgotten, we don’t know. We 
try to search for them in the system [with their PIN]. But if even one digit is 
wrong, we can’t find them. Then we try to search using their names, but it’s 
difficult, because many foreigners have very many names. We ask for the sur-
name and the first name. But then we might misunderstand and search using 
the first name and not the surname. 
And she added later: 
We do try to find them [in the national population register], and we take
time trying. Because it is important that we know that they are not in the
population register before we make a separate patient journal. So, we
search and ask many times. Are you sure this is your date of birth? Could
you write it down? What is your name? What is your first name? What is
your surname?
Linda explained that she sometimes became suspicious if people could not pro-
vide a personal identification number, and she then engaged in these kinds of 
interrogations ‘in order to do her job’. Nevertheless, she concluded, ‘but I don’t 
know, so I have to believe them. And it could be true.’ 
For Linda, the attempt to establish whether the person had an existing PIN was 
primarily about administrative procedures for establishing a patient journal as one 
unique medical document. For irregular migrants, though, always being asked 
about their PIN in their interaction with healthcare constituted a potentially dan-
gerous moment of visibility. It created what  Khosravi (2006 ) has called ‘everyday 
irregularity’. As Khosravi explains: 
The landlord, the employer, the subway ticket controller, the nurse at the 
healthcare institution, and everyone else that demands documents proving 
one’s legal status, contributes to the construction of everyday irregularity. 
[. . .] This everyday irregularity results in a constant feeling of vulnerability 
and surveillance that functions as a disciplinary mechanism. 
( Khosravi, 2006 , 295–296, my translation) 
In this sense, the routine of asking for a PIN can create an environment of sus-
picion and mistrust that might deter some irregular migrants from exercising the 
limited rights they actually have. Bendixsen (2015 ,  2018 ), exploring irregular 
migrants’ experiences of their rights and their capacity to manoeuvre in the health-
care system in Norway, found that migrants frequently viewed their encounters 
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She observed that there was a general feeling of being rejected by healthcare pro-
viders, which appeared to come both from personal experience and from rumours 
about other migrants’ encounters with healthcare providers. Irregular migrants 
that I met during fieldwork would also refer explicitly to the lack of a PIN as a 
barrier for gaining access to healthcare. 
Lack of knowledge about their rights and the healthcare system, fear of being 
reported to the police, poor language skills, and arbitrariness in healthcare pro-
fessionals’ attitudes and knowledge have been cited in the academic literature 
as important barriers to access to healthcare that goes beyond policy and law 
( Biswas et al., 2011 ). These are also factors that can help explain the experience 
of rejection recounted by irregular migrants in Norway. Another possible explana-
tion, suggested by nurses and doctors at the primary emergency care centres with 
whom I spoke, was disagreement regarding the urgency of the situation. Though 
the primary emergency care centres said that they practiced a liberal understand-
ing of emergency to some degree both for irregular migrants and legal residents, 
they also recognised that diverging understandings of emergency could be expe-
rienced as discrimination. As Lena, the doctor at the primary emergency centre, 
explained: 
I can tell you, it’s incredibly difficult to explain to someone who has grown 
up in Norway with college degrees that this is a condition that can wait a 
few days and that they could get an appointment with their regular GP. . . . 
People perceive themselves as much sicker than we in the healthcare system 
believe that they are, in terms of urgency. And to explain it to a patient who 
does not speak Norwegian, who was not born and raised in Norway, who has 
a completely different understanding of the world than we do, is extra chal-
lenging. I can understand how misunderstandings occur and that they may 
feel rejected. And many of these people [irregular migrants] are paranoid for 
good reasons, and sometimes that paranoia takes over. But for us, it largely 
falls under ‘business as usual’. 
Paradoxically, the quest for establishing identity for medical purposes created its 
own problem as people with legal residence would share their PIN with irregular 
migrants. As Doctor Lena explained: 
Now and then we notice that someone comes in with a history that does not 
quite fit with what they told us previously. We know of course that people 
share PINs and come on behalf of one another and so on, but it makes it par-
ticularly challenging to treat them medically. 
For doctors, having access to information regarding allergies, medications, medi-
cal conditions, test results, and so on is important in order to provide the best 
possible healthcare. Wrong information may occur if more than one person is 
registered under the same PIN and can have serious consequences. To exemplify, 







Administrative practices 95 
Last year I had this couple from Somalia; I don’t know if they were sisters or 
friends, but they would switch off coming in and they used the same personal 
identification number and the same credit card as ID, probably because one 
had legal residence and the other one did not. Anyway, one of them had a 
pretty serious condition and the other one was completely healthy. And they 
looked similar. Therefore, it was very challenging for us to know whether it 
was the one with the serious condition that came in. If so, we needed to take 
several precautionary measures, treating the sick one in a completely differ-
ent way medically than the healthy one with whom we did not need to take 
any precautions. There was one time where ‘the healthy one’ was put on our 
observational post for blood tests and treatment and stuff, and then it turned 
out it was not the healthy one after all, but the sick one. That was challenging! 
This example illustrates how the reliance on fødselnummer can pose specific chal-
lenges for healthcare institutions interaction with irregular migrants. 
Rights for a price 
I can recall that we have had patients who did not want to be admitted, saying they 
were afraid, that they could not pay and such. But I could see that they were too 
sick not to be admitted. In those cases, we have said, forget about the money and 
so on. We will help you. 
 Hedda, gynaecologist 
I’ve told them – you’ll get a bill, but it rarely becomes a big issue if you cannot 
pay. I’ve said that to some, so that they would not be afraid that there would be a 
lot of trouble. 
 Kari, midwife 
The issue of payment emerged as the second main area of bureaucratic practices 
through which state borders materialised, as indicated by these quotes. In Norway, 
the healthcare sector remains largely publicly financed and the government still 
plays a major role in the provision and distribution of healthcare services. Nev-
ertheless, the healthcare sector is one of the main areas where market-orientated 
management systems have been introduced in the past decades as part of a search 
for greater efficiency and accountability in service production. These changes 
have involved a gradual move towards more individualistic and right-oriented 
legislation, followed by a more comprehensive control system and financing 
based on quasi-markets and performance measurement models ( Teig, 2012 ;  Mag-
nussen and Nilssen, 2013 ). Since 2002, hospitals in Norway have been organised 
into five regional health enterprises owned by the state. These enterprises pro-
vide decentralised management and delegation of financial responsibility, while 
at the same time the minister of health, in theory, can instruct the regional health 
authorities and overturn board decisions in all cases ( Lægreid et al., 2005 ). These 
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a commitment to providing specialist services to the population within a specific 
geographic area. The actual performance of services may be carried out by both 
public and private hospitals. 
Similarly, most GPs in Norway are self-employed, but part of the regular GP
scheme. Accordingly, their financing comes in three parts: (1) basic funding from 
the municipality, (2) activity-based funding such as refunds from the national gov-
ernment, and (3) user fees from patients. Primary emergency centres are similarly 
financed. The regional health enterprises are financed by the state through basic 
funding and activity-based funding. The activity-based funding is based both on 
number of patients and on type of treatment based on the diagnosis-related groups 
(DRG) classification system ( Byrkjeflot, 2005 ). 
The issue of compensation from the state is one of the reasons why it is impor-
tant for healthcare institutions to verify the personal identification numbers of 
patients. In Norway, governmental reimbursement schemes require the registra-
tion of these numbers. The issue of compensation was also one of the reasons why 
it became tricky for healthcare institutions to treat irregular migrants. Unlike legal 
residents, irregular migrants are expected to carry the full cost of treatment, even 
in cases where they are legally entitled to care, such as emergency care, neonatal 
care, childbirth, and abortion. 
The rules regarding payment of expenses for patients who ‘do not have ordi-
nary residence in the realm’ are specified in the  Specialist Health Service Act 
(1999 , § 5–3). This act states that if the patient cannot cover the expenses, costs 
should be covered by the respective health institution or service provider ( RS 
I-2/2008 ). In this way, the act places the ultimate responsibility for covering the 
expenses on the individual healthcare institutions, by either pursuing the patient 
for the amount due or covering it themselves through their own budgets. The 
circular issued by the Ministry of Health and Care Services regarding the new 
Healthcare Regulation in 2011 specified further that it would not be possible for 
the healthcare institutions to demand prepayment for emergency care and special-
ist healthcare services ‘that cannot wait’. 
During fieldwork, it became clear that the ways in which healthcare institutions 
dealt with the issue of payment varied. There were cases, for example, where 
patients would receive large bills for treatment they were entitled to, while others 
received treatment that did not conform to the letter of the law and did not receive 
bills or were charged only user fees. Healthcare providers, to varying degrees, 
would also inform patients beforehand that they were required to pay the full price 
after receiving services. The difference in practice could be due partially to differ-
ent policies, routines, and practices between hospitals but was also, as indicated 
by my interlocutors, due to a certain use of discretion in different cases within the 
same hospital. For some institutions, the small likelihood of retrieving the money 
meant that it was not worth the effort of trying to collect it. 
The issue of payment, nonetheless, exacerbated the environment of suspicion 
and mistrust that discouraged irregular migrants from approaching healthcare ser-
vices. Irregular migrants I met, for instance, reported having been confronted with 
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healthcare providers I spoke with told of experiences with patients wanting to 
leave hospitals before the doctors thought it was safe or meeting women reluctant 
to give birth at hospitals after being informed that they were required to pay for 
it afterwards. 
Shortly after the new Healthcare Regulation came into force in June 2011, there 
were also a couple of cases that emerged in the public media that challenged, and 
ultimately limited, healthcare institutions’ ability to pursue patients for payment. 
These cases concerned specifically women’s right to healthcare in relation to birth 
and abortion, both explicitly mentioned as rights in the Healthcare Regulation 
(2011 ). 
In the first case, a woman was refused abortion services at a hospital in Oslo as 
she could not pay for it in advance. According to a statement by the hospital, this 
was standard procedure as abortion was not considered an emergency situation. 
However, in the patient journal it was noted that the patient should contact  Pro 
Sentret to get financial support for an abortion. Pro Sentret is the City of Oslo’s 
service for women and men who sell sex and is financed jointly by the central 
government and the city. At that time, the centre had a budget post in the amount 
of 100,000 NOK allocated for women using their services who needed abortions, 
earmarked by the Directorate of Health. However, this support was not necessar-
ily available for women not selling sex. This illustrates how irregular migrants’
access to care largely relied on previous organisational structures in the NGO 
sector and the norms of care and deservingness that informed these ( Chapter 1 ). 
Although the woman in this case was ultimately able to have the abortion at 
another hospital without paying, the case was brought before the Board of Health 
Supervision by the volunteer-run healthcare centre for undocumented migrants 
in Oslo. In its verdict, the board concluded that the hospital had not fulfilled its 
obligation. Since the woman’s pregnancy was considered to be in week 8+4, and 
an abortion must be carried out before week 12 according to the Abortion Act 
(1975), the board considered it to be a case of ‘healthcare that cannot wait’ and 
for which healthcare providers cannot demand prepayment (the Board of Health 
Supervision in Oslo and Akershus, 2011). Although the verdict technically could 
be said to allow the demand of prepayment at an earlier stage of pregnancy, the 
outcome was that the hospital changed its procedure and stopped asking for pre-
payment in all cases. 
The second case concerned the hospital in Kristiansand that billed women for 
giving birth at the hospital. While one woman had been invoiced for 18,000 NOK 
in 2011, another woman had received a bill in 2009 for more than 80,000 kro-
ner that was subsequently sent to debt collection in 2011 ( Larsen and Eie, 2011 ; 
Nilsen and Eie, 2011 ). This prompted a MP of the Liberal Party to address a writ-
ten question to the minister of health and care services in November 2011 to clar-
ify policy. In her response, the minister at the time, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen 
(Labour Party), specified that although patients were supposed to cover the treat-
ment themselves, the law required hospitals to cover it if the patient was not able 
to pay ( Document No. 15:286 (2011–2012 )). The initial interpretation of this was 
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practice some of the institutions that I spoke with already practiced. The hospital 
in Kristiansand consequently withdrew the debt collection claim shortly after-
wards. However, in February 2015, a new case emerged. This time, a woman had 
received a bill of 52,000 kroner from Levanger Hospital after a birth involving a 
caesarean section. In his response, then Minister Høie (The Conservative Party) 
went further, stating to the media that 
no pregnant woman should be worried [. . .] it is up to the hospital to make an 
individual assessment on whether the woman can pay for what the birth costs. 
If the woman cannot pay, the hospital must not send a bill. 
( Dommerud, 2015 , see also  Document 
no. 15:502 (2014–2015 )) 
These cases illustrate the dilemmas the separation of rights from financial sup-
port posed for healthcare institutions. Since many irregular migrants were unable 
to pay, healthcare institutions and providers, in most cases, would have to shoul-
der the cost within their own budgets. For most providers, this was not necessarily 
an economic challenge, as the numbers were quite low. Although some individual 
specialist cases could be expensive, irregular migrants overall were not seen as a 
strain on hospital budgets.4 Not even the primary emergency care centres in Oslo 
and Bergen, which one can assume experienced the highest demand, reported 
treatment of irregular migrants as a financial burden. Nevertheless, the risk of 
not getting compensation for treatment carried out made an irregular migrant an 
undesirable patient, as Doctor Susanne, a hospital specialist and volunteer at the 
healthcare centre for undocumented migrants in Oslo, suggests in the following 
quote. 
If an undocumented had, let’s say, cancer, I do believe he would get treat-
ment, and it would not be a huge problem arranging it. However, the money 
problem is still there. The person would be getting treatment without the 
hospital being compensated. And that’s a problem. It makes the hospitals less 
inclined to take on this type of patient. [. . .] It’s bad business for the hospitals. 
Susanne’s comment should be seen in relation to the NPM-inspired financing 
system in which hospitals partly receive activity-based funding based on both 
the number of patients and the type of treatment. This makes some patients more 
desirable than others. As irregular migrants do not have valid PINs, they will 
not be counted as patients in this system and the hospital will not be compen-
sated. Susanne had experienced complaints about this in her hospital ward and 
had therefore become more reluctant to assist irregular migrants there, as she had 
previously. Instead, she preferred to help them at the volunteer-run centre. Hence, 
I suggest that the main function of the financial framework in regard to irregular 
migrants should not be understood in economic terms, but as a disciplinary tool 
informing healthcare providers’ decisions, for example, by encouraging a restric-
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care beyond formal rights. As noted earlier, it is not illegal for healthcare institu-
tions and providers to treat irregular migrants. 
The disciplinary function of the financial framework was a decisive factor in 
Zeki’s case ( Chapter 1 ). At one point, Zeki was granted the right to drug rehabili-
tation in an institution. A GP had sent a referral on his behalf, and after a mul-
tidisciplinary assessment of his health situation, he was found to fulfil the strict 
requirements and was granted the so-called right to necessary healthcare. The 
referral was open about Zeki’s legal situation and his history: expelled, but ‘unre-
turnable’. However, as one of those reviewing his case explained, there had been 
others before in similar situations who had been granted treatment; therefore they 
had not given his legal status much weight. ‘The right’, though, was withdrawn a 
month later by management before Zeki was summoned to start his treatment. In 
the refusal letter, the manager stated both that Zeki was not legally entitled to it 
because he did not have legal residence status and also that they were not allowed 
to perform services that their ‘owner did not permit’. The ‘owner’ in this case, was 
a state-owned health enterprise. What also emerged when I spoke with different 
actors involved in the decision was that during the administrative preparation for 
Zeki’s medical summon, the institution where Zeki was to be treated had raised 
the issue of financial compensation. Who was going to pay for his treatment? In 
this case, the public health enterprise was not prepared to shoulder the cost and 
neither was the individual private institution to which treatment was being out-
sourced. Zeki’s case thus illustrates how the decision on treatment was framed 
by financial concerns. The negotiation concerning threshold for payments that 
takes place in the cases discussed earlier is also an indicator of the controversy 
and ambiguity that characterises policy towards irregular migrants. The financial 
framework, similar to the regulation, obscures the responsibility for the decision 
of excluding irregular migrants. 
Managing ambiguities and contradictions 
I can certainly understand that they [the government] are afraid of this kind of situ-
ation [health migration]. . . . But the question is: can we defend refusing treatment 
to all irregular migrants based on some individual examples? I believe that this is 
tricky. . . . It can’t be up to the healthcare services to get them [irregular migrants] 
out. Why should the doctor be put in this situation? It is the immigration authori-
ties that must take care of it. 
Doctor Hans, paediatrician 
So, to what extent were healthcare providers willing and able to engage in the 
control-based activities prescribed in policy? Although, healthcare providers to 
some extent have always had a role in controlling the borders of welfare through 
rationing eligibility for services, they are also generally perceived, and see them-
selves, as having a commitment to relieve suffering and maximise the quality of 
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how healthcare providers respond when this commitment becomes circumscribed 
to the extent that it is in relation to irregular migrants. I am particularly interested 
in how they navigate bureaucratic structures in their situated responses to the 
ethical and practical dilemmas raised in their encounter with irregular migrants. 
All of the healthcare providers I met during fieldwork expressed more or less 
similar sentiments as those voiced in the opening quote regarding the new regu-
lations and the idea that healthcare somehow should be involved in migration 
control. For most, the regulation was regarded as putting them in an ‘impossible 
situation’ as they felt called upon to make judgements based on non-medical cri-
teria or knowledge they did not have or were not qualified to evaluate (i.e. to what 
extent departure was likely or whether adequate medical follow up or treatment 
would be available if sent out). Taking immigration concerns into consideration 
before initiating treatment further challenged established understandings of what 
clinical knowledge and professional ethics were (or should be) and particularly 
what should constitute medically significant and relevant information. Doctor 
Lena expressed her frustration with the new terms: 
They use healthcare as a means of coercion in immigration policy. And it is 
absolutely unforgivable. There is no one in the healthcare service that uses 
the term ‘healthcare that cannot wait’. It’s a kind of bureaucratic expression 
that some bureaucrat invented, probably a lawyer. It’s just nonsense. 
What made the term so frustrating to Lena was the impossibility of deciding if 
treatment could wait three weeks if she did not know if treatment would be avail-
able for the patient after these weeks. As she explained: 
As a doctor in Norway, I cannot find out whether people can get vital treat-
ment in rural Afghanistan or Somalia or wherever. It is absolutely impossible 
for me to do that. And even if I checked, I would probably conclude that the 
right thing to do would be to treat the person here in Norway to ensure that 
he gets proper treatment. 
The regulation said nothing about the realism of departure within three weeks or 
whether or how doctors should know if treatment actually would be available to 
the patient later on. More often, the medical results would be better if treatment 
were started sooner rather than later. 
The Medical Association (2010) and the  Nurses Organisation (2010 ) in Nor-
way have also stated that the new Healthcare Regulation (2011 ), in their view, 
was in conflict with the general ethical guidelines to which health profession-
als should relate. The Healthcare Regulation and professional codes of con-
duct could thus be said to place contradictory demands on healthcare providers 
regarding how they should treat irregular migrants. The main response from the 
healthcare providers in my study and the Norwegian Medical Association (2010 ) 
to the dilemmas raised by the regulation was to call for a regulation that clearly 
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enable them to make decisions solely on medical grounds, a task they felt trained 
and competent to do. 
The position of calling for a clear distinction between the right to healthcare 
and the right to legal residence has been a central tactic employed by healthcare 
providers challenging the state’s attempts to manage and control unwanted migra-
tion through welfare restrictions in different contexts ( Castañeda, 2013 ; Gottlieb 
et al., 2012). However, the problem with this approach, as appropriately remarked 
by Ticktin (2011 , 123), is that the proposition that irregular migrants could exist 
outside politics is impossible, as the classification of ‘undocumented’ or ‘illegal’
is political in the first place. 
The literature on the so-called bureaucratic incorporation of irregular migrants 
tends to emphasise further themes of social dissent, discursive resistance, and 
informal practices on the part of service providers. Particularly, a local level in 
charge of providing welfare and workers placing professional ethics ahead of 
restrictive definitions of their legitimate constituency is seen as an opening for 
local advocates to protect irregular migrants’ access to welfare services ( Van der 
Leun, 2006 ;  Marrow, 2012 ;  Laubenthal, 2011 ;  Cuadra and Staaf, 2012 ; Villegas, 
2013 ). For example  Castañeda (2013 ), through her exploration of doctors’ organ-
ised efforts to provide medical aid to irregular migrants within Germany’s strict 
policy environment, has argued that the distinctive ethics associated with provid-
ing medical care has the ability to disrupt the scaling of citizenship by the state 
by treating noncitizens ostensibly as citizens. She suggests that consequently the 
provision of medical care becomes a protest against citizenship as an exclusive 
organising principle of German society. 
Some of my interlocutors, primarily those in primary healthcare, similarly
expressed that they were not overly concerned with the regulation and that they 
would treat irregular migrants that they came into contact with ‘the same as other 
patients’, regardless. As one GP, Doctor Ingrid, explained, ‘I think the regulation 
applies more to specialists. When it comes to us, we follow the rules, but not 
always [laughs]. Anyone who needs help gets it. That’s my rule.’ I also observed 
different acts of individual support, such as treating irregular migrants pro bono, 
providing them with free medical supplies, and so on. 
However, as I observed during my fieldwork, although the conflicting demands 
between law and ethics could be used as a basis for health professionals to stretch 
the limits of the regulation to provide irregular migrants with extended care, it 
could also create uncertainty and reluctance to act. For instance, Hind’s case 
( Chapter 3 ) illustrates that professional ethics and knowledge did not always lead 
to access for irregular migrants but could reinforce the policy of exclusion. In 
Hind’s case, her condition was complex and rare, requiring specialist medical 
knowledge, which was a dilemma for many of the doctors and nurses further down 
in the hospital hierarchy who were often the ones confronted by Hind and had to 
explain to her face-to-face that she would not receive treatment. However, what 
surprised me was that although many of the healthcare providers expressed sin-
cere sympathy in their meetings with her, seeing the situation as grave and wrong, 
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system, in the media, or by writing reports to the UDI/UNE. The response was 
generally that they felt they lacked the necessary expertise, and it had to be the 
surgeon, whom the parents were unable to reach on their own. Evasion, reluctance 
to get involved and/or act, and keeping to a narrow biomedical framework, ignor-
ing circumstance, were approaches taken by healthcare providers that I observed 
during fieldwork that could be said to reinforce exclusion. 
There were also those who did try to help Hind and who eventually got her 
the necessary surgery. Hence, during fieldwork I observed various practices 
employed by service providers to manage contradictions and ambiguities encoun-
tered when translating policy into practice in various situations that challenged 
irregular migrants’ exclusion. I would not go so far as to say that they disrupted 
the scaling of citizenship, as Castañeda (2013 ) stated. Instead, they contributed 
to what I have called precarious inclusion. These practices did not necessarily 
pit formal law against informal inclusion but could be seen to operate in a grey 
zone opened up by ambiguities and tensions that simultaneously cut through law, 
policy, and practice. 
In the following, I will explore in particular the potential and limits of challeng-
ing the border inherent in two common tactics encountered in the field: the pro-
ductive uses of ignorance and structural compensation. I do not necessarily frame 
these ‘tactics’ by service providers as acts of resistance or compliance. Instead, I 
see them primarily as embedded and situated responses or actions that contribute 
to the precarious inclusion of irregular migrants. In this sense, they are manoeu-
vres or ways of coping within the constraints of a landscape of strategic power 
( de Certeau, 1984 ). 
Engaging, coping, and evading through ignorance 
I am sure that I have treated many who have been undocumented and who have not 
had personal identification numbers. I haven’t asked why they don’t have the PIN. 
I’ve just looked through my fingers and written the birthdate. 
Doctor Grete, private practice gynaecologist 
Ignorance should not be understood simply as lack or absence of knowledge but 
involves deflecting or obscuring inconvenient or unsettling knowledge ( McGoey 
(2012 ). As a bureaucratic tactic, it allows actors to maintain a selective under-
standing of their own competences and responsibilities. It is a way of managing 
tasks by simplifying and reducing the emotional labour of complex encounters, 
but it may also open a space for actors to act in accordance with their principles 
and values ( Borrelli, 2018 ). In this sense, it may help both to maintain and to dis-
rupt social and political orders. 
In the context of healthcare, this tactic involves ignoring or overlooking the 
question of legal status and/or the existence of the Healthcare Regulation (2011 ). 
Healthcare providers may ask, but not prioritise, investigating legal status in cases 
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or fail to communicate questions of legal status. Doctor Grete, as she mentions in 
the previous quote, would ‘look through her fingers’ regarding their lack of a PIN 
and treat them as other patients, which also meant charging them regular user fees. 
Unlike the ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ approach adopted by some sanctuary cities in 
the United States ( Nyers, 2011 ), ignoring legal status is not an official policy in 
Norway, but it can be seen as a response by individual healthcare providers. It can 
also be practiced more or less informally at an institutional level. Tina, a social 
worker working in a hospital ward, described the practice at her workplace: ‘I’m a 
bit like this: If I do not know if it is allowed, I leave it until I find out. Here though 
[her ward], we do it until we find out it is not allowed.’ In her experience, the doc-
tors were generally not that interested in finding out what the law said, thus doing 
what they saw fit until they got caught. 
Also, Doctor Lena, in the introductory quote of this chapter, noted that they 
generally did not know who was irregular at her primary emergency care centre, 
but they nevertheless ‘did not care’. When Lena started working at the centre, she 
had asked her superior about what happened with irregular migrants. Her superior 
just answered, as Lena quoted, ‘“Shh. They just come like everyone else. It’s 
nothing to worry about. They get help like everyone else”’. 
As emergency care patients, irregular migrants have the right to treatment on 
an equal footing with other patients. Nevertheless, the healthcare providers at 
these centres still met several specific obstacles in treating irregular migrants, 
compared with other patients. For example, in non-urgent cases and in regard to 
patients with a chronic condition, they were not able to refer them to follow-ups 
with a regular GP. Should they, then, treat these conditions or wait until they 
become acute? The centres have few possibilities for following up patients and 
giving continuous care. Referral to a specialist may also pose challenges. In light 
of this, Lena’s statement that they ‘do not care’ about the patient’s legal status is 
interesting. 
For Lena, ‘not caring’ meant, for example, to ‘deliberately under-communicate 
ambiguities regarding legal status’ in referrals to specialists. It also meant practis-
ing a generous understanding of the emergency care concept as far as capacity 
allowed and downplaying the issue of payment. As she explained: 
We are concerned with finding pragmatic solutions for patients. And when 
people who do not have money come in, we find a way to help them one way 
or another. And when we know the chances of getting payment are zero, there 
is an understanding, at least in the medical group, that we treat the patient and 
they do not pay. It is not our business. We ensure that they receive treatment, 
and the rest is up to the finance department. A bill is sent if they provide a 
home address, but most have understood that they can provide a false home 
address and that this is okay. 
Nevertheless, there is sometimes a very fine line between ignorance which facili-
tates irregular migrants’ precarious inclusion and ignorance which reinforces the 
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they treated all patients the same way and did not take legal status into consider-
ation. However, they were less concerned with, or conscious about, the challenges 
the patient might encounter in actually getting as far as the doctor’s office or the 
discomfort that followed registering without a PIN and being billed. In this sense, 
doctors’ abilities to ignore legal status relied on a division of labour and was a 
tactic not as easily available to gatekeepers, such as Linda, whose work it was to 
register patients. 
Ignorance of the patient’s legal status also presented healthcare providers with 
some particular challenges. In some cases, ignorance of the migrant’s status ran 
the risk of exposing the patient to the authorities. A couple of my interlocutors 
recounted episodes where they had thought the patient was an asylum seeker and 
had, without thinking about it, contacted the UDI to sort out the practical informa-
tion. As Tina recalled: 
‘I had one experience that was not okay, to put it mildly. I think I was lucky to 
get away with it. I had spoken with him [the patient] and everything seemed 
fine. And then I needed some information for a report, and I called [the UDI] 
without thinking.’ She continued, ‘The man who answered said, “He has dis-
appeared”. “Okay. Is there any possibility that you can forget that I have 
called?” I asked.’
In this case, it went well, and the man was treated without being apprehended. 
However, it illustrates a key ethical challenge for healthcare providers, namely 
that irregular migrants are not protected from deportation when accessing health-
care. Gregor Noll (2010 ) refers to this as ‘the bundling effect of jurisdiction’, 
that is, that welfare jurisdiction still comes with immigration jurisdiction within 
a defined territory. 
Failure by healthcare providers to recognise irregular migrants’ legal status 
could also compromise patients’ health. Doctor Siv, a primary emergency care 
doctor, recounted an episode that illustrated this particular challenge. The patient 
was a woman who, according to Siv, had been irregular for ten years, but who 
still had been able to work and pay taxes most of the time, cleaning, among other 
things, government-owned premises. 
‘I met her at the primary emergency care centre the first time,’ Siv began. ‘She 
had a condition that is quite common. She had myoma in the uterus.’ Siv continued 
to explain that this is a common condition that many women have, which causes 
constant vaginal bleeding, making patients anaemic, ‘and when they finally don’t 
have enough blood, they die,’ she clarified. When recounting this specific case, 
Siv elaborated, 
It is a condition that we don’t normally see this advanced in Norway any-
more . . . . She came in and had an Hb (haemoglobin level) of 2.9. This is so 
low that no one could believe it. She was almost out of blood. She looked like 
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Though myomas are common, they are normally dealt with at an early stage. 
The surgery is advanced, Siv explained, but at the same time very easy and rou-
tine for gynaecologists. What particularly upset Siv was that this condition had 
been discovered by doctors five years before when the woman was admitted to a 
hospital and received a blood transfusion. Siv continued: 
The doctors who discharged her were not aware that she did not have legal 
rights, that she did not have a regular GP. So, they discharged her with an epi-
crisis (discharge report) that read, ‘Recommend that the patient be referred 
for a hysterectomy within the next few months’. 
This, Siv emphasised, would be a ‘perfectly safe and reasonably treatment’ in 
most cases. However, since this patient did not have a GP who could refer her 
for surgery, she had continued to bleed for the next five years, fainting several 
times. When she came to the emergency centre, she had very low blood pressure, 
a dropping pulse, and she was about to go into circulatory shock. In addition, the 
patient expressed fear of accessing healthcare, begging Siv not to report her to the 
police when she finally came. To Siv, this episode had been a real wake-up call. 
As she explained: 
Meeting this woman, who had lost all that blood because of a simple gyn-
aecological condition, I was so angry and embarrassed by the Norwegian
healthcare system. She almost died needlessly from a completely banal
thing and the entire time she had cleaned our dirt and paid her taxes. And
then she experienced the Norwegian healthcare system as so dismissive
that she didn’t dare come in until she was absolutely sure that she would
die. And she was right. With an Hb of 2.9 and still bleeding, you won’t live
very long.
Doctor Siv’s case brings out how lack of trust and knowledge can cause treatment 
delays regardless of the regulation. Moreover, it shows how failure by health-
care providers to recognise irregular migrants’ precarity can compromise patients’ 
health. Within literature on irregular migrants’ access to health, delayed treat-
ment is often referred to as one of the main impediments to individuals’ ability to 
receive adequate medical attention ( Magalhaes et al., 2010 ;  Biswas et al., 2011 ). 
Delayed treatment frequently leads to late diagnosis and to the illness or disease 
becoming more severe and more difficult to treat. In some cases, there may be 
permanent damage that could have been avoided. 
In the literature, delayed treatment is often attributed to irregular migrants’ fear 
of deportation or fear of rejection by healthcare providers, as well as bureau-
cratic barriers ( Castañeda, 2009 ;  Larchanché, 2012 ;  Bendixsen, 2015 ). In this 
case, delayed treatment was partly because the initial doctors treated the irregular 
migrant according to established routines and did not know or take her legal status 
into consideration. This raises the following question: Could better or more timely 
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healthcare system or if they were allowed to remain anonymous and ‘treated as 
everyone else’? 
The answer to this is not obvious. In France, for example, a parallel administra-
tive system has been created specifically for irregular migrants. The system, called 
‘State Medical Assistance’ (Aide Médicale de l’Etat – AME), allows undocu-
mented migrants and their dependents to access publicly subsidised healthcare. In 
practice, AME is a certificate granted for a period of one year that must be shown 
to care providers. In this sense, the AME certificate allows irregular migrants to 
access healthcare without some of the problems I have identified in this chap-
ter; it also provides them with an identity within healthcare for patient security. 
However, to obtain the AME certificate, irregular migrants have to present a valid 
identification document, evidence of an address and uninterrupted residence in 
France for three months, and proof that over the last 12 months their financial 
status has remained below a certain economic threshold. As the process to obtain 
the AME certificate involves cooperation and communication with the authorities 
and many difficult requirements, the bureaucratic system in itself may become a 
serious obstacle for irregular migrants’ access to healthcare ( Larchanché, 2012 ; 
Da Lomba, 2011 ). Another dilemma for healthcare providers is how knowing the 
patients’ status might not always make it possible for healthcare providers to help 
as long as the broader circumstances for treatment are unfavourable. 
The dilemmas of structural compensation 
Structural compensation as a tactic involves implementing alternative structures 
to compensate for the exclusion of irregular migrants from mainstream services 
( Karl-Trummer et al., 2009 ). NGO or volunteer-run healthcare centres for irregu-
lar migrants, which now exist in many European cities, are important examples. 
The healthcare centre for undocumented migrants in Oslo, which was an impor-
tant site during my fieldwork, was initially open for four hours, two days a week 
for walk-in consultations but had to extend their offer over the years to include 
an additional day for planned consultations. The centre had 3 to 4 employed posi-
tions and more than 150 active volunteers. The volunteers consisted of doctors 
(including GPs, gynaecologists, psychiatrists, and neurologists), psychologists, 
nurses, physiotherapists, midwives, laboratory technicians, pharmacists, dentists, 
social workers, and telephone interpreters. The centre was also equipped with a 
medical laboratory, two ultrasound machines, one EKG machine, a basic stock 
of medications, and six treatment rooms for patients. Since 2010, the centre has 
had a cooperative agreement with Diakonhjemmet Hospital, which welcomed 
patients for medical, surgical, radiological, and rheumatology treatment upon 
referral from the centre. 
The centre in Bergen was a smaller operation, having 1 employed position and 
about 100 volunteers. It was open for three hours one day a week for walk-in 
consultations with doctors, psychologists, and nurses, and one day second each 
week for consultations with a gynaecologist. They also had arrangements with 
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a dentist office where patients could get urgent pain-relief treatment. The centre 
also has an agreement with Haraldsplass Deaconess Hospital to perform tests.5 
Many of the volunteers with whom I spoke said that these centres provided 
them with an opportunity to provide care and circumvent the limitations they 
experienced working in the mainstream health service. While ignorance or indi-
vidual acts of support to some extent mitigated the dilemmas they experienced in 
their encounter with irregular migrants, most expressed that they still felt limited 
in terms of providing necessary care within the mainstream healthcare system. 
For instance, although a GP could follow up a patient in his or her private practice, 
there would be problems if the patient needed tests or needed to be examined by 
a specialist. In contrast, these centres gave healthcare providers an environment 
in which they could volunteer and provide care based on medical considerations. 
Several of the volunteers at the centre in Oslo also emphasised the advantages of 
the close cooperation and co-location between different medical specialities for 
treatment. 
However, these centres were not without their own dilemmas. Ticktin (2011 ) 
and Fassin (2012 ) have powerfully problematised the idea of humanitarian assis-
tance as it produces victim-subjects in contrast to rights-bearing individuals. 
Another challenge that the volunteer-run healthcare centres faced daily was that 
they risked glossing over the ethical and political dilemmas of irregular migrants 
in need of healthcare, making it possible to ignore the problem both at the policy 
level and within the mainstream healthcare system. 
One key dilemma for the centres was the compensatory role they acquired in 
what they described as ‘a broken chain of treatment’ ( Ottesen et al., 2015 ). This 
meant, for instance, taking on special responsibility for preventive measures as 
well as monitoring and rehabilitation after treatment, or healthcare excluded by 
the temporal frame of the Healthcare Regulation (2011 ). In the Oslo centre’s 
experience, hospitals would refrain from carrying out interventions that were con-
sidered necessary because there were no rehabilitation services willing to accept 
the patient. Hence, by providing such services, the patient could get the required 
treatment within the mainstream health institutions. Some of the patients I met 
at the volunteer centre were also able to use the mainstream healthcare services, 
for instance for check-ups during pregnancy, but still had to rely on the volunteer 
run centre for access to free medication. Yet, by providing such services, the cen-
tres risked becoming a convenient pressure-relief valve for the mainstream health 
services. For example, it gave the primary emergency care centre an alternative 
place where they could refer irregular migrants rather than treat them themselves. 
A key quotidian dilemma described to me by one of the employees of the 
healthcare centre in Oslo was, in individual cases, whether to test the system 
or just provide the healthcare themselves. While their main operation consisted 
of providing in-house care, they tried to refer patients to mainstream healthcare 
when necessary or when it was clearly in line with the regulation (i.e. children and 
pregnant woman). In most cases, they succeeded. The main challenge they experi-
enced concerned referrals to mental healthcare. Together with the Norwegian Red 
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cases, such as the abortion case mentioned previously, to the Board of Health 
Supervision in a deliberate attempt to expand mainstream services’ accountability. 
The healthcare centre also sent patients they did not have time for during their 
short hours to the primary emergency care centres. In some rare cases, this resulted 
in a sort of stand-off between the two care providers. In one case I observed dur-
ing fieldwork, a man arrived at the volunteer-run centre with a potentially broken 
bone. He had initially gone to the primary emergency care centre where he had 
been told he would have to pay. When he explained that he was unable to pay, the 
nurse told him about the healthcare centre for undocumented migrants. However, 
upon arrival there, he was sent back to the primary emergency care centre accom-
panied by one of the volunteer nurses and a note from the centre for undocu-
mented migrants clarifying what they perceived as the primary emergency care 
centre’s responsibility in this case. The primary emergency care centre eventually 
treated the man. 
The Covid-19 pandemic that struck the world in 2020 highlighted further the 
precariousness of relying on alternative structures to compensate for the exclusion 
of irregular migrants from mainstream services ( Drangsland et al., 2020 ; Thorb-
jørnsen, 2020 ). The volunteer-run healthcare centres for undocumented migrants 
in Oslo and Bergen had initially to stop their regular services, because the health-
care providers that usually volunteered were no longer able to do so. Many of the 
volunteers at the centres were retired and age-defined as a risk group for Covid-19 
infections. Other volunteers, who were still working in the public healthcare sys-
tem, were restricted from working elsewhere. Both centres managed after a short 
period to provide a limited service (the centre in Oslo, for example, opened an out-
door clinic in their back yard for simple consultations), and both the municipali-
ties in Bergen and Oslo eventually assigned a GP, who would see patients referred 
by the centres one day a week. Although the centres as such succeeded in making 
the local authoritites somewhat more accountable for this patient group under the 
pandemic, access to care still relied on a limited supplementary arrangement. 
Borders as ambiguous thresholds 
Anthropological research on borders has often highlighted how borders can rep-
resent both dividing lines and thresholds of passage ( Wilson and Donnan, 2012 ). 
As such, they can be alternately permeable or extremely solid. Accordingly, the 
border can be understood not only as a tool for exclusion but also as an instrument 
for producing differentiated forms of access and ‘rights’. 
In this chapter, I have explored administrative practices and routines affecting 
irregular migrants’ access to healthcare and how healthcare providers navigate 
bureaucratic structures in their situated responses to contradictory demands and 
ambiguous expectations. Both are factors that can help explain the ambiguous 
or contradictory outcomes observed in many cases regarding irregular migrants’
encounter with ‘the state’ in the context of healthcare. Hence, ‘the border’ appears 
both as more flexible and negotiated than perhaps initially implied in Agam-
ben’s notion of sovereign decisionism and exceptionalism and as much of the 
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governmentality-inspired research on the so-called ‘internal border control’ that 
has tended to emphasise the importance and prevalence of surveillance technolo-
gies and exclusion. 
Nevertheless, as shown in this chapter, health services do comprise various 
administrative practices and technologies that can be explored as practices of 
border control, where identification was used not primarily to detect but to 
exclude and deter irregular migrants in more subtle ways. There is little to sug-
gest that this contributes in any significant way to the expulsion of irregular 
migrants from state territory. My argument is thus that the increasing intersection 
between migration control and healthcare access first and foremost contributes to 
regulate and discipline the conduct of irregular migrants and the healthcare pro-
viders they come into contact with by normalising the excluded status of irregu-
lar migrants. The Norwegian case thus highlights how current configurations 
of migration control do not necessarily produce a clear-cut division between 
included or excluded but reinforce a blurring of inside and outside. Furthermore, 
the border control is not only located where one enters but at multiple points 
during the medical encounter. The dispersed border is, as I will turn to in the 
next chapter, not also only materialised through practices of surveillance and 
decisions on life but by the imposition of a temporality that accentuates tempo-
rariness and unpredictability. 
Notes 
1 The personal identification number (called fødselsnummer) consists of 11 digits divided 
into 2 main parts: date of birth (six digits) and a social security number (called person-
nummer, five digits). The first three figures of the social security number are called 
individual digits and indicate century of birth with the third digit indicating gender (even 
number for females and an uneven number for males). The last two figures of the social 
security number are called control numbers and are calculated from the preceding fig-
ures (calculated by modulus 11). Although  fødselsnummer is the formal term for the 
entire number, the term  personnummer is commonly used colloquially. 
2 While the social security numbers of other states are approximate equivalents to the 
personal identification numbers in Nordic countries, there are a couple of important 
differences. First, the  fødselsnummer is obtained automatically at birth and is not tied 
to employment or insurance and is assumed to be universal. Second, the number, which 
includes sex and date of birth and follows you throughout your life, is supported by a 
central population register. Third, it is required for most administrative purposes (tax, 
health and social services, passport, elections, legal proceedings, driver’s licenses, etc.). 
It is also needed in contact with many private actors, such as banks and insurance com-
panies. Unlike in many other countries (e.g. the United Kingdom, the United States, or 
Spain), it is not possible in Norway to provide pieces of mail as proof of address to get 
a bank account. Asylum seekers and foreign nationals who come to Norway to work 
for less than six months are given a D-number that serves many of the same purposes. 
D-numbers are constructed in the same manner as the standard identification numbers 
except that the birth date is modified by adding 4 to the first digit. This makes it distin-
guishable from a regular fødselsnummer. 
3 Healthcare providers have the option of registering patients under the so-called sup-
port number (also called an emergency number, H-number, or FH-number). Although 
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systems in use, my interlocutors also reported several different ad hoc ways of register-
ing patients without fødselsnummer or ‘D-nummer’, including using hard copies. 
4 For instance, Diakonhjemmet hospital in Oslo was the only hospital that explicitly 
accepted cases pro bono from the volunteer-run healthcare centre. As such, they received 
most of the referrals from this centre for specialist healthcare within the specialities they 
had. They reported to me in interviews, however, that they experienced the economic 
burden to be limited. 
5 Both Diakonhjemmet and Haraldsplass are independent diaconal institutions within the 
Church of Norway. Both also function as local hospitals for Bergen and Oslo under 
contract with the regional health enterprises through which they receive the majority of 
their fundings. 
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  5 Healthcare through the temporal 
lens of migration control 
In his book Pascalian Meditations, Pierre Bourdieu argues that absolute power 
is the power ‘to make oneself unpredictable and deny other people any reason-
able anticipation, to place them in total uncertainty by offering no scope to their 
capacity to predict’ ( 2000 , 228). This highlights how time is an integral part of 
the exercise of power. In recent years, there has been an increased scholarly atten-
tion to how temporal techniques are central to governing migration (Jacobsen 
et al., 2021; Drangsland, 2020 ;  McNevin and Missbach, 2018 ; Andersson, 2014 ). 
This literature has underlined the imposition of a temporality marked by tempo-
ral suspension and stagnation, uncertainty, and unpredictability in the govern-
ing of migrants. The socio-legal condition of migrant illegality and deportability 
has frequently been described as an ongoing state of temporariness and uncer-
tainty, where the migrant learns to live, or rather survive, in the here and now ( De 
Genova, 2002 ). In this chapter, I aim to explore how the temporal imperatives of 
migration control frame and condition the medical encounter between irregular 
migrants and service providers. I ask: How does unpredictability and temporari-
ness shape the medical gaze as well as medical judgements and practices? 
Hind’s case ( Chapter 3 ) illustrates how both the  territorial and temporal ratio-
nality of migration control are drawn into the diagnostic act itself. As the whole 
medical consultation and the relationship between the involved parties became 
structured by the possibility of deportation, it became more important for Doc-
tor Olav to assess Hind’s legal situation and its temporal implications than her 
new somatic symptoms. However, the case also illustrates how Hind’s  continued
presence became a headache not only for the immigration authorities but also for 
the healthcare system. As time passed, it became more difficult for the doctors to 
justify the lack of treatment, and eventually the doctors performed surgery even 
though her legal status had not become any more secure. In the following, to 
explore how the medical encounter is framed by the temporal lens of migration 
control, I will start by unfolding another case I came across during fieldwork that 
brought this tension to the fore. 
 Timing 
I met Roland quite early in my fieldwork, and for a long time, I thought he was 
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Roland needed surgery, but as an adult, his legal right to healthcare services was 
more limited. Still, Roland had not experienced any difficulties accessing both 
specialist and continuous healthcare treatments up until the time I met him. 
As a child in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Roland was diagnosed with 
a chronic condition that restricted his mobility and for which he would require 
lifelong medication. In 2008, at the age of 32, he came to Norway and applied for 
asylum. By the time I met him he had received, as he put it, his ‘fourth negative’. 
However, he was relentlessly optimistic, insisting that it was only a matter of time 
before he would get ‘a positive’. When I would ask him if he feared deportation, 
he would dismiss it as a possibility. Initially, he would claim, ‘They are not stu-
pid in Norway. They know exactly what’s happening in my country.’ Later, after 
a friend and fellow countryman left on the so-called assisted return-agreement, 
his emphasis would change to his health, ‘They can’t, you know. Because of my 
medical condition’, he would say. 
After having arrived in Norway, Roland was diagnosed with a second condi-
tion, one that, in normal situations, could easily be treated with outpatient surgery. 
However, in Roland’s case, due to his chronic condition, surgery would have been 
quite complicated, and it could have risked escalating his physical disability. The 
same outcome was likely without surgery. As the surgery was not yet urgent and 
Roland was considered a high-risk patient, the doctors initially decided to wait 
and instead regularly monitored the progression of his condition. Surgery was still 
likely to become necessary at a certain stage, that is, when the condition started 
to hinder him from performing daily tasks. Hence, it became a matter of continu-
ously weighing the risk and finding ‘the right time’ for the proposed procedure. In 
the meantime, he was followed up closely by a specialist. 
When I met with Roland, he rarely complained. Instead, he always tried to 
make the best of every situation. He also always expressed complete confidence 
in his doctors’ judgements and satisfaction with the way they treated him. He 
dismissed having had any problems receiving medical treatment or having expe-
rienced being treated differently both prior to and after his second negative. Not 
being treated differently also meant that he had to pay the regular user fees for 
medical appointments and for medicine. However, as these costs were quite high 
in total, the UDI had agreed to reimburse them, along with covering his trans-
portation to medical appointments. He had told his GP and his regular specialist 
about his ‘negatives’ since he had also asked them for medical reports for his 
appeals. It had not been, as he could recall, a topic of discussion in his appoint-
ments with specialists at the hospital. However, as with Hind’s family, Roland 
never considered himself irregular, illegal, or undocumented, but as an asylum 
seeker. His lack of a personal identification number only became a problem in 
relation to e-prescriptions, but he could always get a hard copy prescription to 
bring to the pharmacy. 
Although Roland expressed absolute confidence in his doctors, he still feared 
becoming more severely disabled, and it was a constant worry. Several times dur-
ing my fieldwork, Roland believed the surgery was about to be scheduled. How-
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by various specialists at the hospital. On these occasions, Roland talked about his 
worries, as illustrated here in one of my field note passages: 
When I arrive, he is listening to the radio, a French channel reporting news 
from Africa. There has been an incident in the Ivory Coast, which he tells me 
about. We try to speak in Norwegian this time, he speaks quite well, but he 
says he finds my dialect difficult to understand, so we often slip into English. 
As usual when I come, he is very cheerful. He had told me on the phone ear-
lier that he had received a notice from the hospital, and he thought it meant 
that he was scheduled for surgery. He tells me again excitedly that he is to 
see the ‘chief surgeon’ this time and not his normal doctor. This doctor has 
to check that it is time for the operation. I ask if he is nervous about surgery. 
‘Ah, Saturday was bad, you know. Really bad’, he replies shaking his head, 
explaining that he had been thinking of his mother, his legal situation, and 
the operation. All together it had been too much. This is the first time he has 
expressed his worries about his legal situation to me. Normally he talks about 
his health problems, his worries about becoming more physically disabled, 
everyday events, and his plans for when he gets his papers. I ask if there is 
anything new, but he says it’s just that five years have passed now without a 
‘proper answer’. He had not thought it would take this long. But, he contin-
ues more optimistically, ‘perhaps when I have the operation something will 
happen’. He continues to tell me (again) how important the operation is to 
him, going through the details of the procedure with me once more. 
As with several of the other irregular migrants in my study, ‘the anniversary’ of 
their arrival in Norway was, for Roland, a particularly difficult time, marking the 
passage of yet another year ‘stuck’. This passage also displays how waiting for 
surgery and waiting for papers became entwined in Roland’s life. 
After Roland had waited anxiously for five years for surgery, a date was finally 
set. However, upon examination on the day of Roland’s admittance to the hospi-
tal, the ‘chief surgeon’ decided that Roland’s condition was still too good to risk 
surgery. When I spoke with Roland afterwards, he claimed not to be disappointed, 
rather a little relieved. Though he knew he would need it one day, he was nervous 
about the risks, as he said. At this stage, he was also convinced there would be 
(another) time. 
A few weeks later, on one of our last meetings, Roland told me he expected 
good news soon. At least that was what his lawyer had told him, he said. He had 
just been to see him before meeting me in a city park. They had sent another 
request for renewed consideration (omgjøringsbegjæring), and UNE had asked 
for updated information about his medical situation. Roland had received a dis-
charge summary from the doctors that the lawyer was now going to send in. 
And, as Roland told me, his lawyer was very optimistic. I asked Roland if he 
too was optimistic. Again, he displayed one of his rare moments of doubt, saying 
he would believe it when he saw it. I tried to ask him if he was worried that he 







116 Temporal tensions 
an unspecified period. However, he dismissed this more confidently with, ‘They 
can’t, because of my medical condition.’ A few months later, while I was abroad, 
I learnt that Roland had been apprehended and deported. 
Treating deportable bodies 
Within medical anthropology and sociology, control of patient time (and space) 
has been conceptualised as a central aspect of the power asymmetry between 
health professionals and patients and, as such, of medical sovereignty. In his 
influential article ‘“Your Time or Mine”: temporal contradictions of biomedical 
medicine’, Ronald Frankenberg (1992 ) suggests that differences in the value of 
patients’ and doctors’ time are reflected in how time is enacted as a symbol of 
power and status. Patients and their relatives are made to wait, perpetuating uncer-
tainty and dependence on doctors, while ‘the sacred, inviolable time of the quali-
fied physician’ ( Frankenberg, 1992 , 1) is protected and parcelled out by his or 
her supporters. This protection and value placed on doctors’ time was something 
I came to experience during fieldwork as access to doctors turned out to be more 
difficult than access to the so-called hidden population of irregularised migrants 
partly due to the strict parcelling of their time by their gatekeepers. 
However, control of time in the medical encounter is not simply an expression 
of repressive power. From a more Foucauldian perspective, control of time can 
be understood as a productive form of power. In the patient-doctor relationship, 
power enables doctors to act in the competent role demanded of them by most 
patients and which is legally and professionally prescribed. As such, doctors do 
not necessarily behave in such a way as to deliberately oppress their patients and 
subordinate staff; instead, they behave in a way that is expected of them by their 
co-workers and their patients, and they cannot easily ‘decide to break the frame 
of their professional game’ ( Måseide, 1991 , 552). Or as Deborah Lupton puts it: 
Doctors themselves are subject to the field of power that constitutes institu-
tionalised norms of behaviour in medical practice, while patients expect such 
behaviour as necessary and rational. From the moment the patient walks into 
the waiting room or hospital, it is up to the medical staff to take control. As 
the ‘experts’ in the medical encounter, doctors and other health profession-
als must advise patients how to behave in the encounter, direct their bodily 
movements in clinical examinations, prepare them for surgical procedures 
and advise them on behaviours relating to their health problem and treatment 
regimes, for as ‘non-experts’ the majority of lay people simply do not know 
what to expect or do. 
 ( 2012 , 134) 
What is notable in both the case of Hind and Roland is how medical practice, 
depending on doctors’ control of patients’ time and space, was challenged by their 
bodies being deportable. In Hind’s case, it made doctors reluctant to initiate sur-
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deportation. These cases thus indicate an inherent tension between the temporali-
ties of medicine and migration control. 
Several scholars have critically examined deportation as something more than 
an inevitable conclusion to various ‘failed’ migrant and refugee aspirations. Many 
of these have come to consider deportation as a disciplinary practice and an instru-
ment of state sovereignty that renders certain populations deportable, regardless 
of their ties to the ‘host’ society ( Peutz and De Genova, 2010 ;  Nijhawan, 2005 ). 
Deportation, in most cases, is time-consuming, expensive and is only applicable 
in some cases. De Genova (2002 ) has therefore argued that it is deportability, or 
the protracted possibility of being deported, that is the real effect of these policies 
and practices. It is, as he and Peutz put it: 
[t]he grim spectacle of the deportation of even just a few, coupled with the 
enduring everyday deportability of countless others . . . that produces and 
maintains migrant ‘illegality’ as not merely an anomalous juridical status but 
also a practical, materially consequential, and deeply interiorised mode of 
being – and of being out of place. 
( Peutz and De Genova, 2010 , 14) 
In Hind’s case, the disciplinary effect of deportability, along with its practical 
and material consequences, is clearly visible in that she initially did not get sur-
gery. The complex and contradictory temporalities and the unpredictability that 
permeate threats of deportation not only affected Hind and her family’s mode of 
being but also, importantly, had a disciplinary effect on the healthcare providers 
with whom they came into contact. In Roland’s case, the question of deportation 
worked slightly differently. I did not ask Roland’s doctors directly to what extent 
they had been aware of, or took into consideration, the possibility of Roland’s 
deportation when performing the ‘individual professional evaluation’ (i.e. decid-
ing to postpone surgery). However, the indication I received (mainly from Roland 
himself and his patient journal) was that they had not and did not, though it might 
not have made any difference. Also, Roland’s access to specialist healthcare sug-
gests that his doctors either did not know about his legal situation or ignored it, 
making their decision within established biomedical knowledge and routines ‘like 
for any other patient’. Nevertheless, both Hind and Roland’s cases illustrate in 
different ways the challenges and dilemmas that possible deportation raises for 
healthcare providers. Should they or should they not take this possibility into 
consideration when deciding course of treatment? 
In France, and to a lesser degree Germany, mechanisms have been established 
to address this dilemma by temporally suspending deportation in certain cases 
to allow treatment. This has been related to the way the suffering body gains a 
particular salience for understandings of deservingness and the right to stay in 
these countries ( Fassin, 2012 ; Ticktin, 2011 ). The illness clause is a humanitarian 
provision in French law that gives people with serious illnesses the right to stay in 
France and receive treatment if they are declared unable to receive proper treat-
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official medical certificate saying that one is sick and that one’s pathology should 
be taken into consideration as the basis for granting residence permits. This claim 
is then examined by a state doctor at the state medical office who issues an opin-
ion about whether the patient needs papers and for how long. This is sent to the 
immigration office that puts it into practice. In Germany, the system, officially 
called Duldung (literally ‘toleration’), plays a similar, but more restricted role 
( Castañeda, 2010 ). The Duldung is not a residence permit, but a temporary sus-
pension of deportation that can be issued to pregnant women (six weeks before 
and eight weeks after birth) and people suffering severe illnesses (either if the 
person is too ill to travel or if a person is in ‘mortal danger’ and treatment is not 
available or too expensive in the country of origin), among others. However, both 
Ticktin (France) and Castañeda (Germany) maintain that although these excep-
tions are framed as examples of benevolence on the part of the host society, they 
serve the interest of a restrictive policy, leaving the benefiters either more visible 
and in danger of deportation or in a protracted state of deportability. 
In Norway, the system is not as formalised as in France and Germany, but 
there are some mechanisms that can be used to suspend deportation for treatment 
purposes. UNE, for instance, can grant temporary residence on humanitarian 
grounds. This has been granted in a limited number of cases based on conditions 
related to health, as in the cases of Adam Dzortov ( Chapter 3 ) and Louila Tuban 
(Introduction). Most of these permits were granted in cases where the patient 
was already in treatment or undergoing assessment, or there were specific plans 
for this, at the time of decision ( UNE, 2009 ,  2020 ). There were also examples of 
temporary permits being issued when the forecast for the current diagnosis sug-
gested that the need was temporary. UNE also has the opportunity, when issuing 
the ‘final decision’, to extend the deadline for departure (utvidet utreisefrist ) in 
cases where the person is already under medical evaluation and/or temporal treat-
ment for a serious condition that should not be interrupted. However, the extended 
deadline for leaving must not exceed three months. An exception is made for 
persons under investigation or receiving treatment for tuberculosis. As a general 
rule, they are not ordered to leave the country before suspected tuberculosis is 
disproved or treatment is completed. In addition, UNE can issue the so-called 
deferred implementation (utsatt iverksetting). This is not issued for medical treat-
ment, but in cases where a person is appealing the final decision, either in court, 
to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, or to UNE. Deferred implementation is not 
automatically granted in appeal cases but is based on a specific assessment in 
each case. Also, deferred implementation does not make the stay legal but only 
temporarily removes the threat of deportation. Common to the different measures 
mentioned is that they may suspend the immediate but not the long-term threat 
of deportation. Hence, similarly to the French illness clause and the German Dul-
dung, they maintained a sense of temporariness and unpredictability. 
Neither Hind and her family nor Roland were granted any of these options. 
However, they did engage in more informal practices in order to become ‘less 
deportable’. Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas (2014 ) and others investigating 
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irregular migrants to make them either less detectable or less prioritised for depor-
tation. Such tactics include not committing petty crimes, such as public trans-
portation fraud, avoiding interaction with the police, and not committing serious 
crimes to avoid becoming a priority for removal programmes. Tactics also include 
paying taxes and keeping the same constructed identity over time so as to build 
a consistent trail for legalisation. By living a transparent, above-board quotidian 
existence, they situate themselves in the domain of the licit ( Coutin, 2005 ). Hind 
and Roland, living at addresses known to the state and avoiding crime, tried to 
decrease the likelihood of deportation by keeping their reception centre and UNE 
informed about scheduled medical appointments and treatments. At times, they 
also requested renewed considerations and registered with IOM in hopes it would 
keep the police away for a time. For instance, Hind’s family registered with IOM 
when Reema, Hind’s mother, became pregnant, primarily to feel safe from the 
police during the pregnancy, but also following a cycle of ups and downs where 
they had serious discussions about returning. Their resolution frequently changed. 
UNE on occasion also requested updated information about their medical treat-
ment while evaluating their requests, as I described earlier in the case of Roland. 
Shortly before his scheduled surgery, Roland had filed a new request for reversal 
in his asylum case, submitting the information about the upcoming surgery. At 
UNE’s request, Roland sent an updated medical report after surgery was can-
celled. This was not a specific report written for UNE, but a standard discharge 
summary and as such principally written for other healthcare providers. Roland 
did not know exactly what it said but believed it still clearly stated his need for 
surgery. However, the report was much vaguer, stating that the hospital would 
continue to monitor him and that the need for surgery would be re-evaluated if 
his condition progressed. Having this dialogue with UNE gave Roland a sense of 
security. Still, by the time Roland’s last request was denied he had already been 
deported. 
Healthcare as urgent and temporary measures 
While the illness clause in France described earlier can be seen as an attempt to 
deal with the tension between the temporalities of medicine and border control by 
giving some precedence to medicine, the Norwegian response was primarily to 
limit access to healthcare and to impose a particular temporal frame on medical 
assessments and treatments which made urgent and deferred treatment the norm. 
Since 2004, it has been an official aim that all contacts between public institu-
tions and the individual irregularised migrant should signal a sense of tempo-
rariness so as to indicate that their time in Norway has come to an end ( Brekke, 
2008 ). In the  Healthcare Regulation (2011 ) this was clearly evoked by limiting 
healthcare services in most cases to ‘emergencies’ and ‘healthcare that cannot 
wait’. In the circular and consultation paper to the Healthcare Regulation, the 
Ministry of Health and Care Services indicated that treatment that could wait 
more than two to three weeks should not be initiated ( Ministry of Health and Care 
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frame of three weeks was not medically justified but was set according to what 
the Ministry of Health considered to be ‘a reasonable time frame’ for the irregular 
migrant to be able to leave the country. Hence, the Ministry of Health and Care 
Services presupposed that people without legal residence should (and could) ‘go 
home’ within three weeks and receive the healthcare they needed. The evalua-
tion of what conditions cannot wait was still to be made on individual medical 
grounds. However, some examples were included as guidelines (see Table 5.1 ).
For children, temporariness was evoked in the Healthcare Regulation (2011 ) 
through the sentence ‘unless concern for the child dictates that assistance should 
not be provided’. This sentence did not, as previously noted, refer to ‘the best 
interests of the child’ in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 Table 5.1 Examples of conditions that fall under the concept ‘healthcare that cannot wait’
according to the circular issued by the Ministry of Health and Care Services ( RS 
1–5/2011 , under remarks to the regulation). 
Condition Potential 
treatment 
Severity  Period of time 
the treatment 
 Outcome if 
untreated 
is assumed to 
be able to wait
TIA – warning of Assessment Potentially  0–3 weeks  Risk of developing 
an approaching prophylaxis severe a stroke 
stroke 
 Threatening heart Assessment, Potentially  0–2 weeks  Developing a heart 
attack possibly severe/ attack, death, 
blocking or deadly heart failure 
bypass surgery 
 Sciatica with Assessment, Severe  2–3 weeks  Widespread 




 Gangrene wounds Amputation Severe  1–2 weeks  General infection, 
increasing 
gangrene 
 3rd Degree Burn  Plastic surgery Severe  2 weeks Infection 
spreading 




 Severe depression  Pharmacotherapy, Days Suicide 
with suicide risk ECT
Suspicion of very Pharmacotherapy/ Severe Days  Imminent death 
serious cancer surgery/ 
radiotherapy 
Cancer in the  Palliative care Severe  2 weeks  Severe pain, 
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but instead stipulated that treatment should not interfere with the state’s attempt 
to deport the child ( Chapter 3 ). In the case of children, neither the regulation nor 
the consultation paper or other guidelines indicate a ‘reasonable time frame’ for 
deportation to occur to defer treatment. It is thus unclear whether the doctors 
should consider a theoretical time frame for a possible departure, that is, two to 
three weeks as with adults, or if they should try to establish a realistic time frame 
( Karlsen, R., 2015 ). 
One of the challenges from a medical perspective posed by the regulation was 
that it was not always clear what qualified as a severe and urgent condition worthy 
of exception. In a consultation statement to the Healthcare Regulation (2011 ), the 
Norwegian Medical Association (2010 ) pointed out several temporal paradoxes 
and ethical dilemmas that healthcare providers experienced when medicine was 
approached through the temporal lens of migration control. For instance, from a 
medical point of view, knowing that many irregular migrants would not leave 
after two to three weeks, waiting may conflict with professional ethics and expert 
knowledge on what would be the best medical option. As the  Medical Association 
(2010 ) explained: 
Untreated diseases will often worsen over time and will still end up as condi-
tions that cannot wait while the prospect of treatment often becomes worse 
if you postpone treatment. . . . Considering that many, despite a decree to 
leave the country, will remain in Norway, it will become impossible for them 
to receive adequate healthcare. This would be contrary to accepted medical 
ethics, which states that everyone shall receive treatment regardless of social 
status, position, ethnicity, etc. 
In their consultation statement, the Medical Association also protested the new 
distinction between ‘healthcare that is absolutely necessary and cannot wait’ and 
necessary medical care accorded to legal residents, arguing that that there are 
no medical grounds for this partition. According to the Medical Association, this 
distinction would be difficult to deal with in practice and assessments would nec-
essarily be very subjective. Also, the Priority Regulation (2000) regulating what 
constitutes necessary healthcare for legal residents already stated that severity 
should be of primary importance when prioritising between patients, defining 
severity in terms of loss of functionality, pain, and discomfort. 
How to prioritise within medicine has long been a controversial and contested 
issue as it ultimately reflects a valorisation of life and distinctions between differ-
ent lives, undermining the idea of healthcare as a universal right. The question of 
organ transplantation in Siv Tove and Louila’s cases ( Chapter 3 ) clearly illustrates 
the dilemma of prioritising and how it merges medical and moral judgements on 
life. In these cases, it involved not only a judgement on their current life worth 
compared to drug-free and legal residents but also a judgement about their future 
life quality. Priority is thus not a simple question of ‘objective’ medical standards 
as medical severity can be understood in different ways. Priority decisions can 
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emphasised. Norway was the first country to attempt to implement an explicit 
priority setting system in 1987 ( NOU, 1997 , 7). Even so, priority levels have been 
an ongoing discussion. In 2009, 32 national task forces consisting of medical 
doctors and other healthcare providers from specialist healthcare, general prac-
titioners, and patient representatives were established to define the concepts of 
severity, efficiency, and benefit of intervention within different specialised fields 
of medicine. These definitions were to provide the basis for guidelines meant to 
ensure that the law is practiced equally throughout Norway and to aid the clini-
cians responsible for evaluating referrals received from primary GPs ( Hara and 
Borchgrevink, 2010 ). Still, there continued to be indications of divergent prac-
tices both between hospitals and between specialties and departments within the 
same hospital ( Magnussen and Aasen, 2013 ), illustrating to some extent the con-
tinuing arbitrariness and difficulties of priority decision-making. 
With respect to the discussions in Norway on formal prioritisation standards 
and values, ‘healthcare that is absolutely necessary and cannot wait’ could be said 
to make things more complicated by establishing a new and poorly defined prior-
ity level based on unfamiliar temporal considerations. In addition, the process of 
deciding and defining this term only took a few months and minimal involve-
ment of healthcare providers. Not surprisingly, all the healthcare providers I inter-
viewed found the term difficult to interpret. Furthermore, the doctors did not see 
the time frame of two to three weeks suggested by the ministry as a workable 
guideline for deciding whether or not to initiate treatment. The regulation says 
nothing about the realism of departure, or whether or how doctors should know if 
treatment actually would be available to the patient within this timespan. Having 
to assess the acuteness of treatment without having this information was regarded 
as putting the doctors in ‘an impossible situation’ (see  Chapter 4 ). 
Though many of those I interviewed were not familiar with the Healthcare 
Regulation beforehand, or with the Medical Association’s statement, they con-
veyed much the same criticism. Some also pointed out that emergency care was 
already a very broad term. ‘If you ask ten different doctors, you’ll get ten different 
answers’, one doctor explained to me. What constitutes an emergency, accord-
ing to him, could change based on the patient’s social status, insight into their 
illness, access to a general practitioner, access to caregivers who can look after 
them while they are sick, access to a good home, or circumstances at home that 
are constructive. This definition of emergency, which takes social inequalities 
into account, gives a more flexible temporal understanding of what emergency 
care is and could therefore provide doctors with professional grounds for extend-
ing emergency services to irregular migrants for conditions otherwise considered 
non-urgent. 
Regardless of the ambiguities in the Healthcare Regulation (2011 ), it primarily 
framed healthcare to irregular migrants as temporary and urgent measures, and as 
indicated by the circular (Table 5.1) and the three weeks framework, it was the 
severity and immediacy of current illness and suffering that should guide access 
and not a consideration of future quality of life. As Table 5.1 shows, it was not can-
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triggered the right to healthcare. Hence, a main challenge for healthcare providers 
became how to treat chronic patients such as Roland and Hind. According to the 
regulation, they should not receive care until the situation became acute. From 
a medical viewpoint, this contradicted established practice and knowledge that 
indicated that untreated illness and treatment prospects often worsened over time. 
Furthermore, chronic patients, in going untreated, could end up as intensive care 
patients. As such, they would be entitled to healthcare, but potentially at greater 
economic costs than if they had received adequate treatment at an earlier stage. 
Here, it is interesting to note that the Swedish legislation, which also uses the 
phrase ‘healthcare that cannot wait’ ( vård som inte kan anstå’), defines the term 
differently. In Sweden, healthcare is given to irregular migrants if it can coun-
teract a more serious illness or supplant the need for more comprehensive care 
and treatment (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Sweden, 2013). Hence, in 
Sweden, continuous treatment of chronic conditions can be interpreted as ‘health-
care that cannot wait’, while this does not hold true in Norway. This underscores 
again how the term is ultimately about establishing medical standards based on 
the temporal rationality of migration control and how these standards are linked to 
the way particular moral economies valorise life and define acceptable suffering. 
The ‘here-and-now perspective’
The temporal insecurity inscribed into the medical encounter by deportation prac-
tices and the temporal frame stipulated by the Healthcare Regulation (2011 ) result 
in not only interrupted and delayed treatment but what the healthcare provid-
ers in my study described as an orientation of medical practice to the ‘here-and-
now perspective’. This meant that they tried to address whatever health problem 
the patient brought into the medical appointment, within the allotted time of the 
appointment. 
For the healthcare providers at the level of primary healthcare, this reorienta-
tion was not primarily due to the regulation but due to the possibility that patients 
might suddenly disappear and/or that the centre had limited or no means of con-
tacting them. As such, it was framed by the wider social condition of migrant 
illegality and the difficulties in trying to deal with socio-political issues medically. 
Hind and Roland, with their complicated somatic conditions, represented in many 
ways distinct cases where the tension between the temporalities of medicine and 
migration control intensified. In most cases, the healthcare providers in my study 
stressed that the health issues they encountered tended to be ‘lifestyle related’ and 
of a kind that could be dealt with at the primary healthcare level. Still, many of the 
same dilemmas presented themselves.1 
In particular, two obstacles for treating irregular migrants, as opposed to legal 
residents, came up repeatedly in interviews and conversations with healthcare pro-
viders. These were the difficulties of providing continuity of care and how to deal 
with cases that were seen as socially and legally caused and without clear medical 
solutions. In Norway, as long as primary emergency care centres were irregular 
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to seek care from institutions that were not organised to provide continuous care 
and where it was difficult to a build a long-term relationship that fostered trust. 
Accordingly, the structure of available assistance accentuated care as temporary 
and urgent measures. Also, for irregular migrants, possible and optimal treatments 
for their medical conditions were often complicated by social realities caused by 
their legal status. These frequently included poor living and working conditions, 
limited social network, and a lack of knowledge concerning rights and services 
available, in addition to the insecurity and fear caused by deportability ( Willen, 
2012b ;  Quesada, 2012 ;  Bendixsen, 2015 ). 
For healthcare providers, though, the temporal challenges related to treating 
irregular migrants were not exclusively related to their difficult present situation. 
For example, when I asked Doctor Morten, a GP, what he found most challeng-
ing when treating irregular migrants, he did not answer the lack of rights in the 
Healthcare Regulation (2011 ) as I had somewhat expected. Instead, he pointed to 
the migrants’ ‘lack of a future’. This, in his mind, was what, more than anything 
else, separated his patients that were irregular from others in difficult life situa-
tions. As a doctor, he found this difficult to deal with.  ‘They represent a kind of 
helplessness I don’t think doctors or others are comfortable with. I do not look 
forward to it when I see that they are on the list [of today’s patients]. They make 
me feel hopeless’, he explained. 
Morten’s comment is interesting as it brings forth how medical personnel’s 
conceptions of time, hope, and future are challenged in the encounter with irregu-
larised migrants. Petersen and Wilkinson (2014 ) note that in healthcare and medi-
cal practice, an ‘attitude of hopefulness’ is increasingly viewed as a valued aspect 
of personal wellbeing and deemed as having a therapeutic value. However, as they 
point out, the use of hope in the discourses and practices of medicine and health-
care tends to be associated with an increasing, constructed individual responsibili-
sation, linking hope to the exercise of choice, personal control, and empowerment 
in a way that overlooks the discursive and socio-political significance of ‘hope’. 
Doctor Morten’s concern, however, refers more to what Ghassan  Hage (2003 ) 
has called the unequal distribution of hope in society. While the term ‘irregular 
migrant’, as a legal category, is applied to individuals in vastly different circum-
stances who may have varying individual experiences of hope, Hage’s observation 
draws attention to hope as not necessarily an inherent quality but as a product of 
social conditions. Hope, in this sense, refers to the way access to resources reduces 
or encourages perceptions of a better future. In the case of irregular migrants, the 
state, through border(ing) practices, circumscribes access to resources, and hence 
irregular migrants’ experiences of a (better) future and the possibilities to plan for 
one. It is as such central to the production of their precarity. 
In this context, Doctor Morten identified the absence of hope (i.e. lack of 
future) amongst his patients as a cause of ill health but also as an obstacle to treat-
ment. The therapeutic method of ‘instilling hope’, empowering the patient, was 
revealed as inadequate. The challenge for frontline service providers identified by 
Doctor Morten was related to both the hopelessness experienced and expressed 
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to not being able to help in any meaningful way. This sense of hopelessness and 
helplessness was in many ways related to the very limited availability of assis-
tance for irregular migrants as they are cut off from the normal channels of sup-
port, and it was also something that affected me as a researcher in this field (see 
also Brunovskis and Bjerkan, 2008 ). For Morten and other healthcare providers, 
their dilemma became both how to deal with this circumscription of the future in 
the medical encounter and how they become part of it through a reorientation of 
medicine towards temporary cures. 
It was not only irregular migrants’ lack of future prospects that presented a 
time-related dilemma for the healthcare providers treating them. How to deal with 
their past could also be challenging. As Liv, a psychologist working in a health-
care centre for children and families, explained: 
‘Many of them come with a history of traumas and things that one should 
address. But very much ends up being about the current situation because it is 
so uncertain. So, I think a lot of what I do is to try to find out how to live with 
this uncertainty. And is it possible to do something about it?’ She also added, 
‘To work with trauma issues and that sort of thing when the “now situation” 
is so uncertain . . . [f]irstly, it is not wise. One is advised not to do so. And 
secondly, it is difficult because it is in a way not where their focus is’. 
As implied here, a certain level of stability is usually understood as a profes-
sional and ethical requirement for initiating trauma treatment. This is difficult to 
achieve when faced with irregular migrants who find themselves in a continuous 
life crisis. What Liv often ended up doing with these patients instead was assisting 
them with practical issues, such as writing letters, calling the UDI, getting them 
in contact with a lawyer, and so on. In other words, she helped them to sort out 
their difficult legal ‘now situation’. Hence, Liv moved beyond the medical frame 
in an attempt to help her patients. Also, Morten, in some cases, became personally 
involved in his patients’ asylum cases and in helping them with practical issues 
such as shelter. 
Morten and Liv worked as healthcare providers in Bergen before the volunteer-
run centre was established there in March 2014, and that time they felt alone 
and unsure about how to deal with irregular migrants. One of the advantages 
of establishing volunteer-run centres was that it provided healthcare providers 
with an arena where the difficult issues could be discussed and addressed. In 
the following, I will therefore look at some of the ways the healthcare centre 
for undocumented migrants in Oslo tried to tackle insecurity and unpredictability 
when treating irregular migrants. 
‘Doctors cannot write a prescription for residence’
The title quote to this section is from a former director of the healthcare centre for 
undocumented migrants in Oslo and hints at the limitation and frustration faced 
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be found within the biomedical perspective. Medical anthropologists have pre-
viously noted how medical technology may be effective in curing many acute 
biological pathologies but is often poorly designed to address the social struc-
tural problems that ‘wreak havoc on the bodies of poor people’ ( Bourgois and 
Schonberg, 2009 , 304). Medicine thus risks contributing to a ‘medicalisation of 
suffering’ by ignoring important political, socio-cultural, and moral dimensions 
of distress ( Fassin and d’Halluin, 2007 ; Ticktin, 2011 ). For healthcare workers in 
my study, even when they were aware of the negative impact of illegality on their 
patients’ health, they experienced limitations on what they could do as doctors, 
nurses, psychologists, and physiotherapists. Their encounters with irregularised 
migrants also often challenged established models of treatment. 
The volunteer-run healthcare centre for undocumented migrants in Oslo, dur-
ing my fieldwork, was the most stable and continuous place for care for irregular 
migrants in that area. Though their main activities were on-the-spot appointments 
for which patients would have to queue, they also at times scheduled follow-up 
appointments. The temporal orientation of the centre was not medical emergen-
cies. Emergencies should still be handled by the public primary emergency care 
centres. Instead, the centre was equipped as, and saw its function to be, a regular 
GP office, but with some additional technology, including an ultrasound appa-
ratus, electrocardiogram, a private laboratory, and a somewhat wider range of 
medicines in stock. In this sense, on a daily basis, the centre challenged the emer-
gency frame behind the government’s approach to irregular migrants, although 
in principle it remained within the biomedical frame. However, in so doing, the 
centre took on a compensatory role in what might be described as ‘a broken chain 
of treatment’ ( Ottesen et al., 2015 ,  chapter 4 ). 
Nevertheless, continuity of care was challenging, on the one hand, because 
patients would disappear and, on the other hand, because of the changing rotation 
of volunteers. Most volunteers would only work once a month and were often 
unable to follow up the patients themselves. Many of them pointed out how they 
ended up reorienting their clinical focus to the here and now and to what could 
be addressed in the medical encounter without being able to rely on follow-up 
appointments. They stressed that in this regard, the centre provided an advantage 
over the mainstream healthcare services because of the multitude of providers 
and specialities represented by the volunteers working there. As such, a patient 
would be able to see a GP, a psychologist or psychiatrist, a physiotherapist, or 
even a gynaecologist or a neurologist on the same day without having to be on a 
waiting list. Changing the rotation of volunteers was a larger issue for the Tues-
day evening roster. The volunteers on Thursday consisted to a larger extent of 
retired healthcare providers who volunteered more frequently; some were often 
present every week, and some were able to establish relationships of trust with 
their patients that resembled the patient-caregiver relationship of the regular GP
scheme ( Ottesen et al., 2015 ). 
However, the question of ‘regulars’ was a debated topic at the healthcare cen-
tre. Some of the volunteers felt that frequent users took up time and space that 
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particularly crowded and at times they had to turn people down. ‘The regulars’
were a mixed group but included those the healthcare providers saw as coming in 
for conditions that were not serious or for which the doctors could not do much. 
They were often perceived as either overly anxious about their health or coming 
for social contact rather than medical reasons, and volunteers discussed how far 
their responsibility in these situations should go. For instance, in one discussion, 
one of the physiotherapists took up the issue of ‘big consumers’ ( storforbukere) 
she regarded as ‘shopping around’ at the centre. That day she had a patient who 
had already had more than 30 consultations. He had seen all the physiotherapists, 
and there was not much more they could do for him. He had been given exercises 
he needed to follow. The man, who had been coming there for years, also wanted 
to see a doctor for a ‘dry throat’. Another doctor who was present mentioned 
that she had several patients coming in, asking for a prescription for a shampoo 
containing a fungal retardant, not because they needed it but because they were 
looking for free shampoo. These cases were not representative of the majority 
of patients, but since the centre had so far adopted a liberal view, seeing that 
their social role was medically important, concerns about having to prioritise were 
growing as the patient flow was increasing. 
The discussion about ‘regulars’ also brought forth different understandings of 
biomedical cure versus care and the extent and purpose of medical humanitarian-
ism, including questions of deservingness in medical assessments. Much of the 
anthropological literature on medical humanitarianism has highlighted its rela-
tion to crisis and emergency thinking, as it developed through particular interna-
tional responses to certain situations of acute suffering ( Redfield, 2005 ; Ticktin, 
2011 ). Providing medical care to irregularised migrants involves to a larger extent 
dealing with ‘ordinary’ and less severe conditions, as well as with what Morten 
described as ‘non-medical health issues’. 
How to actually address the complex socio-political issues in the clinical 
encounter was as such a related and recurring issue. Bendixsen (2015 ), in her 
study of irregular migrants’ experiences with healthcare in Norway, describes 
how her interlocutors felt their illnesses had not been taken seriously or treated 
sufficiently by healthcare providers. This was a dilemma also experienced by 
healthcare providers in my study and at the volunteer-run centre (see also  Ottesen 
et al., 2015 ; Mburu et al., 2015), as they felt the tools they had available were 
inadequate, seeing the ‘real cure’ as a residence permit. Some of the healthcare 
providers saw the assistance they could give primarily as a form of ‘reality ori-
entation’. This involved, as my interlocutors explained, recognising the pain the 
patient felt as real but also helping them understand that the cause and solution 
was not medical. In the period from 2011 to 2014, the volunteer-run centre initi-
ated a pilot project with group consultations that attempted to develop ‘appropri-
ate techniques for stabilisation of trauma symptoms and management of daily 
stress’ for their patient group. The dilemma for this project, as Mburu et al. (2015) 
describe it, was how to establish a therapeutic dynamic that clarified what forms 
of assistance the centre could and could not offer and simultaneously recognise 
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Mburu was a participant observer in these sessions, and the article describes how 
the more the group leaders tried to draw up boundaries for mental healthcare and 
the therapeutic purpose of the group, the more the participants opposed what they 
saw as a depolitisation of their suffering. The group leaders therefore ended up 
abandoning their attempts to establish clear boundaries. In addition to arranging 
the group-based treatment programmes, the centre also started facilitating venues 
for socialising and mutual support to address some of the issues that emerged, 
such as social isolation ( Näsholm, 2014 ;  Karlsen, 2021 ). 
So far, in this section, I have described how healthcare providers, particularly 
the volunteer-run centre, dealt with the temporal constraints of migration control 
by focusing on the here and now. Through this, I have also shown the continuing 
tension and dilemmas experienced by healthcare providers because this temporal 
frame often only means relieving symptoms and fails to address the underlying 
issue of the patients’ ill health or the main constraint on adequate and continuous 
healthcare, that is, the condition of illegality. On a final note, though, I would like 
to emphasise that healthcare providers are not the only ones trying to find alterna-
tive ways to deal with the way the condition of illegality affects migrants’ health. 
Bendixsen (2015 ) describes different practices irregular migrants themselves 
employ, including forms of ‘self-care’, such as traditional medicine and praying. 
Some of the irregular migrants in my study also exercised self-care, but most 
often in addition to school medicine. Reema, Hind’s mother, and Roland were 
among those who sought both school and alternative medicine in an attempt to 
deal with the stress of waiting and the uncertainty and unpredictability it entailed. 
Reema, in a particularly tough period, had problems sleeping and remembering 
things. ‘It’s because there is something I do not want to remember’, she explained 
to me, ‘but my brain can’t choose, so I am forgetting all kinds of things’. She 
would write down things she wanted to remember in a notebook, and when we 
were talking, she would often confer with her notebook. At one point, she sought 
help from her GP, who prescribed sleeping pills. Reema, though, was reluctant to 
take them and decided she would first try to come through it by praying regularly. 
As she explained, ‘I sent Nadir [her husband] to the pharmacy and he returned 
with two packages. I looked at them, and I said “no” and put them in the cupboard. 
I told myself that I am stronger than the medicine. I will heal myself.’ When I 
asked Reema how she would heal herself, she replied, ‘I believe in God. I am a 
Muslim. I believe he will take care of me.’ She added, ‘He is the strongest. He 
can help me’. She explained how it helped her to pray, ‘if only for a few minutes, 
three to five minutes. It is like yoga?’ She asked, a bit unsure if she used the right 
word. I suggested meditation. ‘Yes’, she replied. ‘I can sit like this and talk with 
my god. Like this, talking together helps.’
Reema explained to me that the reason she was hesitant to take pills was that 
she had two friends in the same situation who had been taking sleeping pills for 
years. They told her that they became tired from the tablets and had to sleep a lot. 
One of her friends, who had moved away, was no longer able to manage without 
them. She became nervous and itchy and just wanted to go home and take a tablet, 
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her they would help her to quit, but she had not wanted to. Reema did not want to 
risk ending up in a similar situation. 
Roland also suffered from trouble sleeping and stress that would erupt in itchy 
rash all over his body. To deal with stress and to keep his mind occupied, he tried 
to keep busy and participated in a number of voluntary, physical activities. His 
doctors also prescribed various crèmes and tablets for his rash. However, increas-
ingly frustrated by the lack of success, Roland eventually asked for my help in 
finding a local healer through the internet. The recourse to alternative medicine, 
however, was not related to traditional beliefs, as Roland laughingly dismissed 
when I naively broached the topic. He was ‘a city boy’ who had always relied 
on school medicine and not ‘country beliefs’. He got the idea from a friend who 
had watched a documentary about traditional Sami healers. Though there were no 
Sami healers around, we found some names for Roland to consider. When I later 
asked him if he ever contacted any of the healers, he said he had, but it had been 
too expensive for the meagre subsistence Roland received from the UDI. The 
price for a session was 800 NOK and Roland received 910 NOK every fortnight. 
By this time, his doctors had just suggested a new treatment, and though fairly 
expensive, the UDI had agreed to cover it. However, Roland commented, if this 
did not work, he would contact the healer again to see if they could make a down-
payment agreement. By then, however, Roland was back in Congo. 
The point I wish to make here is that all of the described situated responses on 
the part of both healthcare providers and irregular migrants, represented attempts 
to deal temporarily and medically with issues mainly caused by irregular migrants’
legal situation. Though this provided limited relief from symptoms, it also reveals 
the limitations of a one-sided medical response. For instance, while healthcare 
providers were able, through the volunteer-run centre, to challenge some of the 
temporal limitations in the Healthcare Regulation (2011 ), the socio-political 
condition of illegality and deportability were not challenged because of the split 
between healthcare as humanitarian assistance and immigration policy. Ticktin, in 
her book Casualties of Care ( 2011 ), calls this a ‘medicalisation of politics’, where 
the temporality of medical emergencies are brought to social and political prob-
lems. With this in mind, I will turn to the role of health and healthcare providers 
in individual migrants’ regularisation efforts through medical reports. 
A future through medical reports? 
While deportation might be one ‘way out’ of the situation irregular migrants 
find themselves in, regularisation is another. Writing about France, Fassin and 
d’Halluin argue that the medical certificate, ‘a modest object in asylum policies’, 
is far more than a mere expert’s assessment. ‘It is the tenuous thread on which 
hangs the entire existence – both physical and political – of the asylum seeker’
( 2005 , 606).  Fassin (2012 ) and Ticktin (2011 ) have documented that, in France, ill-
ness increasingly became a source of social and political recognition in the 1990s. 
There, as the number of permits granted under the title of refugee diminished 
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Although, the opportunities have been restricted somewhat in later years, health 
remains an important pathway to regularisation. The reason for the legitimacy of 
health in France, Fassin (2012 ) suggests, is that illness is to a large extent devoid 
of the suspicion associated with economic migrants. Hence, with humanitarian 
reason as the driving logic, the sick body becomes the legitimate manifestation of 
a common humanity worthy of being acknowledged in the form of rights. 
In Norway as well, healthcare is cited as the basis for legal residence in many 
cases ( UNE, 2020 ). However, health and medical reports have not gained the 
same formal significance as in France. Moreover, illness is not devoid of suspicion 
in the view of Norwegian immigration authorities, as they worry about ‘health 
migration’. This was clearly seen in Adam’s case ( Chapter 3 ). In their response to 
his appeal, UNE recognised the strong humanitarian concerns in Adam’s case but 
insisted that the concern for ‘health migration’ weighed more than ‘the best inter-
est of the child’. According to them, ‘it was clear’ that the family’s motive from 
the beginning was ‘better and free healthcare’, and as such it constituted ‘an abuse 
of the asylum institute’ ( Jensen et al., 2014 ). This is as such an example of how the 
temporalities of biopolitics shape migration policy as it is the future well-being of 
the collective social body of the nation-state that becomes the main concern, and 
not individual life in the present. 
Nonetheless, in my study, the irregular migrants regarded medical reports 
as highly valuable for the real or imagined authority they conveyed. However, 
obtaining these was not always easy. For their asylum application, Hind’s family 
had initially submitted the discharge summary written by Norwegian surgeons 
following her first examination. Though these were quite detailed, they were also 
mainly technical medical documents. Their lawyer therefore recommended that 
they try and get ‘a proper medical report’ and gave them a list regarding what 
such a report should contain. He also stressed that it should be from ‘the special-
ist’. However, Hind’s parents, Reema and Nadir, were not able to get in contact 
with Doctor Johan by themselves, as his ‘inviolable time’ is strictly protected and 
parcelled out by various gatekeepers. As such they were not able to get a report. 
Disillusioned, Hind’s parents’ resentment and anger towards Doctor Johan grew 
because they felt that he held the key to both their residence permits and Hind’s 
surgery. ‘I want to write a letter to Dr. Johan, explaining him what he is doing to 
us’, Reema, Hind’s mother, told me angrily more than once. She also frequently 
expressed that she did not trust him, questioning his expertise, saying that she did 
not think he could do the surgery and was therefore ‘hiding from them’. 
For months, their sense of helplessness grew, as well as their stress and trouble 
sleeping. In my field notes during this period, I frequently noted how tired and 
depressed they seemed, and their friends also expressed worries to me, reacting 
to what they saw as their passivity towards their situation. However, Reema and 
Nadir eventually resolved to fight. Part of this resolution came after a family they 
knew with a sick child received a ‘positive’ on their ‘fourth attempt’. Visiting 
Reema shortly after their friends had received the good news, she was both happy 
about it and upset, telling me about the celebration she and some other women 
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received a ‘positive’ while they had not. I asked Reema if she had asked her friend 
if she knew why they were eventually granted residence permits. She had, and the 
friend told Reema that it was because ‘they had worked hard with their case’. By 
this she meant that they had ‘gathered reports from everyone they met’. 
Soon after this, Reema asked me if I would come with her to see a lawyer. She 
and her husband had decided to appeal again. Though this lawyer refused their 
case, saying it would be a waste of their money, Reema and her husband did not 
give up and started actively pursuing every healthcare provider with whom they 
came in contact for reports, even if they had only seen Hind for five minutes. 
These were often quite awkward moments in the medical encounter. Agitated 
and nervous out of fear of losing the opportunity, and due to language barriers, 
their requests sometimes came across as quite aggressive. The healthcare pro-
viders did not necessarily dismiss their request right away but would say they 
were unsure what kind of report they wanted or questioned whether they were 
qualified to write it. Nevertheless, this mission gave Reema a sense of purpose 
and she did not give up, and within the next year, she and her husband were able 
to collect reports of various quality from their GP, a school nurse, a specialist 
nurse at the hospital, a paediatrician, a psychologist, and a surgeon (though not 
Doctor Johan). 
In their study of irregular migrants in various EU countries and the USA, 
Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas note how ‘an incipient moral economy’ defining 
deservingness in terms of noncriminal conduct, economic reliability, fiscal con-
tribution, identity stability, and bureaucratic traceability sees ‘irregular migrants 
accumulating official and semi-official proofs of presence, certificates of reliable 
conduct and other formal emblems of good citizenship, whether in the name of 
civic honour, in the hope of lesser deportability, or in view of future legalisation’
( 2012 , 242). In a similar sense, Reema and Nadir’s collection of medical reports 
was an attempt to prove deservingness for regularisation purposes, though based 
on what Fassin (2009) calls biolegitimacy rather than ‘good citizenship’. Reema 
and Nadir’s story, though, came to illustrate two practical challenges for irregular 
migrants in this endeavour, namely (1) actually obtaining medical reports and 
(2) obtaining the right type of documents for regularisation purposes in line with 
the current moral economy. 
Despite the fact that most healthcare providers in my study clearly supported 
the idea that irregular migrants’ right to healthcare should be on a par with citi-
zens, they expressed reluctance when it came to getting involved in their patients’
regularisation efforts. Although there were some who combined a medical and 
political commitment and took on an advocacy role for their patients, most pre-
ferred to maintain a strict separation between what they saw as the medical domain 
and the political domain. Maintaining a strong separation between medicine and 
politics was, as previously noted, a source for resisting the new regulation that 
limited irregular migrants’ access to healthcare and imposed a particular temporal 
frame on the treatment given. In these cases, however, this splitting approach 
seemed to limit healthcare providers’ willingness to use the scientific legitimacy 
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for healthcare providers who would do voluntary work at the healthcare centre for 
undocumented migrants. 
There seemed to be different reasons for this. For some it was a way of protect-
ing oneself from becoming burnt out while making a contribution where they felt 
they had something to give (their medical expertise). Others were unfamiliar with 
the procedure and expressed hesitations regarding what was expected of them 
and what it would entail, as well as a dislike for the extra administration it would 
involve. Also, for the healthcare centre, capacity was an issue in their reluctance 
to write medical reports for their patients. The centre frequently received requests 
for such reports, and all of these were referred to the management. While they 
would give everyone a printed copy of their journal, they would only write sepa-
rate reports after a careful assessment of the particular case. 
Another theme that came up among the healthcare providers was the ques-
tion of whether accountability to the patient and advocacy work on their behalf 
inherently challenged or contradicted their obligations to the state and society in 
general as impartial experts. While some saw advocacy for the patient as in line 
with professional ethics, others saw it as an ethical contravention. To some extent 
it was a matter of keeping things ‘tidy’, as one senior physician expressed it: ‘It’s 
great that doctors participate in campaigns and fight. But they should not do it as 
doctors, but as private persons. It is about keeping it tidy. If you are a doctor, you 
also need to maintain a certain objectivity.’
He found doctors’ reluctance to write medical reports understandable but 
explained it in terms of a misunderstanding about what it entailed. As he explained: 
There are some misunderstandings about what a medical report is. A medi-
cal report is simply that you write what the patient has and what the conse-
quences are and that sort of thing. It is neutral. . . . But some doctors believe 
that they’re supposed to argue the patient’s case. And that’s not right. They’re 
experts. 
This has also been the UDI and UNE’s position. UNE has previously criticised 
publicly the quality of medical reports they received, stating that these were often 
characterised by a strong commitment to the patient and included evaluations/ 
recommendations that often went beyond what the medical judgement warranted, 
in UNE’s opinion. In Norway, there is no formal system for how medical claims 
in asylum cases should be assessed. Reports are thus generally written by regular 
healthcare professionals requested by the patients themselves and not by some 
specially appointed experts who issue medical statements in immigration cases. 
Norway differs from France in this respect. In France, specific state-appointed 
healthcare professionals are involved both in assessing cases and in writing 
country-of-origin reports and categorising illnesses that can provide the basis for 
permits ( Ticktin, 2011 ). 
Healthcare providers in my study, however, frequently asserted that their expert 
views were ignored by UNE and said they questioned UNE’s competence. As 
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You develop strong sympathy for the patient, you get close to them, and there 
is trust. You feel you are the only one who can say anything sensible to the 
bureaucracy about this person, yet you are not believed. You become infuri-
ated. . . . There are many doctors who sit there and write statements and are 
certain that they are the one who knows best because they have talked
more than anyone else with the patient. And then they do not get through 
because there are no official channels to use. [The statements] are considered
only by ordinary bureaucrats who file them away as insignificant. 
Doctors not only have traditionally been gatekeepers to the healthcare system but 
have frequently been called upon to make authoritative judgements for the legal 
system, employers, and other social authorities. As such, medical sovereignty has 
been about doctors’ role as institutional expert in all matters related to health (Wil-
lis, 2006), or as Lupton describes it: 
[Doctors] are able to dominate not only the medical encounter, but also are 
disproportionately powerful in broader society, in terms of being able to rep-
resent problems as medical issues (rather than caused, for example, by social 
inequalities) and claiming authority over these problems. 
 ( Lupton, 2012 , 111) 
However, the medical profession has been gradually losing their privileged posi-
tion since the 1980s in Norway ( Byrkjeflot, 2005 ;  Erichsen, 1995 ), and migration 
control has potentially made this trend more explicit and advanced it, as Doctor 
Morten’s frustration illustrates. Nonetheless, in response to the criticism levelled 
at UNE’s expertise when it came to evaluating medical claims, they established a 
trial arrangement in 2017 with a consultant who was a medical expert (a psychia-
trist, UNE, 2016 ). 
Still, for a migrant, the threshold for gaining residence on medical grounds 
remains high. In Hind’s case, when the family eventually went to see a lawyer, 
taking with them all the medical reports they had gathered, the lawyer doubted 
the usefulness of the documents. As he saw it, UNE had already decided that 
Hind was out of reach of the threshold, and additional reports would not change 
this. The lawyer encouraged Reema and Nadir instead to start gathering reports 
from kindergarten, school, and after-school activities. It turned out, Reema and 
Nadir had worked hard on their case for a year but had gathered the wrong doc-
uments according to what was then Norway’s current moral economy of legal 
deservingness. 
In Norway, children’s ‘affiliation to the Realm’ has become an important ave-
nue for regularisation of families with children.2 The assessment of children’s 
ties to the country should, according to the government, take into consideration 
aspects such as the child’s age, whether the child has been in day-care or attended 
school, whether the child participates in extracurricular activities, and whether the 
child speaks Norwegian (Meld. St. 27 [2011–2012]). In practice, it is mainly chil-
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residence, that are considered to have sufficient affiliation for a residence permit 
on humanitarian grounds. However, children’s affiliation, measured in years and 
age, is often weighed against what is perceived as the parents’ ‘lengthy breach 
of immigration law’, including their lack of cooperation with regard to enabling 
return and clarifying identity ( Ilstad, 2014 ). In this sense, it clearly illustrates what 
Coutin (2003 ) has called the  temporal double bind of illegal time. 
Though Reema asked me sarcastically why they were paying the lawyer, when 
actually they themselves did all the work gathering reports, she and her husband 
went ahead with the suggestion, approaching teachers and others for documents 
stating how well integrated they were, and Hind in particular. This time, as previ-
ously mentioned, their appeal was successful. On the plus side, their acceptance 
letter from UNE noted that their identity was substantiated and that they had not 
tried to evade deportation by staying in a reception centre. Hence, in this case, it 
turned out to be the well-integrated and innocent child with law-abiding parents, 
rather than the sick body, that became the grounds for legal deservingness. 
Short-term remedies and migratory trajectories 
In this chapter my aim has been to explore how the temporalities associated with 
bordering processes and practices frame the encounter between irregular migrants 
and service providers. While state borders have generally been thought of in spa-
tial terms, they can also be approached as temporal strategies and practices ( Mez-
zadra and Neilson, 2013 ). In this chapter, I have primarily been concerned with 
the temporalities of the border as a threshold where inclusion and exclusion occur 
simultaneously and where ordinary rhythms of time are disturbed and framed by 
a sense of temporariness. For irregular migrants, time is often conceptualised in 
terms of waiting, characterised, on the one hand, by stasis and, on the other hand, 
by uncertainty, unpredictability, and an enforced orientation to the present ( De 
Genova, 2002 ; Jacobsen and Karlsen, 2021). These temporal characteristics, that 
is, temporariness, presentness, uncertainty and unpredictability, are central fea-
tures of the process by which irregular migrants are precariously included. 
In this chapter, I have been especially interested in examining what happens 
when control of the patient’s time (and space) in the medical encounter is chal-
lenged by the unpredictability and temporariness implied in migration control, 
how it comes to frame medical practice, and how service providers and migrants 
attempt to deal with these temporal confines. As I have shown, the threat of depor-
tation and the temporal frame of the Healthcare Regulation (2011 ) had a disciplin-
ary effect in the sense that it oriented the medical gaze to the temporal present. It 
was also a factor in healthcare providers’ reluctance to act and was instrumental 
in deferral or interruption of treatment. The healthcare providers’ gaze was further 
obstructed or constrained by the split between politics and medicine implied in 
medical humanitarianism, which allowed them to attend to or ease the immediate 
suffering of their patients but not to address the underlying causes for the suffer-
ing found outside the medical domain. These practices (again) did not fundamen-
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them in the immediate present. Consequently, care came repeatedly in the form of 
short-term solutions that never offered a cure. In this regard, I would like to con-
clude here by extending the focus somewhat by continuing from where I started 
this chapter, with Roland’s case. 
From the perspective of the migrant receiving state, and in most cases the 
healthcare providers, the removal of irregular migrants brings a certain closure 
to their cases, allowing for a general lack of interest in what happens to them as 
soon as they are outside its borders ( Peutz, 2006 ). As such, there is little infor-
mation about what happens with people in ill health who have been deported. 
In calling for ‘an anthropology of removal’, Peutz (2006 ) claims that while the 
deportation of an individual may take only a few days, ‘the significance of this 
episode – replicating and engendering as it does histories of suffering and sub-
jection – will continue to reverberate in the lives of the deportees and their kin’
( 2006 , 217–218). Although Roland’s life was not in immediate danger, his health 
problems and need for medication and surgery did not go away, and he continued 
to face the further loss of function of his body. A short time after his deportation, 
I managed to re-establish contact with Roland. For months, he remained shocked 
and bewildered by the process of removal, repeating that he had not thought they 
could do it. Roland wanted to get in touch with ‘a human rights organisation’ in 
Norway, as he believed it was a violation of human rights conventions to deport 
a person with a chronic condition. ‘A friend of mine read it on the internet’, he 
explained. ‘And I am sure my lawyer told me that too’, he continued. 
Deportation subjected Roland to some very specific medical difficulties as 
well. When he was forcefully deported, he had been given only three months’
worth of medicine to take with him. While he was dependent on this medicine, 
the particular type he used in Norway was not available in his country of origin. 
He was only able to get a type that was not as effective. This had been one of his 
main points of contestation with Norwegian immigration authorities. When his 
medication ran out and he switched to the other kind, he started feeling worse 
and experienced what he called ‘a crisis’ before his family in Europe were able 
to send him his standard medicine by express package delivery. However, this 
was an expensive solution, and he did not know how to solve this problem in the 
long run. 
A greater concern for Roland, however, was that not only had he been deported 
from Norway but he had also been imposed a two-year expulsion from the 
entire Schengen area. As the necessary expertise for surgery was not available 
in Congo, Roland was convinced that he needed to get back to Europe. Speaking 
to him months after his deportation, his life still revolved around how to return 
to Europe to get surgery, contacting authorities to get his expulsion lifted. He 
put all his efforts into this, unable to think of his future in any other terms. As he 
explained to me, ‘I did not come to Norway to be lazy. I came to study, to work. 
They destroyed all that. Here, people like me have no opportunity.’ In this sense, 
Roland’s case fits with what other ethnographies of removal suggest, that is, for 
deportees, deportation is not necessarily the end to their migratory trajectories or 







1 According to the healthcare centre for undocumented migrants, most diagnoses there 
are related to the digestive system, whereas half are related to dental care, the muscular 
and skeletal system, mental health, skin, and the respiratory system. In terms of men-
tal health, the six most common diagnoses were: feeling anxiety/nervous/tense, situ-
ational mental imbalance, emotional depression, sleep disorder, depressive disorder, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder. Poor mental health, they report, is seen mostly in patients 
who have been refused asylum, as opposed to those who have not registered in Norway 
(Healthcare centre for undocumented migrants, 2014). 
2 In 2007, Norway implemented an ongoing regularization mechanism, which was fur-
ther strengthened in 2013. Through this, children, and their families, can be granted a 
residence permit on the grounds of strong humanitarian consideration on a case-by-case 
basis. In the assessment, ‘the child’s affiliation to the realm shall have particular weight’






The main objective of this book has been to scrutinise what is at stake in the 
limited inclusive practices directed at irregular migrants. Scholars have addressed 
questions concerning what is or should be states’ obligations towards unwanted 
migrants residing within their territory ( Bosniak, 2006 ;  Carens, 2008 ), as well 
as mapping and comparing states’ actual policies regarding irregular migrants’
access to healthcare and social benefits ( Karl-Trummer et al., 2009 ;  Spencer, 
2018 ). Investigating the state’s approaches to irregular migrants’ welfare, how-
ever, can also be a fruitful point of departure to explore broader questions of 
state sovereignty, including the interplay between the biopolitical management of 
populations and the geopolitical management of territory and the changing mean-
ing and location of state borders. This latter line of research has been the primary 
concern of this book. 
The theoretical discussions spurred by Agamben’s reconceptualisation of sov-
ereignty has served as a point of departure to critically examine practices of care 
and how they relate to valorisation of life, social rights, and the inside/outside 
of the state. To Agamben, state power is ultimately founded on bare or biologi-
cal life ‘which is kept safe and protected to the degree to which it submits itself 
to the sovereign’s (or the law’s) right of life and death’ ( Agamben, 2000b , 5). 
By entwining sovereign exceptionalism with the state’s role of fostering life, 
Agamben draws attention to the Janus-faced character of the state and to how 
state violence and care of life are intimately related. To Agamben, the problem 
with human and citizen rights is not only that they do not offer protection against 
sovereign violence but that they also ultimately presuppose the state and the 
relation of sovereignty and bare life and thus facilitate an infinite expansion of 
disciplinary coercion and biopolitical control ( Agamben, 1998 , 121 and 181). As 
he writes in Homo Sacer, 
the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts 
with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing 
inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new 
and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which they 
wanted to liberate themselves. 









In this perspective, reform of existing institutions from human rights to the wel-
fare state can only entrench rather than overcome the worst aspects of sovereignty 
and the system of nation-states ( Whyte, 2013 ). 
Agamben’s work is often considered dystopic, presenting the state as a kill-
ing machine and the Nazi concentration camp as the nomos of the modern. This 
perspective might seem at great odds with the image of the Norwegian welfare 
state, generally perceived both as good and caring and as a particularly successful 
and stable state in today’s world. Much of the initial work on the state of excep-
tion also largely examined paradigmatic examples such as the Guantanamo camp 
and other detention camps (e.g. Butler, 2004 ;  Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004 ; 
Aradau, 2007 ). In this book, I have been concerned with a less spectacular expres-
sion of sovereignty, addressing instead how sovereign exceptionalism operates 
and relates to practices of mundane government and particularly how the decision 
on the exception relates to professional and bureaucratic discretion. To Agamben 
(2005 ,  2011 ), as I read him, law-making by administrative decree is not a practice 
associated simply with a rupture to ordinary life under the rule of law but with the 
rise of the regulatory or administrative role of the state. One of Agamben’s most 
central and controversial claims is that because life in modernity is increasingly 
placed at the centre of state politics, exceptional politics has become the rule 
( 1998 , 111). 
The claim that we are all potentially ‘homines sacri’ ( 1998 , 111), I find, is an 
important reminder that the (mis)treatment of irregular migrants is not necessar-
ily as exceptional as it is often assumed but rather represents a paradigmatic site 
of modern techniques of what Foucault calls ‘governmentality’. Still, this does 
not mean that all life is equally vulnerable to the operations of power within the 
nation-state. Similarly, precarious inclusion as a strategy of government is not 
necessarily exclusive to irregular migrants. Possessing status as a legal resident 
or citizen of a given nation-state does not always result in being considered a 
member of the political or moral community of that (nation-)state. For example, 
citizens who do not live up to society’s ethnicised, gendered, or classed norms or 
ideals regarding behaviour may also experience simultaneous processes of exclu-
sion and inclusion that make access to care insecure and limited. The case of Siv 
Tove Pedersen recounted in  Chapter 3 is a forceful example. Recently, the prac-
tice of deregularisation (through which an individual gradually or suddenly lose 
her legal status as a resident or citizen) has also been revived in a number of lib-
eral democratic states, including Norway, making migrants and their descendants 
holding presumably secure statuses more vulnerable to state’s power to deport 
( Brekke et al., 2020 ;  Gibney, 2020 ). Still, territorial presence on state territory for 
most citizens is not threatened the way it is for non-citizens. 
The perspective pursued in this book has been one through which sovereign 
decisionism is not necessarily regarded as associated with ‘the state’, meaning 
government or parliament, or exceptional circumstances, but is instead found in 
mundane institutional practices and procedures in which the decision is devolved 
upon various agents, including service providers. As such, the decisions on the 






norms, professional codes and knowledge, institutional frameworks, and so on 
( Dean, 2007 ). An ethnographic approach, in this context, offers a way to inves-
tigate the conditional nature of sovereign practices by providing a disaggregated 
view of the state ( Gupta, 2012 ;  Ong, 2006 ). It can thus shed light on how con-
tradicting norms, knowledges, practices, and values assigned to various human 
categories can produce a range of contingent and ambiguous outcomes through 
which forms of care can be negotiated for the politically excluded. For example, 
the ethnographic focus on how the sovereign decision is made within the context 
of healthcare has underscored the negotiated and conditional quality of these deci-
sions and, hence, the border in everyday practices and situations. Moreover, it has 
revealed that there was no single critical decision that defined the border; instead, 
multiple and dispersed decisions on the exception or (non)value of life constituted 
a central aspect of migrants’ precarious inclusion. 
The role of life, territory, and temporality in governing 
irregular migration 
An important aspect of this book involves the understanding that evaluations of 
irregular migrants’ lives are incorporated in regimes of care and control and that 
different rationalities and technologies of care and control employed in governing 
irregular migrants may contribute to precarious inclusion. How irregular migrants 
are increasingly cast as ‘undeserving’ in public discourse is widely commented 
upon within migration literature. Scholarly work has also shown how such cast-
ing, as well as the politics of migrant admission and incorporation, is shaped by 
gendered, racialised, ethnicised, and classed notions of innocence, dangerousness, 
and economic desirability ( Ticktin, 2016 ;  Guðjónsdóttir and Loftsdóttir, 2017 ). 
In Norway, over the past decades there has been growing effort to legally and 
discursively demarcate and formalise the category of ‘person without legal resi-
dence’ in contrast to ‘asylum seeker’. This has been related to significant changes 
in rejected asylum seekers’ access to healthcare, state accommodation, and eco-
nomic benefits. Not recognised as a worker, but rather cast as ‘the unproductive 
other’, the irregular migrant becomes a humanitarian concern, whereby surviv-
ability of the body becomes the grounds for compassion and care in the context 
of Norway. In humanitarian forms of reasoning, innocence and suffering is more 
highly valued than fiscal contributions. As such, humanitarianism projects on the 
migrants a life as victims, rather than as rights-bearing subjects. Yet, as  Fassin 
(2012 ) has suggested, the increased emphasis on deservingness and moral worth 
associated with the politics of compassion represented by humanitarianism makes 
policies more vulnerable to moral panic. 
In this book, I have suggested that the unstable, limited, and substandard care 
offered to irregular migrants maintains  precarious life rather than enabling live-
able life. It rests on a form of minimalist biopolitics ( Redfield, 2005 ) that allows 
for life to be preserved, if never quite cured or fully cared for. Care is thus sim-
ply offered to regulate the worst consequences of their lack of legal status for 







but substandard and exceptional care arrangements that contribute to precarity in 
the life of irregular migrants. What is significant about this form of care is that it 
demarcates the acceptability of a ‘lower threshold possibility of life’ ( Redfield, 
2005 , 330) than what has been the norm in the Norwegian welfare state. The 
commitment to equality in Norway has traditionally included not merely equal-
ity of opportunity and status but what some would call ‘equality of condition’, 
an equitable distribution of material resources so as to promote well-being and 
enable all members to pursue their own life projects (Lister, 2009). When it comes 
to irregular migrants, care has come to entail a parallel system in which urgent 
and basic assistance is available only when their very survival is at stake. The 
supposedly universal welfare state, in its distribution of care, has thereby increas-
ingly come to differentiate between lives. The centrality of humanitarian reason 
in governing migration has importantly served to reify the notion of the welfare 
state as compassionate and caring while simultaneously departing from the core 
norms and values of security, solidarity, and equality assumed to underpin the 
Nordic model of welfare. 
Within this system ostensibly based on equality, the hierarchisation of care 
is largely made possible by the distinction  territory, as an imaginary and legal 
mechanism, makes between lives. Even though irregular migrants are physically 
present on state territory, the spatial fixation of them as intruders has made them 
more socially legitimate to neglect. One of the main consequences of the Health-
care Regulation (2011 ) regulating irregular migrants’ access to healthcare in Nor-
way was that it established the person’s legal status as a criterion for judgement 
rather than simply prohibiting access to healthcare. Border control in the context 
of healthcare thus not only became about detecting and excluding migrants at the 
hospital’s doorstep but drew the territorial rationality of migration control into the 
diagnostic act itself in terms of deciding a course of treatment. 
Moreover, my examination has shown that this exclusionary result was not 
necessarily a given. The Norwegian welfare state has largely operated with ter-
ritorially based conceptions of membership, rather than a status-based one. Under 
the territorial conception of membership, rights are primarily determined by a per-
son’s territorial presence. In this sense, it repudiates the notion of differential lev-
els of inclusion based on various formal statuses under the law ( Bosniak, 2007 ). 
The main body of Norwegian welfare laws concerning health and social security 
uses the phrase ‘everyone residing in the Realm’ when defining the scope of the 
law. The actual laws do not distinguish between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ residents. The 
initial response to rejected asylum seekers and other irregularised migrants was 
thus more inclusive ( Mathiesen, 2002 ), and they are still considered to be equally 
included by the scope of important welfare legislations such as the Child Wel-
fare Act (1992 ), the  Education Act (1998 ), and the Act on  Crisis Shelters (2009 ) 
( Søvig, 2013b ). Accordingly, while all irregular migrants are banned by law from 
residing in the country, other areas of welfare law still offer some protection to 
subcategories of irregular migrants. 
Considering this, it is interesting to note how Norwegian authorities used a 









access to social benefits. Their rationale for this was that it would seem inconsis-
tent if the state granted full social benefits to a person who was denied residence 
by the immigration authorities. However, as argued by Andersen (2014 ), this 
would not be inconsistent from a strictly legal perspective. Norwegian admin-
istrative law is based on the so-called sectorial principle. This means that each 
administrative agency only relates to, and realises, the control purposes set out 
in the particular legal framework for the specific, relevant sector. Granting full 
welfare rights to irregular migrants in accordance with the purpose of the Social 
Services Act (2010) would thus be in line with the legal and administrative prin-
ciple of the welfare state, even if they contradict the Immigration Act (2008 ). 
In this sense, it can be argued that the inconsistency derived from the merging 
of these two legal and administrative fields. Nonetheless, problems would still 
emerge in practice, as both jurisdictions are exercised in and intimately tied to the 
same territory. This is what Noll (2010 ) has referred to as ‘the bundling effect of 
jurisdiction’, which means that irregular migrants cannot necessarily use welfare 
services without risking deportation. 
The difficulties in separating the jurisdictional domains of entry and rights in 
practice produce a simultaneity of inclusion and exclusion that makes irregular 
migrants’ access to care more precarious. This highlights how  temporalities are 
integral to governing irregular migration. What emerged as particularly relevant 
in the Norwegian case were the ways in which limited inclusion contributed to 
the institutionalisation of insecurity and temporariness. Inclusive practices either 
were being administered for a short-term period, such as through the emergency 
aid provision, or were constantly changing, such as with access to accommoda-
tion and economic support through the asylum reception system. The temporal 
imperatives of migration control also served to orient the medical gaze and prac-
tice towards the immediate present. This temporal focus, as shown in  Chapter 5 , 
has significant consequences for the care offered to irregular migrants. 
Precariously included in the welfare state 
In this book, I have proposed to conceptualise irregular migrants as precariously 
included in the welfare state, rather than as simply excluded from it. I under-
stand precarious inclusion as a feature of welfare states’ governing of irregular 
migration and as related to the challenges such states face reconciling the tension 
between their commitment to people’s basic security and the exclusionary prac-
tice of migration control. 
The Norwegian welfare state provides a particular context for examining sover-
eign exceptionalism. As part of the family of liberal democratic states, the Nordic 
states have inclined more towards maximising equality than maximising liberty 
( Brown, 2005 ), emphasising universal rights more than limited rule as the path-
way to freedom. Comparatively, they have been seen as more interventionist, 
where belief in social engineering and expert rule has played an important role in 
developing the strong welfare states (Slagstad, 2004). In Norway, research also 






capacity and the desirability of the state to solve problems ( Fimreite et al., 2013 ). 
As such, Norwegian society has been characterised as ‘state friendly’, and to a 
greater extent than elsewhere in Europe outside Scandinavia, the state has been, 
and still is, seen as an extension of society rather than as an adversary or threat 
( Wollebæk et al., 2012 ). In this context, the welfare project’s ideal of a public 
guaranteed justice has largely gone unquestioned across the political spectrum 
and within welfare state research ( Vike, 2004 ;  Slagstad, 2009 ;  Holst, 2009 ). When 
it comes to irregular migrants, however, the Norwegian welfare state does not 
necessarily stand out as particularly generous or caring. 
While the Norwegian welfare state has served as my focal point, I suggest that 
precarious inclusion as a strategy for governing irregular migration is not limited 
to the context of Norway. Everyday state practices that involve complementary 
and simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion can be found in many wel-
fare states. In some countries such as France and Italy, irregular migrants are 
legally granted access to public services such as healthcare and education but 
experience administrative and bureaucratic obstacles to access them ( Perna, 2019 ; 
Schweitzer, 2019 ;  Geeraert, 2018 ). In countries where irregular migrants are 
excluded from regular social provisions, additional and inferior safety nets have 
often been developed ( Spencer and Delvino, 2019 ). These services may be, as in 
the Netherlands, variously provided by state institutions, municipalities, or NGOs 
sanctioned or funded by the state ( Leerkes, 2016 ; Van der Leun, 2015 ). While 
these practices provide vital services for irregular migrants, they also contribute 
towards normalising their precarity. 
Precarious inclusion as a strategy of government may reconcile some of the 
tension between welfare states’ commitment to basic security and migration con-
trol in current migration regimes, but it is uncertain how long such a strategy can 
effectively be maintained. While regularisation, deportation, and rights without 
status are pragmatic approaches to the presence of irregular migrants within the 
existing political and economic order, they do not constitute a long-term solution 
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